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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ROBERT CARR BOYD JR.  Local public sector allocation of scarce emergency service 
assets: an evaluation of the fire service.  (Under the direction of DR. GARY RASSEL) 
 
 
The methodology utilized by public sector managers to allocate scarce resources 
determines the level, efficiency, and effectiveness of service delivery.   These decisions 
are influenced by a myriad of factors, not the least of which is the ideal goal to distribute 
services in a fair and equitable manner.  This ideal becomes problematic if service 
outcomes are important to public decision-makers, because the level of need for these 
resources is not spread equally across local jurisdictions.  Therefore, when goods and 
services are located or distributed equally to all “customers,” many do not receive nough 
assistance and others receive more than they prefer.  This causes inefficient service 
delivery that fails to maximize potential positive outcomes with the available imited 
resources.  This is particularly true with the geographic distribution of fire se vice 
resources across most communities in this country. 
This research effort attempts to model the demographic characteristics that drive 
emergency service demand and workload across local jurisdictions.  Specifically, data 
about demographic characteristics was collected at the Census block group level and 
compared to emergency response data collected by the Charlotte Fire Department.  The 
findings from this effort are promising, as the bivariate correlation and multivariate 
regression analyses indicate that economic and structural factors common to all local 
communities can be used to confidently predict demand and workload on local public 
safety systems.  Measuring these characteristics at the block group level ermitted the 
opportunity to isolate homogenous groups within the population that have risk 
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characteristics associated with more or less demand for these service.  These findings 
provide a solid base to support the development of an alternative model for locating these 
critical emergency resources according to demand and workload to better meet the n eds 
of individual communities. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
                                                                                                               
 Local public sector emergency services are critical to the quality of life 
experienced in every community across the country.  Each community, no matter its size 
has some type of police and fire protection.  As the size of the community increases, the 
distribution of these services becomes more complex.  The ideals of the public sector are 
to deliver services equitably and fairly to constituents; however, scarcity creates a real 
paradox for public safety managers, who must contend with it while also providing 
effective services.  The generally accepted methodology to locate fire service assets is 
based on response time benchmarks.  Utilizing a response time benchmark to guide 
locational decisions spreads resources evenly across a defined jurisdiction, which meets 
the ideal criteria set forth above for the public sector to deliver goods fairly (Kuehnert, 
1999).  Unfortunately, treating all parts of a population the same disenfranchises those 
with more need, places people at greater risk, and increases inequality.  To date, few if 
any emergency service organizations have explored the factors that drive demand for 
these resources to guide locational decisions that might improve service delivery.  Th  
following research effort will analyze demographic population characteristics and 
emergency service demand to build an alternative model to better inform decisions 
regarding allocation of these scarce emergency resources.  
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1.1 Background 
 The redistribution of resources in the form of public services is a primary function 
of local governments.  Public goods and services contribute to the functionality and 
quality of life found within local communities by filling the service gaps left vacant by 
the private sector.  All levels of government utilize tax authority to raise rev nue and then 
distribute the funds in the form of goods and services.  In general, the goods and services 
provided by government are those that the market fails to supply or under supplies.  
Delivering services associated with public safety is a primary responsibility of all levels 
of government, but it is the local level that has the most visible and direct impact in 
protecting citizens (Mikesell, 1999).  Police, fire, and emergency medical services are 
most closely associated with local public safety.  The location of public safety assets 
within a community is critical to the level of service effectiveness and efficiency that can 
be achieved.  Local bureaucrats and elected officials charged with locating these scarce 
resources are challenged to maximize outputs and minimize community risk related to 
emergency events. 
When citizens access the emergency 911 system in most communities, they are 
essentially playing an emergency resource lottery, where the odds of receiving a timely 
response may not be in their favor.  Most local emergency systems in the United States 
do not prioritize responses based on incident severity or locate limited emergency 
resources based on demand.  Instead, emergency resources respond based on a “first 
come, first serve” algorithm.  These limited resources are often distributed evenly 
throughout communities to minimize response times (Barr & Caputo, 2003; Blackstone, 
Buck, & Hakim, 2005; Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  In theory, this system for locating nd 
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responding to emergencies does not advantage or disadvantage any one person within a 
community.  Unfortunately, the reality of these systems is much different, becaus  this 
allocation strategy creates a lottery like system in which responders may or may not be 
available to respond in an expedient manner to an emergency situation.  The goal of this 
project is to develop an alternative model to guide allocation decisions for locating 
limited emergency resources throughout the local community environment.  This model 
will be based on locating resources in a manner that increases the probability that an 
emergency resource is available to respond in a timely fashion to citizens suffering life 
threatening events.  This requires evaluating demographic and emergency response data 
to predict demand and incident severity for emergency services at the neighborhood level 
(Gyimah-Brempong, 1989).    
Local government bureaucrats and elected officials are under constant pressure to 
provide more services with fewer resources.  The public perceives government as 
operating inefficiently and often ineffectively (Citrin, 1974; Wood & Waterman, 1994).  
Whether this is true or not, the ways in which government redistributes limited resourc  
to meet policy initiatives is often controversial.  The private market has self-correcting 
mechanisms, “the invisible hand,” that encourages effective and efficient private sector 
operations (Walsh, 1998).  Similar market forces do not exist in the public sector to reign 
in waste and ineffective methods.  Government, by and large, provides services that the
market will not provide on its own.  Because of this, most government services are 
monopolies, which does not discourage or penalize the delivery of inefficient, and at 
times ineffective, services (Bergstrom, 1979; Savas, 2000).  The public can hold electe
officials accountable through the electoral process, but most local officials serve two or 
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four year terms.  This diminishes the opportunity for voters to gain instant gratification at 
the voting booth.  Even when elected officials are voted out of office for presiding over 
and enabling inefficient services, the bureaucrats within the government structure more 
often than not remain static (Bergstrom, 1979; Wood, 1998).  Therefore, more efficient 
and effective service delivery depends on the decision making processes and values of 
bureaucrats and elected officials.  Whether or not these decision-making processes and 
values align with the social norms within a community is often a source of debate. 
Public safety is a significant part of the service package delivered by local 
governments.  Fire, police, and emergency medical services contribute to the public’s 
perception of overall safety.   Police agencies focus singularly on law enforcment 
activities, which separates them from organizations that provide fire protection.  The 
modern fire service is no longer focused on the singular mission of extinguishing fires.  
The mission of most fire departments is multi-dimensional and includes responding to 
fires, emergency medical incidents, hazardous materials emergencies, and rescue 
situations.  As more types of emergency services are delivered to local communities by 
the fire service, the efficient allocation of scarce resources becomes paramount to 
effective service delivery (Granito, 2003).   
The fire service has long been a second tier industry among federal, state, and 
local government.  It garners little political or public attention but is an integral part of 
every community in the United States.  Most residents believe they will never need the 
fire department, making it easy to overlook this industry.  Oversight and research into the 
fire service is minimal, which leaves the industry as a whole unaccountable for achieving 
its core missions (Donahue, 2004b; Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  Politicians give little 
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attention to the fire service because problems within fire departments rarely cost a 
politician political capital.  Improvements in building construction and private fire 
suppression systems over the past three decades have contributed to reduced fire rat s, 
but researchers have not found valid evidence to link these drops to changes in fire 
service operations.  An evaluation of the fire service conducted by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1973 reported the depleted state of this 
industry in a document titled “America Burning,” but many of the problems mentioned n 
the report, such as insufficient emergency resources, still plague today’s fire service.   
The continued depletion of this industry is further supported by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (2008), which reported in 2005 that direct monetary fire losses 
exceeded $10 billion annually with indirect losses estimated at more than $40 billion.  
These numbers often exceed the total monetary losses attributed to all natural disasters 
combined each year, which contextualizes the impact of fire losses across the country in 
context. 
Traditionally, public sector managers have claimed that to deliver effective 
emergency services, a large number of capital assets carefully located throughout a 
jurisdiction were required.  In addition to having sufficient assets, delivering effective 
emergency services requires that the proper emergency resource, whether it be an
ambulance, fire truck, or police officer, arrives at an incident fast enough to prevent the 
escalation of an emergency event (Granito, 2003; Rider, 1979).  Community problems 
public safety services are expected to resolve can be time sensitive.  A timesensitive 
situation is one that continues to worsen every minute that goes by without definitive 
action to mitigate the event.  The location of emergency resources within a community, 
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no matter the community size, impacts service delivery and incident outcomes (Watt , 
2003).  Small or rural communities usually operate public safety services from a central 
location.  Often times the location is something that cannot be changed, but in larger 
urban and suburban communities emergency resource location decisions are more fluid 
(Hirsch, 1959).   
The location of fire station facilities is often fixed; however, urban administrators 
are frequently forced by economic and/or structural factors to evaluate the n ed for new 
stations, the need to shut down existing stations, and/or the need to relocate emergency 
assets to other stations to maintain sufficient coverage. Unlike other local government 
services, the basic mission of a public safety organization is to protect life and property.  
Fire, police, and emergency medical agencies that do not maximize their limit d 
resources will struggle to meet this critical mission (Rider, 1979).   
When allocating fire, emergency medical, or police services it is necessary to 
permit some level of inefficiency to account for uncertainty (Smith, Greenblatt, & 
Mariani, 2008).  Emergency situations that tax available public safety resource, su h as 
disaster events, do not occur often enough to justify maintaining a large number of 
reserve resources at a constant state of readiness to manage these chance vents.  
However, local jurisdictions still must find a balance between having enough resourc  to 
meet moments of exceptional demand, with respect to average demand for these services.  
On any given day, call volume for fire, police, and emergency medical services can spike, 
and without some reserve resources to manage such situations, a public safety system is 
quickly rendered ineffective (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002; Watts, 2003).   
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Many communities lack the resources to provide sufficient emergency service to 
meet even average call volume demand.  This issue plagues the fire service, and raises 
the question of how these agencies can better locate resources to maximize service 
delivery.  Simply distributing these scarce resources throughout a community without 
regard for risk factors associated with demand is detrimental to service delivery.  Local 
emergency service agencies often struggle to determine the number of resources 
necessary to manage average demand or to even allocate available resources to their 
greatest good.  It does not take a catastrophic event for emergency service requests to 
overwhelm the available public safety resources.  Extreme weather conditions, civil 
unrest, holiday celebrations, and other large public gatherings can become a catalyst for 
increased demand on these systems.  In addition, emergency systems often experi ce 
unexplained periods of increased requests for assistance over a short duration that stress 
the system’s resources, jeopardizing timely responses to time-sensitive events.  These 
situations are impossible to predict with certainty, making them difficult to plan for when 
allocating emergency resources (Coulter, 1979).  However, emergency service managers 
who allocate these scarce resources more effectively ensure their agencies are b tter 
prepared to respond when demand does increase unexpectedly. 
1.2 Problem Statement: Distribution of Scarce Resources 
All local communities struggle to allocate scarce emergency assets in a ma ner 
that maintains an acceptable level of efficiency while also providing effective service 
delivery.  Two extreme models exist for allocating emergency resources with the first 
maximizing efficiency and the second maximizing effectiveness.  As most ec nomists 
argue, it is rarely smart to maximize anything, which is evident when comparing these 
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two allocation models (Heyne, 1997).  The most efficient and least effective model to 
disburse these scarce assets utilizes one centrally located facility from which all 
emergency resources respond.  This is extremely efficient because cost  are kept low by 
maintaining only one facility.  However, the effectiveness of this deployment strategy 
decreases steadily as the size of a community increases, because response times grow.  In 
contrast, the least efficient but most effective strategy is to place a fire station on every 
street corner.  Low response times would improve emergency incident outcomes, but the 
costs associated with such a strategy would be exorbitant.  Because emergency resources 
are scarce, it is necessary to find middle ground between efficiency and effectiv n ss 
based on citizen preferences and budget constraints (McAllister, 1976).   
Evaluating emergency service effectiveness is challenging because many different 
performance measures are used throughout this industry, including average response 
time, monetary losses, cost per response, and number of injuries and deaths.  These 
measures can prove problematic to improving service delivery, as it is unclear how valid 
and reliable they are for assessing service delivery effectiveness (Ammons, 2001; 
Kopczynski & Lombardo, 1999; Rivenbark, Ammons, & Roenigk, 2007).  In addition, 
such measures provide an incentive to public sector managers to maximize these 
indicators for service delivery to make the agency appear more effective, which is often 
detrimental to more important issues related to service outcomes (Lipsky, 1980).  For 
example, decreasing response times throughout a community may add exorbitant cost 
with minimal benefits to protecting life and property.  However, the reduced response 
time becomes the focus, so the principals (elected officials and public) believe the service 
is better, when that is likely not the case.  Developing a valid strategy to ration 
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emergency service assets is a real challenge because of the dynamic political and 
structural environments that influence these decision making processes (Heyne, 1997).                                               
The expanded emergency services mission requires public safety agencies to 
prepare for and respond to many different types of emergency situations, which 
complicates the process of finding valid measures to assess service delivery efficiency 
and effectiveness.  It is no longer acceptable to evaluate fire departments solely based on 
fire rates and fire losses occurring in a community, because a departmnt’s ability to 
lower fire rates and reduce damage is now impacted by the other services provided.  Fire 
resources responding to medical emergencies or hazardous material leaks re not 
available to respond to simultaneous fire incidents.  The number of fire events most 
departments respond to annually is on the decline, while the demand for emergency 
medical assistance, hazardous materials incidents, and rescue responses is incr asing 
(Brudney & Duncombe, 1992).  As a fire department expands its service delivery 
platform, its resources are more thinly spread throughout a community (Donahue, 
2000b).  This places more emphasis on the location of emergency service assets.  
Increasing demand for emergency services essentially reduces the numbr of available 
assets, which raises the chance of citizens being adversely affected by fire, medical, or 
other emergency situations.  For example: 
 
It is a Sunday evening on the eastside of a large city, where the 
population is predominately lower income.  The fire stations in this general 
area, as in the rest of the city, are spaced geographically to minimize 
response times.  Fire and emergency services in this particular part of the 
city experience increased service demand over other areas, which reduces 
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emergency resource capacity to those living and working in this part of the 
community.  On this night, three of the fire companies assigned to the 
eastside are on medical emergencies in their respective response zones.  
One of these units, ladder 223, has responded to a medical emergency in a 
nursing facility located on the outer edge of its response zone.  Soon after 
clearing from this incident, the ladder is dispatched with four other fire 
apparatus to check a report of smoke in a neighborhood.  This 
neighborhood is located in the primary response zone of one of the fire units 
that is currently tied up on a medical situation.  Ladder 223 and the other 
responding fire apparatus have an extended response time to the incident.  
On arrival, Ladder 223 finds a two-story residential structure with the 
attached garage and one side of the house heavily involved in fire.  
Fortunately, the incident is mitigated with significant property loss, but no 
loss of life.  However, while the fire and emergency medical resources in 
this part of the city were responding to numerous incidents, stations in other 
parts of the city that do not experience similar demand were sitting idle.       
 
The decision-making process for locating emergency resources in most 
communities is guided by response time benchmarks.  If followed, these benchmarks 
place an emergency unit or station within a certain distance of every part of a community.  
This equal distribution of resources is viewed as the most fair and effective method to 
protect a jurisdiction (Ammons, 2001).  Other measures to evaluate performance either 
do not exist or are not widely used by the fire service.  The industry has failed to devel p 
reliable and valid measures that correlate with saving lives and property to guide service 
delivery models.  For example, the Commission on Fire Accreditation developed a self-
evaluation mechanism for fire departments to measure service delivery inputs a d 
outputs.  This is a popular mechanism used to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of 
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fire department resources but, similar to fire standards published by the Insurance 
Services Organization (ISO) and National Fire Protection Administration (NFPA), it fails 
to contend with local budget constraints and the numerous service delivery platforms 
provided by these departments to mitigate a myriad of emergency events (Granito, 2003). 
In accordance with the Insurance Services Organization (ISO) and National Fire 
Protection Administration (NFPA), fire service managers and local decision-makers 
allocate emergency resources based on geographical constraints to limit risk (Swersey & 
Ignall, 1991).  The singular focus on response times often ignores risk factors present in a 
community that correlate to emergency service demand.  In other words, where in a 
community, based on building characteristics and population characteristics, is demand 
for emergency services going to be greatest?  Assuming community risk characteristics 
correlate with demand for emergency services, public leaders may be capable of locating 
their limited emergency resources more effectively to enhance service del v ry.  The 
Department of Homeland Security recognized the value of assessing risk and now 
allocates resources to local communities based on their risk of suffering a terrorism event.  
This has proven to be a more effective and efficient method to distribute grant money 
(Willis, Morral, Kelly, & Medby, 2005).  Communities identified to be at greater risk for 
suffering a terrorist attack receive the bulk of resources.  Although not a foolpro f 
method to distribute resources, it does offer the federal government a tool to identify and 
rank communities according to need.  Many decision-makers in communities deemed low 
risk have complained that the distribution of funds is not fair; however, it is more 
equitable as risk from terrorist events is effectively normalized across ommunities. 
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Allocating local emergency resources based on community risk characteristi s has 
garnered little attention from decision-makers, who continue to subscribe to 
geographically driven methods based on response time criteria (Cubbin, LeClere, & 
Smith, 2000b).  This method calls for distributing limited resources in a manner that 
reduces response times to every part of a defined geographical area to the exent possible.  
On the surface, this allocation strategy appears ideal because it does not, to the 
uninformed observer, favor any particular area within a community.  However, locating 
emergency resources equally throughout a community based on response time 
benchmarks disenfranchises high demand areas while “over-protecting” low deman  
areas.  In addition, once units begin responding to emergency incidents, gaps in service 
are created across a jurisdiction (Blackstone et al., 2005).   
Therefore, guiding locational decisions by predicting demand based on 
demographic characteristics is likely to be a more productive allocation strategy, because 
more resources would be targeted to higher demand areas to improve service delivery 
outcomes (Gyimah-Brempong, 1989).  Allocating emergency resources is challenging, 
especially when accounting for budget, political, and social constraints within a 
community.   However, considering variables associated with increased or decreased isk 
in different areas of a community could provide decision-makers with valid information 
to help drive locational decisions to improve service delivery.   
Evaluating community risk as it relates to the services provided by many fire 
departments is complicated by the high level of uncertainty synonymous with predicting 
demand for emergency services.  No sure method exists to determine where the next fir , 
hazardous material leak, or medical emergency will occur or what its magnitude will be.  
13 
 
 
However, it is likely community demographic and structural variables are associ ted with 
an increased or decreased probability of such events occurring (Cubbin et al, 2000b).  For 
example, a section of a city with a dense population of lower income persons living in 
wood framed apartment buildings is more likely to sustain a fire event than a business 
district consisting of concrete structures.  Wood buildings are at greater isk for fire than 
concrete buildings and lower income persons tend to invest less in private fire protection 
system, such as smoke detectors or alarm systems.  However, the likelihood of a fire
event occurring and the timing of such an event remain highly uncertain.  Still, it is 
possible to calculate risk with factors of uncertainty as a method to betterguid  
emergency resource allocation (Gamache, 2003).   
1.3 Purpose of Research 
Emergency service resources are scarce, which makes it problematic to allo ate 
these assets equally across a community and expect all citizens to receive sufficient 
service delivery.  A strategy to allocate these resources that fails to recognize this reality 
will inevitably disenfranchise a greater part of the population (Heyne, 1997).  In general, 
those who reside closer to fire stations and other emergency facilities are advantaged over 
those who live farther away.  Similarly, locational decisions for parks and schools 
disadvantage some citizens based on the travel time required to the public facility 
(McAllister, 1976).  Fire stations are spaced throughout most urban environments to 
minimize emergency apparatus response times, which is the time from when a call for 
assistance is received to the time when a unit arrives at the location of the emergency 
incident (Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  Citizens do not bring their emergency situations to a 
public safety facility, emergency workers must respond to the incident location.   
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Distance to the emergency scene has long been the measure for making fire service 
locational decisions in an effort to minimize response times (Achabal, 1978; Kuehnert, 
1999).  These decisions are predicated on the notion that the faster emergency personnel 
and equipment arrive on scene, the greater the opportunity to protect life and property 
(Meislin, Conn, Conroy, & Tibbits, 1999; Watts, 2003).  The fact that demand for fire 
and emergency services differs depending on the social and structural characteristics in 
the urban environment is often ignored (Lerner, Nichol, Spaite, Garrison, & Maio, 2007).  
It is arguably less equitable to spread emergency resources equally throughout a city in an 
effort to minimize response times to all areas within a jurisdiction because deman  is not 
equally distributed.  Predicting demand could afford decision makers the ability to locate 
resources closer to those who have more need and could benefit more often from reduced 
response times.  However, the current model ignores population characteristics in favor 
of equal distribution. 
The number of emergency resources in most communities is often insufficient to 
keep pace with demand, a problem that is exacerbated each time a service is added to  
fire department’s response platform (Granito, 2003).  For example, fire departm nts that 
add emergency medical response to their service delivery platform will increase the 
workload demand on the existing resources.  If more resources are not added to meet the 
new demand, the community is placed at increased risk.  More responses per unit will 
subsequently reduce each unit’s availability to respond to additional calls for service that 
may occur in its response area.  Fire incidents are on the decline so public administrators 
are searching for ways to justify the cost of maintaining these resources.  This has 
increased the pressure on the fire service to respond to other types of emergency 
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situations, such as emergency medical incidents, hazardous material releases, r scue 
events, and a myriad of other incident types (Donahue, 2004a).  This increases the 
measured outputs of fire departments, which helps to justify existing inputs.   
These service delivery changes have not been accompanied by innovative 
methods to better allocate emergency assets.  For example, most urban fire departments 
respond in the same manner to all calls for service without considering whether these 
specialized limited emergency resources will make a difference in the outcome of the 
incident.  Many decision-makers and the public in general are under the impression that 
any time a call to the 911 system is made a true life-threatening emergency requiring a 
rapid response by emergency personnel exists.  In fact, this is far from the truth.  A study 
by Blackstone et al. (2005) found that in 2000, 96% of the fire alarms responded to by the 
Philadelphia Fire Department were false, meaning there was no fire or emergency found 
when emergency personnel arrived.  This statistic represents a trend that, at the very least, 
should inspire change in how resources are allocated.   
The costs of responding to false alarms or other non-emergent incidents are 
incalculable.  Direct costs associated with an emergency response include personnel, fuel 
for the apparatus, equipment, training, maintenance, and wear and tear on equipment, 
which are essentially wasted when emergency resources respond to non-emergent events.  
The opportunity cost and economic cost associated with these responses can be 
detrimental to a community (Blackstone et al., 2005).  This issue was highlighted in 
Pinellas County, Florida, a community where three fire and medical apparatus responded 
to all emergency medical calls regardless of severity.  The county administrator for 
Pinellas estimated that millions of dollars could be saved each year by limiting the 
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response to non-urgent medical incidents to one unit.  The Director of the County’s EMS 
and Fire administration described the emergency resource allocation strategy as “crazy.”  
He also said, “It’s risking people’s lives.  It’s wasting people’s money.  It’s not 
necessary” (Van Sant, April 28, 2008).  A declining local economy and strained budget 
were catalysts for the Pinellas county decision-makers to identify this issue.  
Unfortunately, many local communities have failed to recognize such inefficiencies and 
continue to arbitrarily allocate their limited emergency resources without regard to risk.   
Requests for emergency services vary widely in number and severity across local 
communities.  In general, as the severity of an incident increases, it becomes more time-
sensitive and more resources are required to mitigate the situation.  As the Pinellas 
County example shows, most urban fire departments do not triage or alter response 
protocols based on incident severity.  Instead, the worst is always assumed until 
definitively proven otherwise after emergency personnel arrive on scene.  This 
methodology leads to ineffective and inefficient service delivery, because no local 
community has the resources to affect such a response strategy.  For example, what 
happens when a fire apparatus that is located strategically to protect a specified 
geographic area is dispatched to a patient with a minor laceration to the hand?  The truck, 
because the fire service treats all customers the same, speeds out the door with lights and 
sirens operating to meet response time criteria generated by outside organizations to this 
non-emergent event.  This places more people at risk than can benefit from the rapid 
response and potentially disenfranchises others who have more urgent needs. 
When units respond with urgency to incidents using emergency warning devices, 
the capital asset is at greater risk of being damaged, not to mention the human 
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investments on the truck and the general public which are placed at increased risk by th  
unnecessary emergency response.  Each year more than 25% of line of duty deaths 
among firefighters are attributed to motor vehicle collisions that occur whileresponding 
to or returning from emergency scenes.  A study conducted by Solomon and King (1995) 
in 1990 found that the 11,325 motor vehicle collisions in the United States involving fire 
apparatus caused more than 1,300 firefighter injuries.  80% of these incidents occurred 
while the fire apparatus was responding emergency traffic to an incident.  It is clear from 
accident data and research that emergency responders are most at risk while responding 
emergency traffic to incidents (Colwell, Pons, Blanchet, & Mangino 1999; Ho & 
Linquest 2001).  What makes this situation a travesty is that only a small percentage of 
calls for assistance are truly emergent, where the outcome can be influenced by th  
minute or so saved by responding with lights and siren (Ho & Linquest 2001).  The 
increased danger and potential costs associated with fire apparatus responding in 
emergency mode raises the issue of diminishing returns.   
Few situations are positively impacted by a time sensitive emergency rsponse.  
The outcome of the vast majority of requests for emergency assistance will not be altered 
by arriving a few minutes sooner (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002).  At the same time, a 
minute can be the difference in the outcome of certain situations.  Few emergency 
agencies recognize this distinction.  Instead, they continue to deploy resources evenly 
throughout communities without regard for demand or incident severity.  Consensus 
standards and insurance industry recommendations for response time benchmarks and 
emergency service locational priorities do not account for risk factors or utilize 
probability analysis to predict the likelihood of emergency events.  Instead, public leaders 
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attempt to provide these life-saving programs equally across geographical areas.  The 
service delivery strategy is the same for the entire community population, yet within a 
population many different risk factors are present that affect emergency srvice demand 
(Southwick & Butler, 1985).  The unwillingness to tailor deployment and response 
strategies to specific groups within the overall society generates inefficiency and can 
delay the arrival of resources to time-sensitive events. 
Another cost factor often overlooked is the marginal cost associated with reducing 
an agency’s average response time.  Each second the response time is decreased in a fire 
service system that allocates resources equally throughout a geographic region inflicts a 
large cost on the taxpayer, because many additional emergency resources must be placed 
into service for this marginal benefit.  It is beneficial to lower response times to certain 
types of emergency incidents (Coleman, 2007).  However, a deployment model that does 
not prioritize responses based on call severity cannot improve response times to life-
threatening incidents without also improving response times to non-emergent events,
which is inefficient.  This requires an enormous commitment of resources, where costs 
will dramatically exceed benefits.  It is more efficient to respond to only the life-
threatening emergencies with urgency, because it reduces marginal costs and improves 
the benefit-cost service delivery ratio. 
Unfortunately, public sector decision-makers fail to grasp the inefficiency 
associated with directing programs to reduce risk and save lives toward large 
heterogeneous groups (Walsh, 1998).  One size does not fit all, and failing to 
acknowledge this places emergency service decision-makers between the proverbial 
“rock and a hard place” when determining how to allocate limited resources.  
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Government officials want to treat every life the same, but each person’s likelihood of 
requiring time-sensitive assistance from a local emergency services agency is different 
(Rhoads, 1999).  Individual characteristics influence risk levels for being involved in a 
fire or car wreck, suffering a heart attack, or any of a myriad of emergent situations based 
on personal habits and lifestyles.  At the same time, providing certain groups within a 
society more services than other groups creates an unpalatable situation for most 
politicians and public sector leaders who do not want the public to think they favor one 
group within the community over others (Feiock, 1986).  Therefore, policy initiatives are 
developed to treat all members of a society the same, which is problematic at the servic  
delivery level.  This strategy fails to match demand with available resources (Hammitt & 
Treich, 2007).   
 This situation is exacerbated when public sector decision-makers fail to 
recognize the difference between a statistical life and an identified life, which impedes 
their willingness to customize resource allocation strategies based on the differing group 
characteristics that drive demand across local communities.  Treating every life as an 
identified life leads to the belief that no amount of resources should be spared to save a 
life, ignoring the opportunity cost associated with programs that subscribe to this ideal.  
The resources are simply not available to treat every individual the same, because this 
disenfranchises others in the society.  Local emergency service agencies will n ver have 
the resources to save everyone (Jenni & Leowenstein, 1997; Viscusi, 1993).  Yet, most 
public sector leaders want to pretend that government programs can save every life.  For 
example, during a congressional hearing, “Congressman David Obey (D-Wisc.) stated, 
‘Quite frankly, I believe that when you’re dealing in questions related to human life, 
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economic costs are irrelevant’” (Rhoads, 1999, 18).  The unwillingness to evaluate 
opportunity cost, marginality, and distinguish between statistical and identifiable l ves 
when developing policy is far more harmful than taking a more utilitarian approach.   
The goal of any emergency service allocation model should be to save the most 
lives possible with the available resources.  Allocating public goods and services to save 
every identifiable life disenfranchises society as a whole.  Programs to save lives must be 
evaluated based on statistics, where the actual persons saved are not identifiable until 
after they have been rescued.  This is a difficult concept for most, which explains why 
programs to reduce risk are, for the most part, inefficient and ineffective (Walsh, 1998).  
Public sector leaders also fear the possibility of the “false negative” wh n allocating 
scarce resources based on statistical trends, because there is an undisclosed error factor 
with these calculations.  Even if an allocation strategy correctly predicts incident severity 
95% of the time, it is the 5% error that will draw the public’s ire.  This issue goes back to 
Munger’s (2000) assessment of the policy process, which rightly points out that “...good 
decisions can turn out bad and bad decisions can turn out good.”  Statistical analysis 
provides a means to make intelligent allocation decisions; however, the influence of 
politics on these decisions plays an important role that will be addressed by this research.                                 
1.4 Overview of Research Study 
 It is theorized that demographic and structural characteristics found across local 
communities are associated with demand for emergency services.  Therefore, this 
research study will analyze hypothesized relationships between numerous explanatory 
demographic variables at the block group level and dependent demand variables to better 
inform resource allocation decisions for these scarce emergency resources.  Predicting 
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emergency service demand is complicated and fraught with pitfalls that can thre ten the 
validity of findings, because the emergency service environment is extremely dynamic 
and, in many ways, unpredictable.  For example, it is one thing to associate demographic 
characteristics with overall demand, but isolating these relationships to only time-
sensitive situations presents numerous challenges.  The majority of emergency 911 
requests are for situations that are not time sensitive, but predicting these and then 
filtering them out is problematic.  However, the development of a model to predict, with 
a high level of certainty, the general location and severity of emergency incidents based 
on demographic characteristics could substantially improve service delivery.  Based on 
these criteria, emergency units would no longer be blindly allocated to equalize 
distribution across a community but could target high demand/risk areas to maximize the 
likelihood of positive incident outcomes.   
 Such a model would facilitate better, more predictable service delivery across a 
community.  To accomplish this, block group level demographic data will be collected 
and compared to emergency service demand measures found in the city of Charlotte, 
N.C.  The block group characteristics that most strongly predict demand and incident 
severity can then be associated with unit availability.  The goal is to produce an 
alternative resource allocation model guided by demand and incident severity, rather th n 
response time benchmarks. 
To perform this analysis, the city of Charlotte, North Carolina will serve as the 
research area.  Response data collected for fire, EMS, hazardous materials, and rescue 
incidents by the Charlotte Fire Department during fiscal year 2006 is the data set.  This 
emergency response data will be combined with Census block group information 
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collected in 2006 through the Charlotte Neighborhood Quality of Life Survey and U.S. 
Census Bureau, which assembled demographic information about each of the 331 block 
groups within the city.  The available data will be used to model the existing emer ency 
services environment and allocation decisions based on demographic risk characteristics.  
As cities like Charlotte continue to grow both in land mass and population, there is more 
pressure placed on decision-makers to carefully evaluate where best to relocate xisting 
resources or locate new emergency service facilities to maximize service outcomes.  A 
detailed analysis of the emergency environment and its relationship to emergency 
resource allocation under budgetary constraints is critical to such decisions if they are 
going to be effective in meeting the mission of these public safety agencies. 
Modeling emergency service demand based on demographic and structural risk 
characteristics could significantly alter how resources are located throughout urban and 
suburban environments. It is also possible that the analysis will provide scientifically 
driven findings to support the continued use of existing models for deploying limited 
emergency resources.  Regardless, the information will be valuable to public sector 
decision-makers to either justify existing locational strategies or support a change in 
deployment methodology. 
  These potential changes include new methods to deploy limited emergency 
resources and improve public finance decisions.  A more efficient method to deploy 
resources with the same or better outcomes could decrease budget line items, fre ing up 
funds for other community needs.  Again, the purpose of the emergency services is to 
first prevent loss of life and then to reduce property damage, so a deployment strat gy 
that either reduces cost without negatively impacting loss of life and property or one that 
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maintains existing funding levels but leads to fewer losses can be considered more 
efficient and effective.  Budgetary constraints must be factored into any emerg ncy 
resource allocation model, because each local community has a different funding 
capacity.  A one size fits all model, as espoused by ISO and NFPA, is not realistic for 
most local communities (Granito, 2003).  Therefore, a new deployment model based on 
risk characteristics and probability has the potential to enhance emergency servi e
outputs based on existing structural and economic conditions.   
Assessing the decision making processes used to allocate emergency resources 
and the exogenous factors that influence these issues will provide additional insight i to 
the factors that enable or prevent public services from operating efficiently and 
effectively.  A myriad of outcome measures have been established to determine the 
effectiveness of emergency services at the local level, but it is unclear wh ther these 
measures translate into the optimal provision of these services.  The obvious trade-offs in 
efficient and effective service delivery must be balanced with the overall welfare of a 
community.  The fire service provides an ideal opportunity to research how locational 
decisions impact service delivery for public safety organizations.                                    
1.5 Summary 
Providing effective and efficient public safety services is a priority for m st local 
government decision-makers.  A large percentage of the tax dollars collected at th  local 
level are devoted to emergency services to limit risk of injury, death, and property loss 
associated with unexpected events (Coe, 1983).  Budgetary constraints, societal priorities, 
exogenous institutions, and the political environment dictate the service level and 
location of these critical services within a community.  No community can afford the 
24 
 
 
resources necessary to be risk free, so the limited emergency resources that are available 
must be located and deployed methodically to maximize risk reduction.  However, 
current allocation models ignore demographic and structural characteristi s a sociated 
with demand, instead focusing locational decisions on response time benchmarks 
(Ammons, 2001).   
The intent of this dissertation is to evaluate the allocation model supported by the 
NFPA and ISO to locate fire and emergency medical resources within urban communities 
and whether these decisions match characteristics associated with risk and demand for 
emergency services.  Response time benchmarks and resource capacity espoused by 
NFPA and ISO do not consider the substantial differences in economic and social 
capacity found across local communities (Granito, 2003).  Few, if any, communities have 
the resource capacity to fund and support the infrastructure required to meet NFPA and 
ISO standards for emergency service delivery.  Instead, communities of all sizes must 
grapple with where to locate limited emergency resources to provide the most effectiv  
and efficient service outcomes possible.  A model that accounts for emergency servie
demand and risk characteristics to guide the allocation of limited emergency resources 
could significantly improve service delivery outcomes, saving many lives and preventing 
unnecessary property losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Decision-makers often struggle to determine where to locate public facilities 
because so many variables are at play that affect these decisions.  Public facilities, such 
as libraries, parks, water and waste treatment plants, maintenance faciliti s, police and 
fire stations, landfills, and jails to name a few, are essential to a functionig community.  
The type of facility often determines whether or not citizens want it loca ed near their 
homes.  The “not in my back yard” problem is just one issue public decision-makers 
contend with when constructing new facilities.  Citizens and neighborhood groups often 
lobby to receive parks or libraries, but few want the waste water treatment plant.  The 
public facility locational literature is full of these examples, but also deals with how 
location decisions affect service delivery.   
 There are costs and benefits associated with where public facilities are loc ted.  
For example, a fire station may reduce the risk of fire in an area but increase th  noise 
pollution.  Fire stations are best described as “site-preferred facilities,” which are public 
facilities that provide greater benefits the closer one is located to the facility (Austin, 
1974).  Citizens must balance their preferences for public safety services with the 
potential cost when supporting or protesting such facilities.  Emergency situations are 
often time-sensitive, so as one’s distance from these facilities increase the potential 
benefits decrease.  Citizens may not want a fire station in their neighborhood, but witho t 
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such a facility citizens assume more risk for fire and other emergency situations (Felder 
& Brinkmann, 2002).  However, there is more to consider when locating emergency 
service facilities than just response times, such as demand and ability to pay for these 
services.  In the case of emergency services, demand and socioeconomic status tend to 
have an inverse relationship, meaning lower income areas have higher demand for these 
services (Gramache, 2003; Southwick & Butler, 1985).  This challenges local decision-
makers to balance locational decisions between those with the ability to pay and those 
who have more demand for the services.  To further complicate these issues, most 
communities operate fire stations that were built many decades ago and cannot be moved 
to address current societal needs.  Locating these facilities to ensure effectiv  and 
efficient service delivery is extremely complex (Boyle & Jacobs, 1982).  This is made 
more difficult by the organizational structure, traditions, and culture that pervade an 
industry that has been in existence since the colonial period (Granito, 2003; Middleton, 
1992).    
2.2 Fire Service History  
The fire service is unique to other public safety organizations because the 
majority of fire departments are staffed by volunteers.  In fact, 70% of the estimated 
30,635 fire departments across the United States are volunteer organizations, where 
firefighters receive no monetary pay for their services.  Volunteerism ha been a 
significant part of the fire service’s tradition since its inception.  The insura ce industry 
provided the primary initiative for the first organized fire departments to protect insured 
liabilities.  The Colonial period marked a time when Britain was experiencing a 
significant increase in industrialization, which spurned intense demand for the goods 
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produced in the colonies.  The mercantile system ensured that British interests controlled 
the colonial economy.  Insurance companies soon recognized the colonists contribution to 
the British economy, encouraging many of them to relocate to the colonies (Middleton, 
1992).  Although fire protection was limited to bucket brigades and the sheer will of 
volunteers to extinguish fires, it was better than nothing (Calderone, 1997; Klinoff, 1997; 
Jacobs, 1995).  During these times, fire brigades often fought to prevent entire towns 
from burning (Golway, 2002).   
Organizations often resist change, but the fire service has historically resisted 
change better than most.  For example, the earliest fire brigades were adamantly against 
trading in their buckets for hand-drawn pumpers to transport water to fires.  As fire pump 
technology improved, these same fire companies fought against using horse drawn fire 
pumpers and then combustion engine pumpers for firefighting in favor of the beloved 
hand drawn pumpers (Middleton, 1992).  This culture continues to resist change, which 
has hampered progress toward developing a more effective and efficient emergency 
service delivery platform.  The mission of the modern fire service is very different from 
that of just two decades ago, when fire suppression was the main priority for most 
departments and the only service provided by others.  Now, fire departments must invest 
in fire prevention programs, respond to emergency medical and rescue situations, nd 
manage hazardous material incidents in addition to extinguishing fires.  Much of the 
changing mission stems from declining local budget funds and a need to maximize output 
from limited public resources to maintain service delivery standards (Donahue, 2004a). 
A more proactive effort to prevent fire events is one significant change in mission 
many fire departments continue to resist (Granito, 2003).  The need for fire prevention 
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was demonstrated in the 1973 FEMA publication, “America Burning” as a means to 
reduce the number of fire events, injuries related to fire, and fire fatalities.  The idea of 
fire prevention was a complete shift in philosophy for fire service managers.  The fire 
service from its inception was tasked with extinguishing, not preventing, fires.  Few 
industries would work to effectively put themselves out of business, which would 
essentially be the result of successful fire prevention efforts.  In fact, fire prevention has 
become so successful that fire departments across the country have had to add other 
capabilities to their service delivery platforms to justify their budgets.  These additional 
services include responding to emergency medical incidents, hazardous material releases, 
and technical rescue situations, which were not part of the fire service just a few decades 
ago.  
2.3 Evolution of the Fire Service 
The evolution of the fire service has been and continues to be slow.  Although the 
culture of this industry is changing, the fire service still shuns technology and other 
advances in favor of antiquated service delivery methods.  One reason for this is the local 
connection to the fire service.  Fire departments are local entities and to this end refl ct 
the local economic, geographic, and social environment (Duncombe, 1992).  The authors 
of “America Burning” noted that the responsibility for fire protection and prevention 
should continue to rest in local jurisdictions and not the federal government.  The report 
limits federal involvement in fire protection to providing monetary resources to local 
jurisdictions, collecting and researching fire data, and assisting state and local governing 
bodies with educational and training resources.  Many of these requests have been 
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fulfilled in recent decades, including the establishment of the United States Fire 
Administration and the National Fire Academy (Coe, 1983).   
The “America Burning Report” established a goal during the 1970’s to reduce the 
fire rate across the country by 5% annually.  In hindsight, this was an aggressive goal that 
ignored the organizational attributes of the fire service, which were intrinsically resistant 
to change.  In addition, some argue that more federal involvement, especially in the area 
of rating the level of fire protection in each community would improve fire servic  
delivery techniques.  This has been resisted by the insurance industry and other private 
organizations that have a financial stake in maintaining the existing practices for rating 
and delivering fire protection (Coe, 1983).  This entropy found in the fire service and 
resistance from organizations that benefit from fire protection being a local c llective 
good have prevented significant progress in reducing the destructive results of fire in the 
United States. 
A second report titled “America Burning, Revisited” was published in 1987 to 
evaluate the progress made in reducing the national fire rate since the first r port.  It also 
promoted a new strategy to combat the fire problem.  This report indicated the fire 
service had improved its efforts to combat the fire problem during the previous ten years.  
The number of fires, injuries caused by fire, and fire deaths had fallen.  Although on the 
surface the data was encouraging, the exact cause of these declines remained unclear and 
no guidelines for how to continue the progress were provided.  It is even more difficult to 
attribute the declines to the fire service, because of the many potential exogenous factors.  
For example, a myriad of fire codes and standards were passed during the ten year study 
period.  Also, technological advancements in communications, building materials, and 
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other factors far removed from the changes made by the fire service likely contributed to 
the decline.  Despite all of the possible contributing factors, the one statistic that has 
remained constant for decades is the monetary losses attributed to fire (Ahrens, Frazier  
& Heeschen, 2003).  
Fire rates vary from place-to-place within the United States depending on climate, 
socioeconomic status of residents, and other demographics (Coulter, 1979).  Annual fire 
losses in the United States often exceed losses suffered from hurricanes, tornadoes, 
earthquakes, and other natural disasters combined.  Fire departments respond to more 
than two million fire incidents each year.  Fire causes over ten billion dollars in property 
loss and thousands of deaths (FEMA, 2000).  The authors of “America Burning, 
Revisited” (1987) recognized that the fire service was going through “revolutionary” 
change as the demand for emergency services shifted towards new frontiers, such as 
emergency medicine and hazardous materials response (p. 12).  This change in 
organizational mission can be associated with the declining number of fire events.  Fire 
service managers continue to search for ways to justify the exorbitant costs of manpower, 
equipment, and infrastructure.  Although not mentioned in most government reports, the 
insurance industry remains a significant lobby and proponent for increased local fire 
protection resources (Coe, 1973).  
The “American Burning, Revisited” report showed a small reduction in losses 
from fire across the United States.  A renewed push for fire codes and regulations, fire 
prevention, and additional fire fighting resources followed this report.  In general, the fire 
service is much different organizationally today than it was in the 1980’s.  Most fire 
departments, even those in rural America, provide suppression, prevention, and 
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emergency medical services (Granito, 2003).  However, monetary property losses from 
fire, even when controlling for inflation, remain comparable to losses in the 1970’s 
(Ahrens et al., 2003).  Much of the reason monetary fire losses have been consistent for 
so long can be attributed to increasing population density and rising property values 
across the country.  While responding to and combating these fire events, more than 100 
firefighters die in the line of duty each year (Washburn, LeBlanc, & Fahy, 1991).  This 
fatality rate has remained relatively constant for decades.  Monetary property losses and 
firefighter deaths are just two examples of the fire service’s inabilty to find new and 
innovative methods to deliver emergency services.    
Outside agencies, such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), have for decades published 
consensus fire protection standards and laws to improve community and firefighter 
safety.  Standards published by the NFPA, for example, provide guidelines for minimu  
staffing on fire apparatus, response time benchmarks, equipment, and the resources 
required to meet an adequate level of fire protection for all types of communities.  State 
and federal OSHA agencies provide additional laws and codes intended to improve the 
health and safety of firefighters and other rescue professionals while performing their 
duties.  However, implementing many of these rules and regulations is extremely 
resource intensive, which has hampered their impact in the vast majority of communities 
across the country. 
The fire service continues to push the same issues that it has for the past two 
decades with only minimal effect on fire losses.  Aggressive efforts to educat the public 
and provide fire suppression services have proven inadequate to significantly lower fire 
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losses.  The organizational structure of the fire service may carry some of the blame 
because of its resistance to change.  In addition, the opportunity cost of fire protection has 
proven to be a formidable barricade to improved fire protection.  Citizens in most local 
communities continue to want the public sector to provide more services, which often 
requires funds to be diverted from emergency services to pay for these services (Citrin, 
1974).  Ignorance of the fire problem may be a cause, but the public is willing, in general, 
to spend for additional police protection and other forms of public safety.  Even the 
smallest communities have paid law enforcement officers or rely on the local sheriff’s 
department.  This is not the situation for fire protection, as most small and rural 
communities depend on volunteers to provide these crucial services (Coleman, 2007). 
Suburban and urban communities generally have the tax base to fund paid or 
combination staffed fire departments (Brudney & Duncombe, 1992).  However, most fire 
protection agencies argue the resources allocated to the fire service are woefully 
inadequate to lower the losses associated with fire (Duncombe, 1992).  These agencies 
attempt to lay firefighter deaths, property losses, and the countless civilian injuries and 
fatalities associated with fire at the feet of politicians not willing to fund the resources 
necessary to provide adequate fire protection to decrease these statistics.  I  is unclear at 
what point the marginal costs of fire protection resources begin to far outweigh any 
marginal benefits.  Obviously, more emergency resources are desired by public safety 
officials, but the opportunity cost of adding more resources in most communities is 
usually too high to make the necessary additions.  This places more emphasis on 
maximizing the existing limited emergency resources to improve public safety. 
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Fire departments tend to attract less attention from the public, because most 
citizens do not have regular contact with them or the need for their services.  However, 
paid fire departments command the second largest budget, behind police protection, in 
most urban communities.  Because these agencies are often overlooked, fire manag rs 
and administrators are able to act with impunity in developing organizational policies 
(Slack, 1989; Santoro, 1995).  The fire service is a monopoly, which further empowers 
administrators in their policy positions.  There are no alternatives if your house or 
business catches on fire, so the fire service has no competition (Caporaso & Levine,
1992; Romer & Rosenthal, 1979; Savas, 2000).   
The fire service, similar to many government agencies, continues to blame 
inadequate funding for the inability to combat the fire problem.  Much of the argument 
for increased funding has fallen on deaf ears at all levels of government.  No matter how 
much “saber rattling” representatives of the fire service did throughout the end of the 20th 
century, funding levels in most areas only seemed to decrease and new funding streams
were non-existent (Duncombe, 1992).  Fire departments continue to resist change, as the 
overall number of fires decrease, while the demand for other emergency servi e  
increases.  A byproduct of the increasing population density in most communities is 
increasing demand for the non-traditional services fire departments are either providing 
now or are being pressured to provide (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002).  These services 
include responding to medical emergencies, providing technical rescue (i.e. vehicle
extrication, confined space rescue, urban search and rescue, and rope rescue), and 
managing hazardous materials incidents.  Urban administrators view most of these 
services as natural fits for fire personnel to provide, believing fire departments are set up 
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well to provide these additional services because of their organizational structure and 
availability. 
With the available manpower and locational advantages that fire protection 
services have over other public safety entities, it is easy to understand why public 
administrators continue to look to these agencies to take on additional emergency 
response tasks.  The additional services do help justify the high costs of fire protection 
during a time when the number of fires is declining.  However, as departments deliver
more services they become less effective, because built in capacity for fire events does 
not account for the additional responses that come with providing more emergency 
services (Donahue, 2004b).  Local officials who do not add fire and emergency resources 
or adjust allocation decision methods to meet the changing mission of the fire servic  
place their respective communities at increased risk. 
Fire departments provide a myriad of emergency services to most communities in 
the United States.  These departments have become critical components of the emergency 
management and the public health systems, not to mention their contributions to the 
homeland security and environmental protection goals of this country.  The fire service 
carries a large and diverse service delivery burden that is dependent on the decisions and 
resources provided at the local level.  This is especially true in the urban environment, 
where demand for emergency services provided by local fire departments continues to 
rise.  Despite the integral part the fire service plays in the local public safety arena, 
minimal attention has been devoted to developing ways to deliver these services more 
efficiently and effectively (Duncombe, 1992).  Although many organizations continue to 
35 
 
 
develop standards and make recommendations to improve this industry, few consider the 
local economic and political constraints that affect service delivery (Teitz, 1967).   
2.4 Exogenous Influences: ISO and NFPA 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the insurance industry have 
strong influence over fire protection services in this country.  The NFPA develops 
consensus standards for the fire service.  Local fire departments are expected to comply 
with these standards, which do not carry the authority of a law but are admissible in a 
court of law if not complied with.  This places fire administrators into a difficult position 
because even partial compliance with NFPA standards can be very costly.  Yet, non-
compliance creates liability that also has potential costs.  It is not that the fire industry 
does not want to comply with these standards, but the resources are simply not available 
at the local level to be 100% compliant.  Budget constraints and other practical 
limitations often determine a department’s level of compliance with NFPA standards. 
  NFPA standards are developed by persons associated with the industry, and 
often do not reflect what is prudent and reasonable for local communities based on 
financial capacity.  In fact, no fire department is 100% compliant with NFPA standards, 
because local communities simply do not need or even desire the level of fire protection 
mandated by this organization.  For example, NFPA 1710 mandates minimum staffing of 
four firefighters on each fire apparatus.  Personnel costs account for well over half the 
budgeted dollars for most fire departments.  It is debatable whether four firefighters is the 
optimal staffing level for fire apparatus, because the emergency environment is so 
dynamic (Granito, 2003).  The standard also fails to account for the increased mission 
most fire departments are undertaking, as fire units are responding to more medical and 
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rescue emergencies than fire events.  Medical emergencies and most rescue situations are 
less manpower intensive than fire suppression operations.  Improvements in fire 
prevention and building construction have further reduced the number and severity of fire 
events (Brudney & Buncombe, 1992).  Therefore, locating fire and emergency resources 
based on ISO and NFPA benchmarks or complying with these staffing standards may 
lead to enormous service delivery inefficiencies for many local communities. 
The insurance industry is the other major exogenous influence on fire protection 
resource allocation.  The Insurance Services Organization (ISO) ranks local fire 
protection capabilities for the insurance industry.  This organization is beholden to the 
insurance industry, which provides support and utilizes the rankings to determine the 
insurance rate each community is assessed. Local communities receive an ISO r ting 
between 1 and 10, with 10 being the lowest and 1 indicating the highest level of fire 
protection.  The exact methodology and guidelines used to rate communities is not 
available to the public, making it difficult to assess the validity of these rankings.  I  
general, the ratings evaluate the water supply capabilities and the fire s rvices provided 
by local communities.  Rural communities that do not have fixed water supplies and rely 
on volunteer firefighters receive ISO ratings between 8 and 10.  ISO ratings between 1 
and 3 are usually only granted to urban jurisdictions that provide paid fire protection and 
have fire hydrants within 1000 feet of every structure.  ISO provides an incentive for 
political leaders to fund fire protection to lower ratings, because a lower ISO ating 
correlates to lower insurance rates.  However, it is often far more expensive to provide 
the additional fire protection resources necessary to lower ISO ratings than it is to just 
pay the higher insurance rates (Coe, 1983; Granito, 2003).   
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In addition, a number of fire incidents in recent history indicate that ISO ratings 
may not be associated with fire related losses or the level of fire protection provided by a 
local jurisdiction (Coe, 1983).  This became evident during the summer of 2007 when 
nine city of Charleston, South Carolina firefighters were killed fighting a fire in a 
furniture store.  The City of Charleston is one of only a few cities in the entire country 
that has an ISO rating of 1.  The fact that nine firefighters perished in the fire is tragic but 
not the sole reason to question the validity of ISO ratings.  It was the myriad of other 
factors contributing to the deaths that is at issue, which included inadequate water supply, 
outdated equipment, training deficiencies, poor tactics, and an inept command staff.  
These factors are all criteria ISO is assumed to evaluate when rating a community. 
The changing mission of the fire service adds to the complexity of locating 
emergency resources.  Urban fire departments must balance the availability of scarce 
emergency assets with the increasing demand for these resources generated by more 
emergency medical incidents, hazardous materials emergencies, rescue events, and fire 
emergencies.  Statistically, calls for emergency medical events are the most common 
types of incidents departments manage (Brudney & Duncombe, 1992).  However, the 
allocation of fire/emergency medical resources is more often than not based on ISO a d 
NFPA criteria, which are focused on fire events.  This leads to inefficient resource 
allocation decisions, because effectively mitigating a medical situation requires far fewer 
resources than managing a fire incident (Donahue, 2004b).  Therefore, locational and 
response criteria that does not account for the different types of incidents fire depa tm nts 
respond to decreases the efficiency and effectiveness of these services.   
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2.5 Response Time Benchmarks 
Fire stations are located in most communities to minimize response times to every 
part of an urban or suburban environment (Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  However, equally 
spacing these stations to uniformly lower response times ignores demand.  This leads to 
high demand stations and low demand stations because of the variability in social and 
structural characteristics found across response areas.  For example, a city with forty fire 
stations will have some fire apparatus that respond to a few hundred calls per year while 
other apparatus respond to thousands of emergency incidents over the same time period.  
This disparity results from the equal dispersion of resources without regard for demand.  
Aside from the over use of some emergency resources and under utilization of others, the 
main issue with this strategy remains the potential for coverage problems as units respond 
to emergency events (Cubbin, LeClere, & Smith, 2000b).   
This locational dilemma is addressed by McAllister (1976), who argues public 
facilities should be located based on demand, so that services consumed can be 
maximized to improve efficiency.  Based on this concept, emergency resources should be 
located so that each unit responds to roughly the same number of incidents each year.  
Fire protection assets are not nonrivalrous, so when a resource is actively mitigating an 
emergency situation it is unavailable to respond to additional emergency requests for 
assistance.  This means high demand jurisdictions are more vulnerable to units being 
unavailable when scarce emergency assets are dispersed evenly.  After all, high demand 
areas within a community are more likely to experience simultaneous emerg ncy calls, 
which can create large gaps in coverage (Blackstone et al., 2005).  Response zones within 
urban environments where demand for emergency services is high are disadvantage 
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when emergency resources are spread evenly throughout an entire city.  Each time a unit 
in a high demand area responds to an emergency coverage gaps occur, which lead to 
longer response times to any additional incidents that occur while the primary unit is 
occupied (Blackstone et al., 2005; Peters & Hall, 1999).  NFPA standards and ISO 
evaluation criteria do not consider demand for emergency services under conditions of 
limited resources when determining optimal fire protection and emergency medical 
coverage.   
Urban administrators conscious of potential legal and insurance issues try to 
disperse resources evenly, so theoretically each citizen can be reached within a maximum 
response time (Rider, 1979).  According to ISO and NFPA response time criteria, th  
primary fire and/or emergency medical resource should arrive on scene within four 
minutes of the emergency call ninety percent of the time (Bryan & Pane, 2008; Kuehnert, 
1999).   This does not account for the specific type of incident or whether a four minute 
response versus a more extended time will make a difference in the final incident 
outcome.  Many departments have implemented an alternative response time benchmark 
that is more reasonable.  For example, the city of Charlotte Fire Department sets a lower 
response time benchmark to all incidents within the city.  It strives to reach all emergency 
situations within 6 minutes of receiving a call for assistance 80% of the time. In fiscal 
year 2008 the department reported reaching 77.33% of incidents within 6 minutes, which 
demonstrates the difficulty in meeting NFPA response time criteria (Fully Involved, 
2008, August).  It is unclear whether a four or six minute response time benchmark 
significantly influences the measured outcomes of the fire service, such as monetary fire 
losses, fire fatalities, or injuries.  The reality is that few local communities have the 
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capability to fund enough resources to reach ninety-percent of all emergency incidents 
within four minutes, which explains why most communities rely on less stringent 
benchmarks to evaluate service delivery.  This makes it difficult to compare the outcomes 
of different fire service communities (Rider, 1979). 
Response time benchmarks drive the decision-making criteria for locating 
emergency resources in most local communities.  However, evaluating emer ency 
service effectiveness based on an average response time ignores two significant and often 
overlooked factors: the impact of outlier response times and the fact that majority of 
emergency requests for assistance are not time sensitive events, making a rapid response 
unnecessary (Meislin et al., 1999).  It is well known by emergency responders, but often 
overlooked by decision-makers, that only a small percentage of emergency incidents are 
truly time-sensitive (Blackstone et al., 2005).  For example, a five minute versus a ten 
minute response time will not change the medical outcome of a person suffering from the 
flu or a headache.  Much inefficiency occurs when fire units do not alter their response to 
911 calls for assistance based on severity, because non-emergent events receive too many 
resources and emergency events too few.  Worst case scenario, units are tied up on non-
emergent events and there are no units available to respond to emergent events.  
Emergency medical systems across the country are the only public safety organizations 
seriously addressing this problem.  Many high performance emergency medical s rvices 
now devote substantial resources to triaging requests for assistance.  The severity and 
threat to life of each request for assistance determines which incidents receive an 
emergency response and which ones do not.  Triaging emergency incidents based on 
severity facilitates more efficient emergency service delivery with scarce resources. 
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Emergency medical service agencies triage calls for service based on severity to 
guide ambulance allocation decisions, which improves service delivery effectiveness and 
efficiency.  By prioritizing each incident, a unit responding to a lower priority medical 
call can be diverted to a higher priority call if that unit is the closest available unit.  This 
strategy for assigning units to emergency medical calls permits EMS agencies to limit 
built-in resource capacity without sacrificing service outcomes.  Few fir  agencies have 
subscribed to allocating resources in this manner.  One reason is that fire departments, 
with few exceptions, are public sector organizations.  These agencies do not generate 
profits or have to fear going out of business for poor performance, which diminishes the 
incentive to expend human capital to improve efficiency (Morrill & Symons, 1977).  This 
is not the case with most high performance EMS agencies, which rely on service f es and 
profits to provide the service.  These agencies must prioritize calls to operate more 
efficiently within the guidelines specified by their local jurisdictions.  Market forces enter 
into the process, which provides an incentive to find more efficient methods to deliver 
effective services.  
Increasing fire and emergency resource “capacity” is the traditional solution to 
meeting increased demand (Granito, 2003).  However, adding emergency resources i 
costly and difficult to justify (Teitz, 1967).  Public goods are provided based on the 
public’s willingness to fund such services.  Individuals allocate resources based on the 
utility they expect in return (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1996).  Most citizens believe they will 
never need the fire department, so why pay more for a service that they do not expect o 
use or benefit from?  This makes it difficult to justify additional revenue for these 
emergency services.  Rider (1979), in a study of fire department resources, determin d 
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that “capacity” must be ten or more times greater than necessary to meet average demand 
for emergency services.  The study compared the number of fire apparatus that were 
committed to incidents and the number available to respond to additional emergency 
events during times of average demand across fire departments.  Rider makes the point 
that it is unclear how much fire asset “capacity” a community requires, but an increase in 
available resources can equate to a decrease in response times depending on how these 
assets are distributed.  Many local communities do not have the revenue to purchase 
and/or sustain this significant number of additional resources.  Instead, public leaders are 
left to locate limited fire and emergency resources to meet the demand found in 
individual communities based on the funding constraints.  This requires innovative 
methods that do not necessarily follow prescribed norms to gain efficiency and 
effectiveness in the public safety arena.  ISO and NFPA benchmarks are idealistic and 
many times do not reflect the economic reality found in communities.  Government 
officials do allocate resources for public safety, but they must balance these deci ions 
with the provision of other services the public demands. 
2.6 Public Sector and Local Government Environment 
There is tension between the different levels of government over which are best 
suited to provide the different public goods and services demanded by the electorate.  The 
characteristics of some public goods are more conducive to provision by one level of 
government over another, such as the federal level providing the military.  However, 
based on the ideals of federalism public goods and services should be provided by the 
lowest feasible level of government (Tullock, Seldon, & Brady, 2002).  Often times the 
level of government that should provide a particular service is not clear making it 
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susceptible to the changing political environment.  A polycentric system of government 
where each local jurisdiction provides a different market basket of public goods and 
services is supported by the public choice literature.  This situation provides a pseudo-
competitive market environment between jurisdictions, which gives people options when 
making locational decisions (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961).  Local decision makers 
are much more likely to receive service delivery feedback from the people than those at 
the state and federal level (Niskanen, 1975).   
The public sector is inherently handicapped in allocating resources efficiently, 
effectively, and equitably because information about citizen willingness-to-pay or service 
delivery preferences is not freely exchanged.  Public decision makers are often left o 
gauge service delivery preferences of the electorate through the ballot box.  Maj ritari n 
voting rules provide incentive for elected officials to support policy initiatives that the 
median voter prefers (Sylves, 2004).  Theoretically, it is the preferences of the median 
voter that influence how limited resources are allocated in the public sector.  However, 
this overlooks the influence of the bureaucracy, which tends to have the expert 
knowledge and incentive to grow government.   
Based on the Niskanen model, public bureaucrats gain prestige and power by 
maximizing budget allotments to increase salaries and resources (Rosen, 2002).  Because 
of the principle-agent relationship between the political and bureaucratic decision-
makers, the preferences of the median voter are often minimized.  In fact, Niskanen 
(1975) found that public budgets often exceed the preferences of the median voter.  These 
excesses are rarely acknowledged by legislators and local elected officials who resist 
their oversight obligations, because monitoring a bureaucracy or an executive branch is 
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itself a public good.  Monitoring the bureaucracy is not only costly for politicians, but the 
benefits are spread throughout the entire electorate and not just to the constituency of the 
politician conducting the oversight activities.  Therefore, the rational politician attempts 
to free-ride on others who may be willing to provide some oversight of the bureaucracy.  
As with any public good, this situation encourages little to no oversight as those who are 
rational prefer to free-ride, which permits the bureaucracy to allocate resourc  based on 
their preferences.  These preferences often do not parallel the desires of th  elec orate or 
median voter. 
The incentive to grow government is a reason local leaders have failed to find 
new emergency resource deployment strategies to improve service delivery.  Utilizing 
existing resources more efficiently is not the generally accepted solution to mos  public 
sector problems.  Instead, emergency service decision-makers use servicd li ery issues 
caused by increased demand to plead or justify a need for additional resources, rather 
than finding new ways to use existing resources.  For example, when local crime rates 
increase, often times the police chief utilizes a “knee jerk” reaction and argues for more 
police officers, instead of first attempting to redeploy existing resources in more 
innovative ways to combat the issue.  However, as Niskanen explains, there is littl 
incentive to find more efficient methods to deliver public services, which is a reason fire 
service leaders have shunned new deployment models in favor of simply arguing for 
more resources to meet new and increasing demand. 
2.7 Economic and Information Issues in the Public Sector 
Specifically, government must provide those goods and services that are 
inherently public, which means nonrivalrous and nonexclusive.  The private market will 
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either under provide or fail to provide public goods because of these characteristics 
(Munger, 2000).  The concept of nonrivalry means that one person’s enjoyment of a good 
does not detract from another person’s simultaneous enjoyment of the same good.  
Nonexclusion describes the inability to prevent the consumption of a good or service.  
National defense is a pure public good, which necessitates its provision by the federal 
government.  Every person who resides in this country and even many beyond the 
borders receive the benefits of the United States military regardless of status or position 
in society.  There is no way to prevent the consumption of this good.  In addition, the 
benefits are shared equally by all because consumption by one individual does not reduce 
or impact consumption by another (Williams, 1966).   
Although few pure public goods exist, governments provide a myriad of goods 
and services that are collective in nature.  These goods share many of the charact ristics 
of public goods, but are not completely nonexcludable or nonrivalrous (Olson, 1982; 
Savas, 2000; Weimer & Vining, 2005; Williams, 1966).  Emergency services are just one 
example of a good provided by government that has many characteristics of collective 
goods.  The private sector is hesitant to provide these types of services for a myriad of 
reasons.  Not only is exclusion costly, but these services generate many positive 
externalities that are difficult, if not impossible, for private firms to internalize.  In effect, 
positive externalities can be equivocated to lost profits, which is not a situation that 
appeals to most private sector firms.  Therefore, these services are best suited to be 
provided by lower levels of government because of the externality and collective good 
problem (Tullock et al., 2002).  Each local community has its own emergency service 
needs, which could not be met if these services were provided by the state or federal 
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level.  At the local level, decision-makers can customize emergency services to match the 
dynamic needs and budget constraints found in their community.  This permits the 
delivery of more effective and efficient services.   
Another reason the private market will not provide collective goods is the 
inability to accurately ascertain consumer willingness-to-pay.  Since ex lusion is not 
possible, consumers have an incentive to overstate their preferences for collective goods 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1965).  Information about consumer preferences is asymmetric in 
the public market.  Individual consumers may know how much of a service they prefer 
but are unlikely to accurately reveal those preferences.  This brings us back to the 
problems of centralized government, which facilitates and even encourages free-riding.  
The country was founded on the concept of a strong national government, but the 
concepts of federalism ideally permit the provision of public goods and services by 
different levels of government.  However, economic and social instability are often 
catalysts to centralizing power and service delivery at the national level (Smith et al., 
2008).   
Centralized decision-making processes tend to decrease the efficiency with which 
public goods and services are allocated (Tullock et al., 2002).  Again, the mechanisms to 
transmit accurate and timely information between consumers and producers in the public 
sector become less effective as the level of government providing the service  moves 
from local to state to federal.  The decision processes move farther away from the 
individuals receiving the good as service delivery shifts from the local to the federal 
level.  At the federal level services are paid for by and provided to a massive number of 
people who have a wide variance in preferences.  Rational people will limit participation 
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in collective actions involving large groups because participation is so costly fr little to 
no benefit (Olson, 2001).  Optimally, federal government decision-makers establish the 
amount of service to provide based on median voter preferences; however, service levels 
will always exceed or fall short of the majority’s desires, which is ineffici nt.  The 
inability to provide an efficient level of services has much to do with the heterogeneous 
national population.  As service delivery is moved down to the state or local level, 
consumers of collective goods become less heterogeneous.  Therefore, local level 
decision-makers, despite asymmetric information, can theoretically allocate resources 
more efficiently.  Quite simply, if the median voter preferences are satisfied at the local 
level fewer persons with alternative preferences are dissatisfied (Olson, 1982; Tiebout, 
1956). 
Most people accept the inefficiency and ineffectiveness associated with public 
goods and services, which to an extent will always be the case when government 
provision is necessitated (Chilton, Jones-Lee, Kiraly, Metcalf, & Pang, 2006).  The more 
centralized decision-making becomes, the less responsive and efficient the outcomes.  
Government decision-makers simply do not have the information or incentives to make 
efficient and effective resource allocation decisions, which Leeson (2007) clearly 
demonstrates in his analysis of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 
response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster that afflicted the gulf coast states in 2005.  
FEMA knew a category five hurricane striking the New Orleans area would have 
catastrophic consequences.  This threat was taken seriously enough by FEMA that a year 
before Hurricane Katrina struck the federal government held a mock exercise called 
“Hurricane Pam.”  This exercise simulated a category five hurricane striking the New 
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Orleans area (Cooper & Block, 2006).  Based on this exercise and other preparations 
prior to the storm, FEMA claimed it was well prepared to respond to a disaster in the 
days leading up to the Katrina landfall (Sobel & Leeson, 2006).  Unlike disasters that 
strike unexpectantly, hurricanes often provide emergency response agencies days and 
even weeks to prepare.  Statistically driven weather models are also used to predict with a 
high degree of certainty the place a hurricane will make landfall many days in dvance.   
Despite the advanced notice, FEMA failed to follow their pre-deployment disaster 
plans developed during the Hurricane Pam exercise.  Not long after the hurricane force 
winds subsided on the gulf coast news organizations began broadcasting photos of the 
devastation.  These news agencies had pre-deployed ahead of the storm and utilized 
satellite feeds to broadcast information despite the massive power and communication 
outages.  Meanwhile, FEMA was nowhere to be found.  Why with all the preparation, 
was the primary federal agency for managing such an event not on the ground providing 
aid, while news organizations and other private sector services were already p ovi ing 
assistance?  Leeson (2007) answers this question by comparing the FEMA response to 
this disaster to that of Wal-Mart.  He explores the information and incentive problems 
that differentiate the private from the public sector.   
Centralized decision making in the public sector does not permit the free 
exchange of information across the bureaucracy.  Communicating resource needs and the 
urgency with which those resources are needed to decision-makers is almost imposible.  
The private sector, in this case Wal-Mart, is able to decentralize decision-maki g 
processes and utilize the voluntary exchange of information facilitated by the private 
market to guide allocation decisions that are more efficient and effective.  In the days and 
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weeks following the Katrina landfall Wal-Mart provided relief supplies to those in n ed, 
while FEMA continued to gather resources and evaluate where to send them.  This 
situation is germane to the fire service, because the organizational structure of most fire 
departments is decentralized with fire stations placed in different parts of each 
community.  This permits scarce emergency resources to be located in individual micro-
communities where groups are more homogenous.  Therefore, just as Wal-Mart stocks it  
stores with different products based on local consumer preferences, the fire servic could, 
and at times does, allocate resources based on the demand experienced within each fire 
station’s coverage area.  When decision-making processes are pushed down to lower 
levels of government, information flows more freely and is often more timely than we
gathered by a central entity.  This was the crux of the problem FEMA dealt with when 
responding to gulf coast resident’s needs following the Katrina landfall.   
FEMA gathered information for days before deciding how to allocate its 
resources, which in many cases were plentiful but in the wrong locations.  The agency
failed to utilize resources to their highest level of output.  For example, FEMA had 1000 
trained rescuers sitting in an Atlanta, Georgia hotel ready for deployment while people 
remained stranded under collapsed homes and on roof tops in the disaster zone.  Yet, 
these individuals were held for days to attend redundant training and then were deployed 
away from the most impacted areas to simply raise the FEMA flag in a vain effort to 
improve public relations.  Although the information feedback mechanisms in the public 
sector are problematic, the news video alone should have provided FEMA the motivation 
to commit medical and rescue resources to the hardest hit areas, which the media 
exposed.  The media outlets are private firms that enjoy a free exchange of i formation 
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and must satisfy viewers to remain viable.  Unlike FEMA, these news outlets had he 
incentive to pre-deploy their assets to the most impacted areas to ensure they gained 
market share (Burton, 2008; Cooper & Block, 2006).   
Aside from the information problem, the public sector also has an incentive 
problem when allocating resources.  The public bureaucrat does not have a profit motive 
to allocate limited public resources efficiently.  This is not the case in the private sector 
where a firm that fails to adapt to market conditions, such as changes in consumer 
preferences, will be forced out of business.  The government does not have to worry 
about going out of business if it fails to effectively or efficiently allocate resources.  
Government, in general, does not earn revenue to fund public goods and services, 
because it has monopolistic powers and the authority to take money out of the private 
sector via the tax system (Bergstrom, 1979: Savas, 2000).  The example Leeson (2007) 
gives describes Wal-Mart’s response to the disaster, which was quick and effective.  He 
explains the profit motive in the private sector provides incentive to decentralize 
decision-making, which facilitates the exchange of information to ensure resources are 
allocated efficiently to maximize profits.  In addition, private firms are concerned about 
their corporate image, because a positive image translates into profits.  In Wal-Mart’s 
case, it was able to pre-deploy the resources it predicted would be in highest demand to 
its stores located in and near the disaster zone.  Generators and other equipment were 
moved to ensure stores could open and serve the populations.  Whether Wal-Mart 
assisted in the disaster situation by giving away needed resources in some cases or selling 
them in others, the profits for the company as a whole increased because of the demand 
for goods and the goodwill engendered through the effort. 
51 
 
 
Leeson (2007) explains the differences between the FEMA and Wal-Mart 
response to this disaster as an issue of information and incentives.  The private market 
provides for the free exchange of information so that decision-making can be 
decentralized.  Profits provide the motivation to ensure that effective and efficient 
allocations are made.  The public sector is hampered by a lack of information and 
incentives.  In fact, the public market provides an incentive structure that rewards 
incrementalism and painfully slow response to citizen needs, especially under disaster 
circumstances.  Monetary profits are the incentive for private market firms to be 
proactive in their efforts to meet consumer demand.  This was evident during Wal-Mart’s 
response, and the response of the media who were transmitting video from the disaster 
zone even while the storm raged.  Private sector firms that are reactive will lose market 
share to proactive firms that are more organized and willing to take risks.  This is not the 
case for the public sector.   
The incentive structure in the public sector promotes a reactive strategy to manage 
citizen demand and preferences for services.  Leeson (2007) attributes the reactiv nature 
of political and bureaucratic leaders to fear of committing “type-one verse type-two 
policy errors” (16).  He describes the type-one error as occurring when public leaders are 
not cautious enough when making policy decisions.  Policy makers are susceptible to 
committing type-one errors when promoting proactive policy solutions to solve problems.  
When government acts proactively, actions are more observable to the public regardless 
of the outcome.   A type-one error occurs when political leaders take proactive action that 
does not produce public benefits but instead appears to increase cost or lead to loss of 
life.  In the hurricane scenario, proactive government officials might have mandated 
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evacuations many days prior to landfall, organized mass transportation resources, and 
pre-deployed emergency personnel and equipment.  However, these actions would have 
made the public officials susceptible to committing a type-one policy error had the 
hurricane taken a different track or diminished its intensity.  The clear, early ev cuation 
order, if later deemed unnecessary, would have generated far more criticism than the 
same order, proven effective, would generate praise.  Therefore, the incentive structure in 
the public sector is paradoxical to the proactive policy initiatives found in the private 
sector (Sobel & Leeson, 2006). 
Instead, government officials committed what turned out to be numerous type-two 
policy errors before and after Katrina made land fall.  The most serious of these deci ions 
was waiting to evacuate residents in the New Orleans area until landfall was certain, 
which did not leave enough time to empty the city.  Public officials were too cautious in 
mandating evacuations because they feared moving people out of the city too early only 
to have the hurricane change course (Cooper & Block, 2006). This would have made the 
evacuations unnecessary, so they risked committing a type-two policy error.  As 
hindsight would prove, the decision to hold off on the evacuations was a significant 
factor in the human catastrophe that occurred in New Orleans and along other parts of the 
gulf coast following the storm.  However, the public sector incentive structure 
encouraged the reactive evacuation policies because the political cost of committing type-
two errors is less than the cost associated with being proactive and committing a type-one 
policy error (Leeson, 2007; Sobel & Leeson, 2006).  
The Katrina example demonstrates the distinct differences between public and 
private sector resource allocation mechanisms.  Much of this is attributed to the 
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centralized decision-making processes used by the public sector, which contrast the 
decentralized philosophy in the private sector.  Wal-Mart shifted the appropriate 
resources to its stores located in the gulf region, while its other store locations cross the 
country continued to receive normal supply shipments.  In fact, high demand resources 
located in stores not near the disaster zone were relocated to stores in the impactd 
region.  FEMA was unable to make similar resource deployment decisions, which led to 
an ineffective response to the disaster.  In many ways, local fire departments ar  
organized like Wal-Mart, in that most of these agencies provide services from numerous 
locations spread throughout a jurisdiction.  Each one of these service delivery locations is 
located in a somewhat demographically homogenous area, meaning service deliverycan 
be customized to meet demand.  This is no different than how Wal-Mart shifted its 
resources to high demand stores to ensure effective and efficient operations.  The logical 
method to resolve this issue is for all levels of government simply to decentralize 
operations; however, the structure of public markets makes this somewhat unrealistic 
because of information and incentive problems (Leeson, 2007; Sobel & Leeson, 2006).   
As public finance economists recognize, government is a necessary component 
for any society to prosper.  However, it collects most of its revenue to operate from the 
private sector through coercive mechanisms, such as taxes.  There are inherent
inefficiencies associated with public sector services because of transactio  costs, equity 
considerations, political influence, and asymmetric information that are not as prevalent 
in the private sector.  Therefore, it is preferred to have the private sector provide as many 
services as possible, so the public treasure is used to its greatest capacity.  When private 
funds are taken to provide public resources, decision makers struggle to utilize the dollars 
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efficiently to deliver effective services.  The government simply does not have a reliable 
means to determine customer willingness-to-pay for goods and services, which hampers 
resource allocation decisions.  Therefore, citizens often receive too many or too few 
services based on their preferences, which is not efficient.  When private sector firms 
overproduce it drives the market price down or creates inefficiencies that detract from 
profits.  In these situations, it is the company or shareholders who have voluntarily 
invested in the private firm who are harmed.  A private sector firm that continues to 
overproduce will eventually lose shareholders or profits to the point of being forced out 
of business.  This is not the situation in the public sector, where agencies can over 
produce without fear of retribution.  In many ways, when local emergency services are 
allocated evenly rather than based on demand, unaccounted for inefficiencies are r ated
that disenfranchise tax payers. 
2.8 Local Government and the Fire Service 
A centralized model of public service delivery has proven problematic in many 
ways; however, economic and social conditions tend to determine whether public 
services are delivered with a decentralized or centralized focus (Sobel & Leeson, 2006).  
The military is probably the purest of the public goods and provides services to the entire 
country and beyond making its provision by the federal level beyond debate.  Fire 
protection, on the other hand, is the responsibility of local level jurisdictions (Dye & 
MacManus, 2007).  Fire protection, in general, is a decentralized service because ach 
local community has its own needs and risk factors.  The provision of these services must 
be customized to efficiently and effectively protect a jurisdiction.  The public safety 
needs of one jurisdiction are often very different from those found in other jurisdictions 
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(Coulter, 1979).  Because these services are decentralized, a great deal of variance in 
service delivery exists between fire protection jurisdictions. 
 The private sector has proven unwilling to provide public safety services, 
especially fire, for public consumption.  As a public sector service fire departments 
generate positive externalities.  For example, a rapid response with adequate fire 
suppression resources to a house fire prevents fire from spreading to other structu es.  
These positive externalities would be difficult for a private firm to capitalize on for profit, 
reducing the incentive to provide sufficient services to protect a community.  
Government has a role to play in the private market, one of which is to limit negative 
externalities.  These occur when persons outside of a voluntary private sector exchange 
are impacted negatively by the transaction, such as residents living downstream of a 
paper plant that dumps hazardous materials into the water.  The public sector’s almst 
exclusive provision of fire protection and other emergency services in many ways limits 
potential negative externalities that may result from private sector firms supplying these 
services.       
The provision of fire protection is an optimum service to analyze in exploring the 
challenges democratically organized governments experience when allocating scarce 
resources.  It is the ultimate local collective service, because the state and f deral levels 
have ignored the fire service for the most part.  Recently, federal and state grants have 
been made available to help fund local emergency services, but on the whole it is the 
local government that provides these public safety services (Schneider, 1990).  Unlike 
crime rates, deaths and injuries associated with fire garner little political a tention.  The 
fire service is, for the most part, viewed positively by the electorate which further 
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diminishes its relevance in the political spectrum.  Fire departments garner the second 
largest budget item in most local governments.  Police protection is the only service that 
consistently supersedes fire protection in the budget (Coe, 1983).  Providing public safety 
services is a significant funding challenge for most local jurisdictions, which places 
greater importance on how scarce emergency assets are distributed by decision-makers. 
The FEMA response to Hurricane Katrina, compared to that of Wal-Mart, 
illustrates the issues associated with centralized decision-making for allocating limited 
resources.  The fire service provides an opportunity to study the potential advantages of 
decentralization at the local level.  The federal government has taken a myriad of 
responsibilities away from state and local governments or is, at the very least, imposing 
influence over them following the September 2001 terrorism events.  The ever-present 
threat of terrorism, two active war fronts, and a declining economy have provided a 
favorable environment for the federal level to take a more dominant role in the policy 
arena.  This effort has even trickled down to the fire service, which has tradition lly been 
a purely local level service.  For example, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandates 
that local and state governments train and equip fire personnel to respond to terrorist
events (Dye & MacManus, 2007).  The fire service is the primary entity that will manage 
a natural or manmade catastrophic event, and the federal government has taken relativ ly 
few actions to impede how local officials allocate their limited emergency resources.  If 
anything, more federal dollars have been provided for public safety through a myriad of 
grants since 2001 (Posner, 2006).  These grants have provided needed resources to many 
local communities to increase fire, rescue, and emergency medical assets above and 
beyond what the local tax capacity permits.  This has afforded some localities greater 
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flexibility in deploying emergency resources, because federal grants h ve provided many 
areas with more assets to use when responding to emergency incidents.   
 The decentralized nature of the fire service should permit local public decision-
makers to capture the demand for fire, rescue, and emergency medical services that are 
particular to each individual community.  This permits service delivery to be customized 
to the electorate and dictated by the community characteristics associated w th fire and 
other emergency situations.  Local officials are closer to their constituents and better able 
to gauge preferences for public services.  In addition, citizens are more involved in 
government at the local level.  Rational voters are more active at the local level because 
their voices have more influence and will receive more of the benefits than at the other 
levels of government (Olson, 1982).  Decentralization also provides intergovernmental 
competition as each local jurisdiction works to provide a market basket of goods and 
services that attract residents and businesses to their community (Rosen, 2002; Tiebout, 
1956).  The other benefit of localization and decentralization of services is the ability of 
neighboring jurisdictions to evaluate and then copy or avoid service provision methods.  
In many ways each community acts as a “laboratory” (Rosen, 2002; Smith et al., 2008).  
2.9 Locating Emergency Resources: Risk Aversion 
The fire service industry is in many ways self regulated, which leads many to 
describe this industry as “200 years of tradition unimpeded by progress.”  Allocating 
local emergency resources based on risk has garnered little attention from decision-
makers, who continue to subscribe to geographically driven methods to minimize average 
response times by emergency responders to incident locations (Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  
It is unclear what the most effective and efficient method to allocate or locate these 
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resources is, while accounting for budget and social constraints within a community to 
reduce risk.   However, evaluating community risk with deference to the level of 
uncertainty that surrounds emergency incidents could provide decision-makers with valid 
information to help drive these locational decisions to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 Locational decisions determine where emergency resources are placed within a 
community and can mean the difference between life and death for a citizen.  Seco ds 
can matter when responding to certain types of emergency events.  For example, a fire 
can double in size every minute it is left unattended (Shpilberg, 1977).  In addition, for 
every minute a victim suffering cardiac arrest does not receive Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation (CPR) and other emergency care, the chance of survival decreases by 10%.  
In other words, someone suffering cardiac arrest has a 0% survival rate if c r does not 
arrive in the first 10 minutes of the medical crisis (Nichol, Steill, Laupacis, Pham, 
DeMaio, & Wells, 1999).  Although fire protection resources are spread throughout most 
urban communities, it is unclear whether the dispersion methodology used to locate these 
resources is the most effective and efficient method to save lives and property.  Unlike
pure public goods, the use of fire protection is not nonrivalrous at the individual level, 
because once firefighters and equipment are committed to an emergency event th s  
resources are no longer available to other citizens who may have an emergency (W imer 
& Vining, 2005).  Because of this, spacing fire stations and emergency resourc equally 
throughout a community is arguably an inefficient and ineffective means to maximize 
public safety.  All emergency requests are not the same, so allocating resources equally is 
problematic and does not account for true demand of these services. 
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Most people are risk averse when making decisions.  However, government is 
often more risk averse than its citizens, especially when formulating policies to decrease 
overall societal risk.  It is impossible to create a risk-free environment, but most 
politicians campaign on issues that would lead many to believe government can eliminat  
all risks, especially the risk of death.  Political decision-makers have incentive to 
overstate risks, because it provides the opportunity to gain support for programs and 
initiatives that appear to reduce risk.  However, risk is often determined by individual 
actions and characteristics, which explains why government programs directe  at large 
heterogeneous groups tend to be ineffective (Rhoads, 1999; Tullock et. al., 2002).   
Public sector programs to reduce societal risk, such as emergency services, are 
inherently inefficient.  These programs provide a service level that inevitably falls well 
short of some and exceeds the preferences of others in a demographically diverse 
community.  Efficiency is only gained by separating large heterogeneous groups into 
smaller more homogenous groups, which is challenging for the federal and state 
governments.  At the local level, persons tend to self-select into homogenous groups 
based on where they choose to reside.  Because of this, communities become fragmented 
into neighborhoods that provide local decision-makers the opportunity to customize 
programs intended to reduce societal risk (Oakerson, 1999).  In particular, the emerg ncy 
services are set up well to take advantage of this fragmentation, because emerg ncy 
response assets are often located at the neighborhood level.  The more homogenous a 
target population is the more effective and efficient a risk reducing program can be 
(Walsh, 1998).  Unfortunately, public sector leaders have, in most cases, failed to take 
full advantage of these relatively homogenous groups that naturally form in every 
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community to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of local programs to reduce 
societal risk. 
This is the situation with policies to allocate fire and other emergency resourc  
throughout individual communities.  Local government decision-makers attempt to 
spread these limited resources to minimize response times to every part of a community.  
This is a conservative strategy that prevents the commission of a “type-one policy error.”  
The victims of this policy are difficult if not impossible to identify, which is prefe red by 
decision makers (Leeson, 2007).  This subscribes to the maximin rule, which supports 
allocating resources evenly across a community so that even the individuals at minimal 
risk have equal opportunity to benefit from the services.  This is an overly cautious 
strategy to deploy scarce emergency assets, because risk factors are not spread evenly 
across communities (Friedman, 2002; Rosen, 2002).  With any public policy initiative 
there will be winners and losers.  This strategy to deploy emergency assets is 
representative of distributive policies at the federal level that are most closely associated 
with “pork barrel” spending.  The hallmark of a distributive policy is that the winners 
know who they are and losers have no idea who they are.  Persons who are “saved” or 
who directly benefit from emergency services know who they are; however, it is difficult 
for the person who is disenfranchised by this system to recognize that they are “policy 
losers.”  This situation provides further incentive to maintain the status quo for 
distributing scarce emergency assets, rather than searching for a more efficient method 
that may improve overall social welfare.    
A more utilitarian approach to formulating risk reducing programs could be more 
effective and efficient, especially with regard to the allocation of emergency resources.  
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This approach would locate limited resources with the goal of doing the most good for 
the most people.  For example, resources could be located according to neighborhood 
characteristics, which more closely capture individual risk factors (Rosen, 2002; Tullock 
et al., 2002; Walsh, 1998).  This is an approach not popular with most public leaders, 
because it requires a more proactive policy, opening the possibility for committing a 
type-one policy error.  Such a location strategy would require using demographic and 
emergency response data to predict demand for these services.  Emergency resoures 
could then be concentrated in the highest demand areas.  This situation would make the 
winners and losers more evident, because scarce resources would be located 
disproportionately throughout a community based on risk levels. 
The incentive to proactively allocate these resources is not pronounced, because 
chance emergency events occurring in areas with reduced resources would elicit strong 
criticism.  This strategy is prone to type-one policy errors, as victims are more 
identifiable (Leeson, 2007).  The potential benefits of the deployment strategy will be
ignored, despite the likely increase in general welfare resulting from directing resources 
towards those most at risk.  A more utilitarian deployment strategy for emerg ncy 
resources focusing on characteristics associated with risk for fire and medical 
emergencies would also reduce opportunity cost, or the cost forgone by providing too 
many risk reduction services to those without the need (Walsh, 1998). 
The reality of government provided emergency services is that basing locational 
decisions at the individual level is impractical and costly.  The population becomes less 
heterogeneous as you move from the national to the state and then to the local level.  It is 
easier to allocate resources more effectively and efficiently to homogenous populations.  
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Most local communities are considered highly heterogeneous, especially large urban 
environments.  However, neighborhoods within urban locales tend to be highly 
homogeneous because people want to live near others who are like them.  For example, 
persons with similar incomes tend to cluster together in neighborhoods.  Evaluating risk 
at the neighborhood level could prove to be a powerful tool to allocate fire and 
emergency service resources (Cohen, Gorr, & Olligschlaeger, 2007).   
Most urban and suburban communities provide paid fire protection and work to 
meet ISO and NFPA standards, which dictate that a fire station is located every so many 
square miles to minimize response times.  These standards ignore the risk differences 
found between neighborhoods, and lead to some having too many resources and others 
not having enough for adequate protection.  A more effective deployment strategy could 
be developed by evaluating neighborhood risk characteristics associated with fire and 
other emergency events to locate these resources.  In many ways, this is simple ri k 
discounting or making decisions based on probability analysis about neighborhood 
characteristics prior to an emergency event occurring (Munger, 2000). 
A more efficient and effective deployment strategy is possible if resources are 
allocated based on neighborhood level risk factors.  These factors could be used to 
determine which areas have the greatest need and avoid the issues of service inefficiency 
associated with allocating finite risk reducing resources to large heterogne us groups.  
Walsh (1998) provides a good example that typifies the value of evaluating risk on an 
individual basis explaining that, “Statistics for automobile fatalities may yield a lifetime 
risk of 1 per 100 persons dying in a car accident – but this doesn’t mean that a particular 
person’s chances of dying in a car accident is 0.01” (134).  A community fire fatality or 
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injury rate is meaningless to the allocation of fire protection resources, unles you are 
following the maximin rule, because one neighborhood alone could generate all of the 
fire fatalities experienced by the jurisdiction.  Allocating fixed resources based on 
neighborhood risk characteristics and then allocating response criteria based on 
individual risk characteristics is in many ways the Pareto optimal solution, because no 
one would be better off if resources could be moved to certain areas without harming 
others.  Yes, groups or neighborhoods in a jurisdiction will not have a fire resource as 
close as other jurisdictions using this model.  However, resources would be located wher  
they will provide the greatest net social benefit, which will result in reduced property 
damage and loss of life from fire and other emergency events (Cubbin et al., 2000b; 
Rosen, 2002). 
The insurance industry uses a similar strategy to price discriminate ag inst high 
risk customers to ensure an efficient level of risk spreading resources.  The industry 
monitors insurance claims and purchasing patterns and the characteristics of individual 
consumers.  A description of the characteristics most associated with increased and 
decreased insurance claims is then developed to assess risk (Walsh, 1998).  The insuranc 
industry then charges persons with the characteristics associated with higher claim rates 
more than those with characteristics associated with minimal claims.  This rewards those 
who are low risk and should not be saddled with paying for those who are at increased 
risk.  This also reduces the moral hazard effect, because those with increased risk pay
more.  The idea put forth in this research for allocating emergency resource follows this 
same philosophy, which is to allocate scarce assets based on risk to avoid deadweight 
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losses that result when trying to evaluate collective risk for large heterog neous groups 
(Tullock et al., 2002). 
2.10 Statistical versus Identifiable Lives 
Information to allocate emergency resources more efficiently and reduce the 
number of statistical lives lost is not freely exchanged in the public sector.  However, 
individual and structural characteristics are often associated with increased risk 
throughout local communities.  Data on these characteristics could be collected and 
utilized to better allocate scarce emergency resources.  Knowing that neighborhoods are 
relatively homogeneous based on demographic and economic characteristics, it is 
possible to better allocate fire and medical resources to areas with a higher potential for 
time-sensitive emergency events.  For example, medical emergencies mak  up the vast 
majority of fire service responses.  Persons suffering cardiac arrest or severe trauma have 
the most time-sensitive medical emergencies.    A study performed in Chicago found that 
African-Americans are at significantly higher risk of suffering premature cardiac arrest.  
Personal traits such as age, initial cardiac rhythm, and potential for early initiation of 
CPR by a bystander are associated with survival rates.  The study furtheround that 
response times to all races in the Chicago area for non-traumatic cardiac ar est were 
comparable and overall mortality rates exceeded 97% regardless of race(Beck r, Han, 
Meyer, Wright, Rhodes, Smith, & Barrett, 1993).  This information is valuable to more 
effectively distribute medical resources throughout a community.  Mortality r tes for 
cardiac arrest were almost 100% to begin with in Chicago (this is not the case in most 
communities), so any change in deployment strategy would likely result in more lives 
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saved.  Relocating resources to neighborhoods where individuals with increased risk 
factors reside improves overall social welfare (Southwick & Butler, 1985, Viscus , 1993). 
Unfortunately, it is not likely that public decision-makers will recognize or utilize 
economic and research mechanisms to allocate limited emergency resources t  improve 
social welfare.  This would require proactive policy initiatives, which most public 
decision makers attempt to avoid.  Locating scarce emergency resources based on 
predictive research or probability analysis would expose public leaders to committing 
type-one policy errors, which they have proven unwilling to do (Leeson, 2007).  The 
status quo emergency service deployment strategy ignores true risk characteristics and 
attempts to distribute resources equally throughout communities.  This is a reactive 
solution to protecting society, which is preferred by policy entrepreneurs.  However, this 
ignores an important concept that Munger (2000) develops for evaluating policy 
decisions, which points out that “good decisions can turn out bad and bad decisions can 
turn out good.”  Equal distribution of emergency resources renders consumption on a first 
come, first service basis, which may be fair but is not efficient or effective (Blackstone et 
al., 2005).  Those disenfranchised by this system are difficult if not impossible to 
identify, which explains the incentive to maintain the status quo.  Utilizing predictive 
methods to better allocate resources based on characteristics associated with increased 
risk would make for better decisions.  However, as Leeson (2007) pointed out, the cost of 
a mistake is greater for public decision-makers implementing proactive policy initiatives, 
which decreases the likelihood such policies will be implemented.  
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2.11 Summary    
In the end, it does not matter which level of government provides the service, 
there is going to be inefficiency and ineffectiveness, because government is simply not 
organized to gather and distribute information and then respond appropriately to that 
information.  Public finance economists recognize the influence political actors have on 
budgets and resource allocation decisions.  Issues of equity and fairness must be
considered in the public arena.  It is the responsibility of the political leaders to gauge 
social preferences that go beyond economically efficient allocation of res u ces (Rosen, 
2002).  Neoclassical economists are more concerned with economic efficiency and have 
an eye toward Pareto optimal allocation.  The concept of marginalism is also critical to 
evaluating allocation decisions in the public sector according to the neoclassical ideal.  
This is a powerful concept, but in some ways ignores the political influence that ispar of 
every public decision (Levy, 1995; Sobel & Leeson, 2006).  The public sector simply 
does not have the information and incentive mechanisms to permit the effective 
decentralization of services, which is present in the private sector.  Public resource 
allocation is based on imperfect information, an incentive structure counter-productive to 
efficiency, issues of equity, and the influence of interest groups, making it irrational to 
even conceive of an economically efficient and effective public sector (Boettke, 
Chamblee-Wright, Gordon, Ikeda, Leeson, & Sobel, 2007).  However, recognizing all of 
the limitations to resource allocation provides valuable insight into improving the overall 
social welfare of the public. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: DATA & METHODS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The city of Charlotte serves as the research area for this analysis. Data collected 
by the Charlotte Fire Department, information from a neighborhood quality of life 
survey, and Census data at the block group level are used to test the stated hypotheses.  
Demographic and structural characteristics vary across the city of Charlotte, making it 
similar to other local communities.  Much of this variation is captured in the individual 
block groups that divide the city into homogenous areas.  These geographical units 
closely reflect the neighborhood divisions throughout the city, which is optimal for 
assessing societal risk characteristics that influence emergency service demand 
(Iwashyna, Christakis, & Becker, 1999; Ostrom, 2000).  The plethora of data available 
for this study provides an opportunity to thoroughly investigate neighborhood social and 
economic characteristics that are related to demand for local emergency services.   
 Scientifically driven research into the fire service is limited.  A quick scan of the 
literature reveals that few academic or other research bodies have recogniz d the overall 
importance of this industry from a public policy standpoint.  Much of the national data 
and information about this industry is limited, making it difficult for academics and 
stakeholders to perform systematic research into the public policy issues pertinent to the 
fire service (Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  Exogenous organizations, such as the NFPA and 
ISO, compile fire department emergency response statistics, but this data no  available 
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to the general public.  For a substantial fee, the NFPA will release some fire s rvice data 
and reports; however, the flow of information needed to conduct scientific research and 
draw conclusions that can be inferred beyond a sample is not readily available.  In 1974, 
Congress passed the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act to help facilitate more 
research and evaluation of the fire service industry (Ahrens, 2008).  The legislation gives 
authority to the United States Fire Administration to collect fire incident data from local 
fire departments across the nation through the National Fire Incident Management 
System (NFIRS).     
 NFIRS is the most comprehensive national database for information about the 
emergency services provided by fire departments across the country.  However, 
participation is voluntary, which has proven an impediment to the submission of accurate 
and complete data.  Recent Homeland Security initiatives have provided federal offici ls 
new ways to incentivize participation in NFIRS.  For example, fire departments ca  no 
longer apply for federal fire grants without the submission of incident data to NFIRS.  
Fire departments not willing to participate in NFIRS are not eligible to compete for these 
federal grants.  These provisions have significantly increased the number of fir  
departments that are consistently submitting information to NFIRS.  Unfortunately,  two 
year lag in the public release of data is standard, because NFIRS relies on each state to 
submit its departments’ incident data.  State officials must collect and sort the data before 
submitting it to the national database, which slows the dissemination process (Ahrens, 
Stewart, & Cooke, 2003).   
 The most recent data available through NFIRS is from 2005 and includes 
information on more than eight million emergency incidents.  This database continues to 
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be plagued by incomplete and inaccurate information about emergency incidents.  The 
lack of standardization and strict guidelines for collecting data mean individual fire 
departments often use their own measurement criteria for variables and fail to ensure that 
the information submitted is accurate (Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  In addition, the 
completeness of information relevant to conducting research into the fire service is not 
collected through NFIRS, such as response time measures to the nearest second.  In the 
case of response times, this is a problem because seconds can and do matter when 
evaluating emergency service issues and outcomes.  Currently, NFIRS rounds all time to 
the nearest minute, which can significantly change the outcome of an analysis.  Finally, 
fire departments are local entities, making it challenging to collect data th t is comparable 
from one department to the next.   
 Local fire departments must collect information that is relevant to their 
stakeholders, and this data, at times, differs from that collected by NFIRS.  Despite the 
numerous challenges to NFIRS data, it remains the most comprehensive national data set
available to the public (Ahrens, 2008).  Unfortunately, the data challenges associated 
with NFIRS render it inadequate as a reliable comprehensive source of information for 
this research effort.  Because of this, data for this analysis was derived from in ormation 
collected by the Charlotte Fire Department for emergency incidents and neighborhood 
level demographic data collected through the Charlotte Neighborhood Quality of Lfe
Study 2006 and U.S. Census at the block group level. 
3.2 Description of Research Area 
 The city of Charlotte, North Carolina serves as the study area.  Charlotte is a 
growing city with a population that exceeds 650,000, making it the 20th largest city in the 
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United States.  Incorporated in 1768, favorable annexation laws in North Carolina have 
facilitated land area growth that now spans more than 280 square miles.  The city sits
within Mecklenburg County, which is located in the piedmont region of the state and 
borders South Carolina.  It is the second largest banking center in the country behind 
New York City, is served by an international airport, and is home to more than 250 
Fortune 1000 companies, making it a hub for domestic and international business.  Other 
unique features include two major interstate highways, a comprehensive regional mass 
transit system, numerous post-secondary academic institutions, professional sports 
complexes for football and basketball, and two nuclear power plants located just outside 
the city limits to its south and north.  These characteristics and others make this a 
dynamic environment that presents many challenges to the local public sector emergency 
service departments. 
 The Charlotte Fire Department is the primary first responder agency for the city.  
It provides trained personnel, equipment, and other resources required to mitigate all 
emergency incidents (fire, rescue, EMS, hazardous materials) occurring within the city 
limits.  The department responds to more than 80,000 emergency events annually from 
37 different fire station locations that are dispersed throughout the city.  Each station i  
staffed twenty-four hours a day every day of the year by trained firefightrs.  The 
department maintains more than 54 front line fire units, each staffed by four firefighters, 
to respond to emergency events.  The front line units consist of 38 engine companies, 14 
ladder companies, 5 airport crash units, and 2 rescue companies.  The department also 
maintains 3 hazardous material units, 6 brush fire units, 5 water tankers, and 2 urban 
search and rescue trucks to respond to specialty type incidents.  When needed, these 
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specialty units are staffed by on-duty firefighters who are assigned to front-line units.  
Charlotte continues to grow through annexation and economic development efforts, 
which places substantial demands on these emergency service resources. 
 Throughout the history of the department, fire stations have been strategically 
located across the city based on geographic requirements.  This allocation strategy locates 
fixed facilities and units primarily based on fire apparatus response time benchmarks.  In 
modern times, the department has used a six minute response time as its benchmark 
measure.  Therefore, the goal is that every part of the city can be reach d by a fire 
apparatus within six minutes of receiving a request for assistance.  This is an effective 
strategy for deploying resources as long as all emergency units are available in their 
respective fire stations when a call for service is received, because under this scenario 
response times are predictable with a high level of accuracy.  Unfortunately, most 
emergency service systems receive multiple calls for service at a time, meaning units are 
more often not located in their respective fire stations to receive calls for service 
compromising the response time benchmark deployment strategy (Perrin, 1998).   The 
fire department further exacerbates this situation by not using a priority dispatch system 
to triage calls for service.  Units frequently respond to non-urgent situations which
compromises availability for emergent situations.  This is a common strategy used 
throughout the fire service industry for deploying and responding to emergency incidents 
to reduce overall societal risk; however, it ignores the fact that groups or neighborhoods 
within a community have different levels of risks and need for these services (Hammitt & 
Treich, 2007).   
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 The emergency service environment in Charlotte is dynamic with structural and 
social characteristics varying throughout this community.  Like most fire departments 
across the country, the Charlotte Fire Department responds to a wide varietyof 
emergency incident situations that require many different specializations.  Because 
emergency response and incident data is abundant and diverse, there is a great deal of 
opportunity for mistakes when collecting such information.  This has proven particularly 
problematic with NFIRS and other national emergency service databases.  Utilizing 
response and incident data from Charlotte makes for more valid findings, since there is 
more opportunity to research and correct data errors.  This would not be the case if using 
data from NFIRS, because it would be impossible to contact each fire department 
associated with a discrepancy or missing value.  Instead, the Charlotte data can be 
checked for accuracy and any problems found can be resolved by contacting the source of 
the information.  
 Fire service response data collected by the Charlotte Fire Departmnt and data 
from a neighborhood quality of life study and the Census will be used to test the 
hypotheses, listed in chapter 4, to develop an alternate model for locating emergency 
resources.  The goal of the new model is to account for the myriad of emergency services 
provided by urban and suburban fire departments and their impact on service delivery.  
To date, the Charlotte Fire Department allocates its emergency resourc  in a way that 
focuses on the individual, meaning it attempts to provide equal service delivery outputs to 
every person residing within the city.  This method fails to separate individual from 
societal risks, which leads to service inefficiency and ineffectiveness (Cubbin et al., 
2000b).  The situation is exacerbated by the increasing demand on limited emergency 
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service resources in Charlotte and other communities across the country.  This means 
fewer resources are available to respond to more urgent requests for assistance, because 
units are more frequently committed to non-emergent incidents.  Finding an alternate 
method to deploy these resources to maintain or reduce current societal risk level  based 
on the available limited emergency resources is necessary to manage demand (Barr & 
Caputo, 2003).  Identifying factors that correlate with increased or decreased demand for 
emergency services provides an opportunity to more effectively guide where to loca e 
these resources to better address demand.   
3.3 Charlotte Neighborhood/Block Group Data Sources 
  In 1997, the Charlotte City Council commissioned a neighborhood study to 
measure quality of life, at which time seventy-three inner city neighborhood areas were 
identified.  These areas were aligned with U.S. Census block groups to the extent 
possible.  The study area was expanded in 2000 to include an additional 100 
neighborhood statistical areas (NSA) that encompassed all of the incorporated a eas and 
the city’s sphere of influence areas.  In 2002, 2004, and 2006, a more consistent 
methodology was implemented to perform the Neighborhood Quality of Life Studies o 
facilitate better comparisons between neighborhoods.   These studies were compl ted by 
the Metropolitan Studies Group at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.   
 The 2006 Neighborhood Quality of Life Study and Census block group 
information provides data on more than twenty demographic variables about the city.  
The variables measure population demographics, crime statistics, economic conditions, 
and structural appearance of the neighborhoods to assess quality of life.  Many of these 
neighborhood characteristics have been linked to demand for emergency services in 
74 
 
 
previous studies and government reports.  However, reports and other research into the 
subject do not attempt to combine these characteristics with fire response data or to 
evaluate the impact on the entire service delivery platform that is provided by most urban 
departments. 
 A potential issue to overcome with the Neighborhood Quality of Life Study for 
this analysis is the focus on permanent residents.  Data is sparse for areas of th  city with 
few residents, such as the business district uptown.  The uptown area is predominately 
high-rise office buildings and other non-residential structures; however, emergncy 
service demand is high in this jurisdiction because of daily population density increases, 
the vagrant population, and other unique factors.  Fortunately, the business district is 
small in land area.  Two fire stations are located uptown, each with an engine ad ladder 
company assigned, that have the business district within their primary respons  
jurisdiction.  Each of these two stations also have residential areas included in th ir
primary response jurisdictions, which are included in the neighborhood study.  The 
Charlotte Neighborhood Quality of Life Study does not include information about the 
business district, because in 2006 there were few if any residential structures in this finite 
area of the city.  This situation does create a potential for bias because fire units do 
respond to a significant number of incidents in these areas.  Without demographic data it 
is not possible to confidently assess relationships that might be associated with these 
responses.  It is likely the sample will contain so few responses into the business district 
that any bias will be limited.  However, to further limit the effect of the neighborhood 
deficiencies, individual census block groups were substituted for the NSA’s.  Instead of 
173 NSA areas, the block groups effectively divide the city into 331 areas, providing for 
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more precision and fewer information gaps.  Because the NSA divisions were derived 
from the census block groups, the demographic information is similar and provides 
additional variables to include in the analysis. 
 Eleven variables from the Census Block Group data for the Charlotte area are 
used for this analysis to inform a new fire service resource allocation model.   Th se
variables were selected because of their hypothesized association to emergency service 
demand based on theory, experience, and previous literature (Gamache, 2003; Cubbin, 
LeClere, & Smith, 2000a).  The following variables were selected: POPULATION, 
HOUSE UNITS, HOUSE INCOME, CODE, APPEARANCE, HOMEOWNER, FOOD 
STAMP, YOUTH, AGED, HS GRAD, and BUILD AGE.  Below each variable is 
defined and the method for measuring each is explained. 
 POPULATION is often associated with demand for emergency services.  
Typically, population is positively associated with the number of emergency incidents, so 
block group areas with more people are expected to have more demand for emergency 
services than block groups with fewer people.  The variable is defined as the total number 
of persons residing in a block group and is measured at the ratio level.   
 HOUSE UNITS is associated with the level of fire risk in each block group area.  
Roughly 80% of civilian deaths and injuries nationally result from fires occurring in 
residential structures each year.  In 2006 direct dollar losses from residential fires 
approached $7 billion.  More than 2,600 people died and 13,000 injuries resulted from 
these residential fires (U.S. Fire Academy, 2006).  The volume of residential structures is 
likely associated with the chance of fire within a block group, which impacts demand for 
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emergency services.  The variable is defined as the number of residential structures 
located in each block group and is measured at the ratio level.   
 HOUSE INCOME is a measure of wealth.  Poverty is associated with increased 
risk for fire according to national data trends (Gamache, 2003).  The variable is defined 
as the median household income in dollars for each block group and is a ratio level 
measure.   
 CODE violations are expected to be associated with increased demand for 
emergency services, because dilapidated buildings are more prone to fire. Code 
inspectors circulate daily throughout the city surveying residential and commercial 
structures.  These inspectors also respond to complaints and inspection requests.  
Structures not deemed structurally stable, with broken windows or other hazards, can be 
cited for code violations.  Inspectors have the authority to condemn and demolish 
structures that are in extreme disrepair or pose a substantiated danger to the public.  This 
variable also represents the economic conditions found in each block group.  The variable 
is defined as the percent of residential units within a block group that have been cited for 
building code violations. 
 APPEARANCE violations represent how well the structures in each block group 
are maintained.  Poorly maintained structures are more susceptible to fire.  Block group 
areas with more appearance violations are likely to be associated with increased demand 
for emergency services.  The variable is an indexed interval number describing the 
condition of properties found in each block group.  This variable represents the 
percentage of appearance code violations for each block group.  Higher scores are 
awarded to block groups with structures in better condition and lower scores represent 
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block groups with residential areas in a more dilapidated physical condition.  Appearance 
violations can include high grass, vehicles parked on lawns, and obvious structural issues.   
 HOMEOWNER is likely correlated with demand for emergency services, and 
also serves as a measure of economic status for the block group.  The variable is defined 
as the percent of owner-occupied residences in each block group measured at the ratio 
level.  This is a measure of an area’s structural condition because owner-occupied 
dwellings tend to be in less disrepair than renter-occupied structures.   
 FOOD STAMP is a measure of economic status.  As reported in the Topical Fire 
Report Series 2008, the poor are at greater risk of being impacted by fire than other 
economic groups.  The variable is defined as the percentage of persons residing in a block 
group who are receiving food stamps.  This is a ratio level measure associated with 
poverty. 
 YOUTH are almost twice as likely as the average person to sustain an injury or 
die from fire.  The variable is defined as the percentage of persons 18 years and younger 
residing in each block group and is an interval level measure.   
 AGED is associated with increased risk for fire and medical emergencies, which 
influences demand.  The variable is defined as the percentage of persons 65 and older 
residing in each block group and is an interval level measure. The measure indicates only 
a higher or lower percentage across neighborhoods.    
 HS GRAD is a measure of the percentage of persons 25 years and older residing 
in each block group that have either graduated high school or earned a graduate 
equivalent degree (GED). 
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 BUILD AGE is a measure of the average age of the structures located within eac  
block group.  This variable is included because older structures are more prone to fire.  
Building codes have improved progressively with time, so older structures tend to have 
fewer fire protection systems such as sprinklers and monitored alarms.  In addition, there 
is more opportunity to be in disrepair as the building ages.  Although older buildings tend 
to have fewer fire protection systems, newer construction also has many problems that 
create fire hazards.  For example, laminated wood beams and truss systems commonly 
used today in all types of construction permit rapid fire spread and collapse, which limits 
the opportunity to extinguish fires in these buildings.  
 Below is a table (Table 1) providing summary statistics for each of the elev n 
variables for the randomly selected sample of block groups and for the entire population 
of block groups for comparison.   
Table 1: Independent Variable Univariate Statistics  
Explanatory  Variable Summary Statistics 
Sample (n=118) Population (n=331) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
   
POPULATION 2506.95 2261.97 2260.67 1898.07 
HOUSE UNITS 1073.09 909.15 971.92 785.65 
HOUSE INCOME 52877.47 27500.58 56478.59 35367.96 
CODE 0.0962 0.02 0.0114 0.0442 
APPEARANCE 0.2 0.1972 0.1849 0.1842 
HOMEOWNER 0.527 0.2492 0.5528 0.2466 
FOOD STAMP 0.1099 0.1111 0.1086 0.109 
YOUTH 0.2478 0.0704 0.2512 0.07 
AGED 0.0963 0.0509 0.1031 0.594 
HS GRAD 0.8188 0.1495 0.8228 0.1501 
BUILD AGE 34.39 15.74 34.32 15.28 
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 Charlotte is a diverse and dynamic city, ensuring variability across the 331 block 
group areas.  The clearly defined boundaries of each area permit comparison with data 
acquired from the Charlotte Fire Department to facilitate this research ffort.  The eleven 
block group level independent variables were chosen based on their hypothesized 
relationship to emergency service demand.  These relationships were derived from 
previous research, such as that performed by FEMA (2008, February) for its T p cal Fire 
Report Series, which describes fire risk characteristics from 2004.  FEMA used NFIRS 
data to compile demographic factors associated with increased risk for fire to p oduce 
this report.  Many of the variables, such as AGED, YOUTH, MEDIAN INCOME, and 
FOOD STAMPS, were included for this analysis to test the stated hypotheses listed in 
Chapter 4.   
3.4 Charlotte Fire Data 
 Emergency incident and response information collected during fiscal year 2006 
by the Charlotte Fire Department is the other data source for this analysis.  Charlotte Fire 
is the key city business unit charged with responding to and mitigating all fire, medical, 
hazardous materials, and rescue emergencies that occur within the city limits.  Local tax 
dollars are the primary funding source for the department, which has an annual operating 
budget that exceeds $80 million.  The department also receives money from the federal 
government through Homeland Security grants.  These grants help to fund specialty units 
and services, such as a regional hazardous materials team and urban search and res ue 
units.  Incident data from FY2006 matches the time period when data for the 
Neighborhood Quality of Life Study and census block group information was collected, 
which is important to ensure valid findings.  The data set developed for this analysis 
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contains information on 84,023 emergency incidents that occurred within the city limits 
between July 1, 2005 and June 30, 2006.  The Charlotte Fire Department maintains 
information on each emergency incident to which it responds.  This data includes the 
nature of the emergency, date and time, unit(s) that responded, time unit(s) were 
dispatched, time each unit responded, time each unit arrived at the incident, time each 
unit completed the assignment, location of the incident, and where units responded from 
to each incident.  This information is stored by the department for legal and 
documentation purposes.  The dependent variables to test the hypotheses are derived 
from this data set.   
 During FY2006 the department responded from 37 fire stations located 
throughout the city with 54 front-line fire apparatus.  Front-line apparatus include engine, 
ladder, and rescue companies.  These companies are staffed by firefighters twenty-four 
hours a day.  Engine 37 began operation during this fiscal year, responding from a 
temporary station located in close proximity to the permanent site for the new station, 
which is located in the southern part of the city.  Each of the 37 fire stations has at le t 
one engine company and 17 of the stations also have a ladder company, rescue company, 
or airport crash unit assigned.  In addition, the department operates two urban search and 
rescue trucks out of Station 11, two hazardous materials units out of Station 13, a 
regional hazardous materials unit out of Station 32, five brush trucks, and five tankers for 
specialty type emergency incidents.1  For this analysis, front line units are the only units 
included, since they are the ones staffed full-time by firefighters and have te capability 
                                                          
1 Description of specialty type apparatus: See Appendix A. 
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to initiate action to mitigate emergency incidents.  These units are engine companies, 
ladder companies, and rescue companies. 
• Engine Company:  Apparatus that carries thousands of feet of hose, a pump, 
and water to extinguish fires.  Each Charlotte engine company has a minimum 
1500 gallon per minute (gpm) pump with the three companies assigned to the 
high-rise district having 2000 gpm capacity.  These trucks carry a minimum of 
500 gallons of water with companies assigned to out-lying stations having 750 
gallon water tanks.  A myriad of hose sizes are also carried that include 1 ¾ 
inch diameter attack lines with 180 gpm capacity, 2 ½ inch diameter attack 
lines capable of 300 gpm, and 5 inch supply lines used to connect the truck’s 
pump to the fire hydrant for water.  All engine companies in the city are 
staffed with four firefighters except Engine #9 which is staffed by five 
firefighters.  
• Ladder Company: Apparatus that carries hose, a pump, water, a full 
complement of ground ladders, vehicle extrication equipment, and an aerial 
ladder.  The fourteen ladder companies in Charlotte all carry 370 gallons of 
water, a 2000 gpm pump, a small complement of hose, three hydraulic 
powered vehicle extrication tools, multiple ground ladders of lengths 16’, 28’, 
& 40’, and a 105’ aerial ladder.  Four firefighters staff these trucks, which are 
used for fire suppression and technical rescue. 
• Rescue Company:  Apparatus that carries technical rescue equipment for 
vehicle extrication, high angle, confined space, structural collapse, trench 
collapse, water emergencies, and dive rescue.  The two rescue companies in 
Charlotte are each staffed with five firefighters. 
 
The 37 stations are separated into seven battalions, which are administrative designations.  
A battalion chief is assigned to each battalion and supervises four to six fire stations.  The 
Charlotte Fire Department operations section consists of more than 1,000 uniformed 
firefighters who are assigned to one of three shifts.  Each shift works 24 hours at a time.  
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 The number and type of fire apparatus that respond to an incident is determined 
by the nature of the emergency.  Medical emergencies account for roughly 61% of the 
fire department’s emergency responses.  Each front line apparatus is staffed by 
firefighters certified as emergency medical technicians (EMT) who can provide basic life 
support medical care.  This level of care includes the ability to defibrillate pati nts in 
cardiac arrest, administer oxygen, manually ventilate patients, bandage wounds, spli t 
fractures, and provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).  A single fire apparatus 
(engine, ladder, or rescue) responds to all medical emergencies within the city.  The fire 
department does not provide medical transport services.  Patient transport is provided by 
a third service agency, Mecklenburg EMS Agency (MEDIC), within the city.  MEDIC 
operates the ambulance service and provides advanced life support medical care.  Ea h 
ambulance is staffed by at least one person certified at the paramedic level who can 
perform all basic and advanced life support procedures.  Paramedics are capableof 
starting intravenous fluids, administering cardiac medications, performing 
electrocardiograms, and intubation.  The fire department provides first response servic  
to medical emergencies because there are significantly more fire apparatus than 
ambulances within the city and are usually in a position to reach incidents faster th n the 
MEDIC units.  Response statistics for the fire department to medical emergncies are 
included in the data set but do not include information about emergency medical services 
provided by MEDIC. 
 In addition to medical incidents, only a single fire resource responds to vehicle 
fires, residential fire alarms, motor vehicle accidents without entrapment, and other 
service calls that can be managed by one company.  The department dispatches multiple 
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fire resources to fire, rescue, and hazardous material incidents.  A myriad of resp nse 
criteria are used by the fire department to match the risk potential of each type of incident 
with a complement of resources.  A low risk incident is one that is unlikely to expand and 
can be handled by one or two fire companies.  As the risk level increases, so do the 
number of resources assigned.  For example, a report of a residential structure fire will 
trigger a response of three engine companies, a ladder company, and a battalion chief.  If 
the first unit on scene confirms that the residential structure is on fire, an additional 
engine company and a rescue company are also dispatched to the incident.  The type of 
structure and number of persons that may be impacted by an emergency incident also 
figure into the risk level assessment.  Structures deemed high risk by the department 
include schools, businesses, industrial sites, and high-rise buildings.  The initial respons  
to high risk structures is four engine companies, two ladder companies, one rescue 
company, and two battalion chiefs.  Additional resources can always be dispatched to an 
incident at the discretion of the fire officers on the scene.  The Charlotte Fire response 
data include the number of responding resources to each incident, which impacts 
allocation decisions.  This dataset includes 84,023 incidents, which accounts for 131,907 
unit responses.  More than one unit responded to almost 20% of the incidents during 
FY2006, explaining the disparity between the number of incidents and the number of unit 
responses.   
 The response data variables will be linked to the block group explanatory 
demographic variables for the analysis.  The variables include DEMAND, 
DEMANDFIRE, DEMANDEMS, DEMANDRESCUE, DEMANDHAZMAT, 
DEMANDALARMS, DEMANDCANCEL, DEMANDMISC, DEMANDSTRUCTURE, 
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DEMANDOTHER, DEMANDNMV, DEMANDMV, TOTALTIME, and 
ONSCENETIME.  These dependent variables are described and defined below. 
 DEMAND is a ratio level measurement calculated for each block group to norm 
the variable.  For the sample population of block groups (N=118), the mean number of 
incidents per block group was 488.  The range of incidents per block group included a 
minimum of 7 and a maximum of 2819.  The measure for demand was normed by 
calculating the total number of emergency incidents in each block group per 100 
residents [DEMAND = # incidents/(population/100)].   
 The variable for DEMAND is generated by a myriad of incident types, and each 
one has the potential to be associated with different demographic characteristics.  
Therefore, in addition to evaluating the relationship to overall demand, it is also 
important to separate the different types of incidents.  Incident type can be broken down 
into four or five broad categories (fire, medical, rescue, hazmat, other); however, I have 
chosen to separate demand into seven categories and then further divide fire and medical 
incidents into subcategories to capture more precision for the analysis.  Each of the 
incident categories are measured at the ratio level and have been normed based on the 
population found in each block group.  Just as the DEMAND variable was normed, each 
of the incident type variables is calculated to represent the number of incidents per 100 
persons in the population.  In particular, it is important to separate out the types of 
incidents because some are more emergent than others.  For example, a small fire will 
become a big fire if left unchecked.  Unfortunately, the available data does not provide 
enough information to measure severity for all incident types, which is why the 
ONSCENETIME and TOTALTIME variables are included.   
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 DEMANDFIRE represents the number of incidents occurring in each block group 
that involved an actual fire.  This variable does not represent the severity of the fire, only 
that there was an active fire.  Therefore, it includes vehicle fires, structure fires, grass 
fires, rubbish fires, aircraft fires, and any other incident type where the pres nce of a fire 
was recorded in each block group.  DEMANDFIRE was then broken down into two 
subcategories to separate fires involving structures and other types of fire.  Sp cifically, 
DEMANDSTRUCTURE represents all fires that involved a structure, which is important 
not only for potential monetary losses but also potential threat to life.  Structures include 
high rises, office buildings, school buildings, residential buildings, storage facilities, 
mobile homes, and outbuildings.  Again, this variable does not represent incident 
severity, only the potential for a severe incident.  DEMANDOTHER simply measures all 
other fires that do not involve a structure, which includes motor vehicle fires, brush fires, 
forest fire, and rubbish fires.    
 DEMANDEMS represents the number of emergency medical incidents occurring 
in each block group.  Emergency medical incidents account for well over half of the calls 
for service.  These incidents include all medical emergencies, trauma emergenci s, motor 
vehicle accidents, and other incidents that required the fire department to provide med cal 
care to a complainant.  DEMANDEMS was then separated into two subcategories.  Fire 
departments, including the Charlotte Fire Department, respond to many different typ s of 
medical incidents, which vary greatly in severity.  The purpose for separating medical 
incidents into those not involving a motor vehicle (DEMANDNMV) and those involving 
a motor vehicle (DEMANDMV) was to better isolate and evaluate the affect o  
demographic variables on demand.  In general, the majority of emergency medical 
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incidents involving a motor vehicle occur on roadways, highways, and interstates.  
Although these transportation corridors pass through block groups, it is likely the 
relationship between motor vehicle accidents and the demographic characteristics a e 
spurious.  Medical emergencies not involving a motor vehicle are more likely to occur in 
or around where people reside or work, which is better represented by the block group 
demographic measures.  Therefore, DEMANDEMS is separated into two additional 
variables: DEMANDNMV and DEMANDMV. 
 DEMANDRESCUE represents the number of incidents where a person was 
trapped or pinned by an object requiring the fire department to remove them from the 
situation.  These incidents include motor vehicle accidents where a victim is entrapp d by 
the wreckage, industrial accidents, trench incidents, and any other situation where fire 
service personnel had to extricate a victim using specialized equipment and knowledge.  
Overall, rescue situations were the least likely type of incident. 
 DEMANDHAZMAT measures the number of incidents where a hazardous 
material is involved.  The most common of these incidents are cut natural gas lines, 
which leads to an active gas leak posing a fire and chemical hazard.  In addition, any leak 
or spill of a chemical or other hazard (gasoline, diesel, milk, oil, etc.) requiring the fire 
department to mitigate the incident is included in this measure. 
 DEMANDALARMS measures the number of fire alarms occurring in each block 
group.  This measure does not include an alarm that ends up being an actual fire event, 
which is relatively uncommon.  Alarm activations that prove to be non-events are a 
problem all fire departments must manage.  This measure essentially mesures the 
number of responses to non-events based on alarm activations for fire or carbon 
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monoxide situations.  The ability to limit or eliminate responses to these non-events could 
significantly free up resources for more emergent events. 
 DEMANDCANCEL measures the number of times a unit(s) is dispatched to an 
emergency event and either cancelled prior to arrival or is unable to find the incident.  
Units are cancelled for a variety of reasons, some of which include a resident providing 
the correct pass code to turn off a fire alarm or a medical patient changing his mind about 
needing assistance.  This measure also includes false calls for service.  Often times, 
persons driving down the road will use their cell phones to report an incident, such as 
smoke in the area which turns out to be from a chimney and not a fire event.  These types 
of incidents are costly for the fire department. 
 DEMANDMISC is the final demand category and includes all incident types that 
cannot be categorized with the other demand variables.  These incidents include animal 
rescues (yes, getting cats out of trees), illegal burning, overcrowding, keys locked in a 
vehicle or house, standbys, and citizen complaints.  Miscellaneous incidents tend to be 
non-emergent events, but generate demand for the fire department and therefore impact 
resource allocation. 
 In addition to the measures of emergency service demand, the time units spent on 
scene and managing incidents was also calculated from the response data.  Specifically, 
two measures were calculated based on response time information.  The first, 
TOTALTIME represents the time from when a unit is dispatched to the time the unit 
becomes available after each emergency incident [TOTALTIME = Available – 
Dispatch].  This is an important measure because each time a unit is dispatched it is 
unavailable to respond to an additional incident.  Therefore, this measure not only 
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captures response and on scene time, it also captures those incidents when units are 
cancelled after dispatch.  TOTALTIME used in the analysis represents the total time units 
spent on incidents in each block group divided by the number of incidents to find an 
average. 
 The second time measure, ONSCENETIME, represents the amount of time units 
spent on scene mitigating incidents.  This is measured from the time a unit arrives on 
scene to the time when the unit becomes available again.  This measure is hypothesized 
to be representative of incident severity.  As with total time, ONSCENETIM was 
calculated for each incident occurring in a block group and then divided by the total 
number of incidents to find an average [ONSCENETIME = Available – Arrival].  All 
incidents where a unit did not arrive on scene, such as when cancelled after dispatch, 
were coded as missing, to avoid skewing the data. 
 Univariate summary statistics for each of the fourteen dependent variables 
calculated from the Charlotte Fire Department response data are listed below in the table 
(Table 2).  The mean and standard deviation values were calculated for the population of 
block groups and the randomly selected sample of block groups for each variable, which 
provides an opportunity to evaluate the validity of the sample. 
Table 2: Dependent Variable Univariate Statistics  
Dependent Variable Summary Statistics (per 100 population) 
Sample (n=118) Population (n=331) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
   
DEMAND 17.05 30.67 15.81 22.09 
DEMANDFIRE 0.7968 0.9381 0.814 0.7933 
DEMANDSTRUCTURE 0.4008 0.4374 0.4077 0.3778 
DEMANDOTHER 0.3958 0.5267 0.4062 0.4717 
DEMANDEMS 10.89 20 9.906 14.33 
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Table 2: Continued 
    
Dependent Variable Summary Statistics (per 100 population) 
Sample (n=118) Population (n=331) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
DEMANDNMV 9.897 18.48 8.86 13.05 
DEMANDMV 0.9415 0.5267 1.009 1.787 
DEMANDRESCUE 0.0767 0.3889 0.0544 0.2541 
DEMANDHAZMAT 0.4404 1.79 0.3525 1.11 
DEMANDALARMS 1.858 5.508 1.72 3.686 
DEMANDCANCEL 1.561 3.107 1.493 2.471 
DEMANDMISC 1.429 1.542 1.47 1.531 
TOTALTIME 0:15:41 0:02:12 0:15:44 0:02:27 
ONSCENETIME 0:04:58 0:01:08 0:05:01 0:01:11 
 
3.5 Combining the Data: GIS Layers 
 The 37 fire stations are strategically placed to minimize response times to each 
part of the city.  However, the individual fire unit responding to each incident is the unit 
of analysis, not the station.  This provides more variation and more accurately describes 
the impact of locational decisions.  Again, seventeen of the fire stations house two front-
line fire units, meaning the neighborhoods protected by these seventeen stations have 
more resources assigned.  The block group data and the Charlotte Fire response data are 
linked using a geographical information system (GIS) program for each emerg ncy 
incident. 
 ARCVIEW is the GIS program utilized to associate the block group and response 
data.  The geocodes for each incident were pasted into a mapping program of the City of 
Charlotte containing the geolocations and borders of the 331 block group areas.  
Geocodes are simply X and Y map coordinates, which permit each emergency incident to 
be associated with the specific block group in which it occurred.  Numerous GIS layers 
are used to associate the data sets.  These include: 
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• Layer 1: City of Charlotte boundary with road system and neighborhood 
boundaries. 
• Layer 2: Neighborhood demographic variables, such as population, race, 
appearance, economics, etc. 
• Layer 3: Fire response district boundaries for each apparatus and station/apparatus 
location.  Seventeen of these districts will have multiple emergency resource 
assigned. 
• Layer 4: The FY2006 dataset includes the geocodes for each incident.  Therefore, 
the sample of incidents can be located on the GIS map to associate it with a 
neighborhood and response area. 
 
GIS provides a means to describe station locations and boundaries visually; however, the 
main purpose is to find relationships between the block group variables and the response 
variables.  Each incident (n=84,023) is linked to the block group (n=331) where it 
occurred.  Demographic and response information are then linked to create the actual data 
set for the analysis.   
 The combined emergency response and block group data were converted into an 
Excel spreadsheet document to calculate TOTALTIME and ONSCENETIME variables.  
This information was then pasted into the Statistical Package for the Social ciences 
(SPSS).  The SPSS program permits more detailed statistical analysis of the data.  
Specifically, multiple regression, correlations, and probability analysis were performed to 
find relationships between variables important to formulating an allocation strategy to 
improve service delivery. 
3.6 Data Sampling Strategy 
 Each of the dependent and independent variables used in this analysis are 
measured at the block group level.  The demographic independent variables were clearly 
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calculated for each of the block groups in the city of Charlotte.  The dependent variables 
were calculated from the response data which included 84,023 cases using GIS, EXCEL
and SPSS to generate block group level measures.  A random sample strategy was then
used to select 33% of the cases from the population of block groups (N=331).  Each case 
represents a block group within the city limits where the fire department responded to 
incidents during fiscal year 2006.  Numerous factors influence demand for emergency 
services, such as the season, day of the week, and hour of the day.  The U.S. Fire 
Administration report, The Seasonal Nature of Fires (2005, January) indicates a 
relationship between time of year and fire rates.  In particular, more structure fires are 
reported during the winter months, while an increase in other types of fires tends to occur 
during the spring and summer months.  In addition, the report indicates a measurable 
increase in fire incidents during holidays, such as Christmas, Fourth of July, 
Thanksgiving, and Halloween.  Another emergency service analysis conducted by the 
U.S. Fire Administration, Fire Department Overall Run Profile (2007, December) 
supports the seasonal effects on fire rates, while also showing no clear relationship 
between medical emergency incident rates and seasonal changes.  The data does indicat  
a relationship between time of day and emergency service demand.  National statistics 
demonstrate that the number of emergency incidents increases beginning arou d 0500 in 
the morning through 1800 in the evening before a slow decline begins for the remainder 
of the night time hours.   
 The size of the sample was selected to account for the variability between cas s, 
while also attempting to maximize accuracy.  Variability between cases for many of the 
variables is relatively high, because block groups represent fairly small are s that are 
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relatively homogenous across a large geographical area.  The City of Charlotte Fi e 
Department responds to 300 or more emergency situations each day across the 331 block 
group areas.  Clearly, some areas experience much higher demand than others.  It is 
expected that selecting 33% of the block groups will provide a representative sample to 
model demand and demographic variables.  The SPSS program was used to generate the 
random sample.  The program randomly selected the 118 cases from the overall data set
(n=331).  This sample will permit a high level of precision, which is important when 
making decisions about the allocation of limited emergency resources. 
3.7 Summary 
 The data described above will be used to test the hypotheses listed in Chapter 4.  
The block group level demographic data is optimal for this analysis because of the 
homogenous characteristics of those residing in these areas (Ostrom, 2000).  This will
result in a high level of certainty to when predicting emergency service demand and other 
response variables for each area to guide resource allocation decisions.  Although each 
emergency incident is different, urban fire departments across the country are confronted 
with the same locational issues as those present in Charlotte.  How do you find the 
optimal locations for limited emergency resources to maximize outcomes, which are 
measured by lives and property saved?  This chapter outlined the data sources, described 
the variables, defined the measures, and explained the sampling strategy that will be used 
to complete this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES 
 
 
4.1 Research Focus 
The tax base capacity of most local governments is insufficient to fund the 
emergency resources necessary to manage increasing demand, while also m eting
arbitrary service delivery benchmarks.  National fire department incident statistics 
demonstrate this increasing demand, which show a 5.2% rise in call volume in 2006 
compared to 2005.  The number of medical emergencies responded to rose 4.8% while 
departments responded to 2.5% more fire events.  On average, one of the 30,635 fire 
departments in the United States responded to a fire emergency every nineteen seconds
during 2006.  The direct dollar loss from fire exceeded $11 billion, which was the largest 
dollar loss measured during the previous ten years with the exception of 2003.   
Managing limited emergency resources in the presence of increasing demand challenges 
local decision-makers to find new ways to do more with less.   Communities often 
struggle to balance the number of emergency resources necessary to maintain an 
acceptable level of community safety with public preferences for the myriad of other 
services desired at the local level (Donahue, 2004a; Kuehnert, 1999). 
Providing emergency services is resource intensive, but so are most other local 
public sector services.  The opportunity cost of providing emergency services can be 
high, especially when balancing the delivery of other important services.  Thi situation is 
compounded by the persistent rising cost of energy and other cost factors.  For example, 
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fire apparatus are powered by diesel engines that get only six miles to the gallon.  These 
mileage calculations decrease under emergency driving conditions, because vehicles are 
accelerated and decelerated rapidly.  The City of Baltimore, for example, recently 
adjusted its emergency response policies to reduce fuel consumption.  The city now 
triages incidents based on severity to determine how many units should be dispatched in 
an effort to reduce the number of emergency responses (Anderson, 2008).   Local 
decision makers must adjust emergency resource deployment strategies because of 
limited available funding capacity to add or support their existing emergency srvices.  
This research effort will focus on developing an alternative model for fire service 
resource deployment and response to emergency events to improve efficiency.   
The model is based on probability and risk analysis within the urban environment 
to evaluate fire service delivery needs.  Geographic, structural, and socioeconomic 
community variables associated with changes in emergency service demand (fire 
suppression, rescue, hazardous materials, and emergency medical situations) guide the 
model algorithm.  The allocation model currently used by most communities relies on 
response time benchmarks as the predominant criteria for locating emergency esources 
within a defined geographical area.  The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
standard 1710 provides an objective for paid fire protection services to place a fire 
apparatus and personnel on an emergency incident within four minutes of receiving a 
request for assistance 90 percent of the time.  Allocating emergency resources based on 
the NFPA’s response time criteria or a different response time criteria equires limited 
resources to be dispersed equally throughout a community (Ammons, 2001).   
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A problem with this model is that it discounts the influence of community risk 
factors on emergency service demand.  Different areas within a jurisdiction experience 
varying degrees of risk for fire or other emergency events based on geographic, social, 
and structural characteristics (Gyimah-Brempong, 1989; Hallstrom, Boutin, Cobb, & 
Johnson, 1993).  Because of this, emergency incidents are not distributed evenly across 
geographic areas, which is problematic when using response time benchmarks to alloca e
emergency resources (Hammitt & Treich, 2007; Ostrom, Parks, & Whitaker, 1973).  An 
alternative model must include factors associated with demand for emergency servi es to 
guide resource allocation decisions to improve service delivery metrics.     
Population density statistics are frequently used by emergency service decision 
makers to justify the need for additional resources.  Previous research has identified 
correlations between population density and demand for emergency services, but 
population density alone is only one factor associated with call volume.  This statistic 
provides minimal information to guide public decision-makers in allocating emergency 
resources efficiently and effectively (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002).   For instance,  
inner-city neighborhood revitalization effort may spawn new high-density residential 
living opportunities.  These new residential structures are likely to displace lower income 
persons who were living in older, dilapidated structures.  Middle and upper income 
persons will occupy the new apartment and condominium buildings, which increase 
population density.  What impact does such a situation have on the emergency services?   
Based on population density measures, the emergency resources allocated to the 
inner-city neighborhoods would be maintained or increased.  However, a decrease in 
demand for emergency services is likely to occur in this situation for a number of 
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reasons.  First, fire codes continue to evolve for new construction, requiring more fire 
stops, sprinkler systems, automated alarm notification devices, and the use of non-
combustible construction materials.  New buildings are less susceptible to significant f re 
events, because even when a fire occurs it is usually contained in the area of origin and 
the emergency services respond prior to the fire intensifying.  Second, the upper and 
middle class occupants are demographically at lower risk for fire and are more likely to 
have healthcare options, which reduce their dependence on emergency resources for non-
emergent illnesses.  Instead, an increase in emergency service demand can be expected 
where the individuals displaced from the inner-city relocated even if they moved to an 
area with lower population density.  Lower income persons tend to be less educated and 
live in older structures that often do not meet fire codes.  This places them at greater risk 
for fire makes them and more prone to request medical services for non-emergent 
illnesses (Cubbin et al., 2000a).  This example shows that risk level or the probability of 
needing the local emergency services is dependent on individual habits, which population 
density statistics do not capture (Walsh, 1998). 
The challenge associated with any emergency resource allocation model is 
distributing scarce resources to their highest net present value.  Communities invest large 
sums of public funds to provide emergency services to protect life and property.  True 
emergency events are time sensitive, so any time a resource is unavailable or out of 
position to respond to an incident there is a reduction in service delivery effectiveness 
and efficiency.  For example, if a fire apparatus and personnel are responding to an 
incident where mitigation is not time sensitive, the resource is not available to manage a 
life threatening emergency that may occur simultaneously elsewhere.  A similar situation 
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occurs when too many resources are located in low demand areas or too few are located 
in high demand areas.  The large percentage of emergency responses to false alarms and 
incidents not involving a threat to life or property is a significant challenge emergency 
service decision makers must solve (Blackstone et al., 2005).  When emergency service 
agencies respond with equal speed and urgency to non-emergency events as they do to 
emergency events, an undue burden is placed on limited resources.  This also requires 
significant built in capacity to ensure emergency resources will be available for 
emergency events that do threaten life and/or property (Peters & Hall, 1999).   
An alternative emergency resource allocation model based on characteristics 
associated with demand and incident severity could have far reaching implications for 
local emergency service delivery and public finance.  The goal of a new model is to 
provide a template for policymakers to allocate emergency resources mor efficiently and 
effectively based on the community characteristics that drive demand and are associated 
with time-sensitive emergency events.  Predicting the future is rife with uncertainty, but 
based on the “law of large numbers” it is reasonable to expect that a model can be 
devised to estimate the probability of routine emergency events with a high level of 
certainty.  This will provide better information to guide resource allocation decisions 
across the tens of thousands of local jurisdictions that provide fire and emergency 
medical services (Pindyck & Rubinfield, 2001; Walsh, 1998).  A deployment strategy 
that is one size fits all is not realistic if a community expects effective and efficient 
emergency services, especially when considering the different economic and social 
constraints found in every community.  Allocating resources based on an alternative 
model that accounts for individual community risk characteristics and probability 
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assessment for emergency events will provide a mechanism to deliver these servic s 
more effectively and efficiently, which will reduce opportunity costs. 
4.2 Response Time Benchmarks 
The goal of any emergency resource deployment strategy is to reduce the loss of 
life and property associated with fire, hazardous materials, rescue, and medical events 
that afflict citizens.  This requires emergency resources to be available and positioned to 
arrive in time to mitigate an incident and limit loss of life and/or property.  Response time 
is the critical measure used throughout the emergency services industry to evaluate 
service delivery.  The commonly accepted definition of a response time is the time from 
when a request for assistance is received by emergency dispatchers to t  time when the 
first resource arrives at the incident address.  Arbitrary response time benchmarks were 
developed by NFPA based on time-sensitive events, such as average time to flashover 
and maximum time following cardiac arrest for successful resuscitation (Kuehnert, 1999).  
“Flashover is the stage of a fire at which all surfaces and objects in a room or area are 
heated to their ignition temperature and flames develop on all contents and combustible 
surfaces at once” (Brannigan & Corbett, 2008, 82).  NFPA 1710 recommends response 
times that do not exceed four minutes to 90% of incidents for fire departments staffed by 
paid personnel (Barr & Caputo, 2003).  Most urban and suburban communities, to the 
extent possible, locate emergency resources to minimize response times to all areas 
within a jurisdiction.  Exogenous factors and hesitancy on the part of public decision 
makers to use response data to predict future demand makes this deployment strategy 
resource intensive if response time benchmarks are going to be met.  Deploying 
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emergency resources in this manner decreases the efficiency and effectiv ness of service 
delivery (Cubbin et al., 2000b). 
Many emergency response issues are created when decision makers attempt to 
locate resources based on response time benchmarks.  Demand is not evenly spread 
across a jurisdiction, so locating emergency resources to meet a response time criteria to 
all areas of a jurisdiction is problematic.  This is especially true when multiple emergency 
requests are received simultaneously in the same response area (Peters & Hall, 1999).  In 
this situation, the emergency resource assigned to an incident is no longer available to 
respond to other emergencies within its area, which can leave large coverage gaps until 
the assigned unit has completed the response.  No matter the size, all local jurisdictions 
will experience this situation, which occurs more frequently in urban communities wh re 
call volume is higher.  This strategy also does not spread workload evenly among the 
emergency resources.  Equipment and personnel in low demand areas are under used 
while equivalent resources in high demand areas are over used, requiring more 
maintenance and premature replacement.  In addition, as the workload on a resource 
increases, the jurisdiction it protects becomes more vulnerable.  The more hours a unit i
tied up on incidents, the fewer hours it is available to respond to additional incidents. 
This means that units from neighboring coverage areas will respond more frequ ntly into 
high demand areas, creating additional coverage problems.     
Few if any local government jurisdictions have the resources to meet stringent 
response time benchmarks for every emergency incident, because as demand increses 
the gaps in service also increase, making the community more vulnerable.  The only way 
to avoid this situation is to better allocate scarce resources based on the probability f 
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events that may cause loss of life and/or property occurring.  However, the emergency 
services industry continues to subscribe to existing response time deployment mod ls that 
require significant built in capacity to meet response time benchmarks.  This fails to 
account for the economic reality of most local government’s work, which usually does 
not permit the acquisition of adequate resources to meet these benchmarks while 
maintaining the capacity to respond to simultaneous emergency events. 
4.3 Managing Limited Emergency Resources 
The realities of limited resources require that policymakers make calculated 
decisions to maximize service delivery output.  This is a difficult transition in decision 
making for government officials who are programmed to espouse reactive and not 
proactive policies (Burton, 2008).  Reactive policy decisions prevent what Leeson (2007) 
describes as “type one policy errors.”  Instead, reactive policies subject public officials to 
committing “type two errors,” which are more politically palatable.  Current d ployment 
strategies are reactive, providing the appearance of equality for all citizens.  This strategy 
is subject to “type two policy errors,” which occur when emergency resources are not 
available or are out of position to respond to time-sensitive emergency events.  The 
strategy effectively deploys resources on a first come, first serve basis (Blackstone et al., 
2005).   
This method for distributing resources prevents citizens or even political leaders 
from monitoring effectiveness and efficiency.  Asymmetric information makes it difficult 
for those outside of the fire service to recognize that a problem is created by this
deployment strategy, which produces a potential moral hazard situation.  Allocating 
resources on a first come, first serve basis gives the impression of equality, but  in fact 
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creates a hidden action from the “customers” who are harmed by such policies.  For 
example, if two neighbors dial 911 thirty seconds apart, the first caller will receive the 
closest unit regardless of the severity of the event.  A unit from another area will respond 
to the call received thirty seconds later, which will increase the response time.  The 
failure to triage these incidents could easily harm the second caller if his/her situation is 
more serious.  The asymmetric information problem prevents the citizen from knowing 
when he/she is harmed.  In such case, a moral hazard situation has resulted because th  
citizen is unknowingly harmed by the actions of the decision-makers (Brehm & Gates, 
1999).  The inability to identify the inefficiencies and other problems with this 
deployment model provide incentive to policy makers to continue with the status quo.    
This also demonstrates how the established policy for locating resources is 
compromised when multiple incidents occur simultaneously in an area.  Without 
considerable emergency unit redundancy built into the system, time-sensitive emergency 
incidents are more likely to receive delayed responses.  When such an error occu s with 
the existing deployment model, the victims are often impossible to identify.  This makes 
it difficult for citizens to hold anyone accountable.  As in the situation above, the second 
caller does not know whether her emergency or her neighbor’s was more critical.  She 
also is unlikely to know whether there was a longer than necessary response time.  
Because of this, the fire department can turn a blind eye to situations where the 
deployment strategy may have harmed rather than aided a citizen.  The inability to 
identify victims of a reactive policy provides an incentive to maintain the status quo for 
locating local emergency resources.  
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Despite this finding, a more efficient and effective deployment methodology is a 
critical issue for the emergency services moving into the future.  Emergency s rvices are 
expected to reduce risk of loss from fire, rescue, hazardous materials, and medical 
emergencies to society, although it is neither reasonable nor possible to eliminate all risk 
(Rhoads, 1998).  Evaluating community risk through probability assessments provides a 
valuable tool to better maximize the deployment of available resources.  Clearly, the 
potential benefit of allocating emergency resources based on probability assessments has 
not been realized.  However, decision-makers committed to public safety will have to 
find alternative methods to allocate emergency resources because existing allocation 
models are too resource intensive.  A deployment model based on probability is subject 
to error, but it is likely that this error is less than that experienced with current allocation 
models.   
4.4 Research Objectives  
Many research questions must be posed to begin the analysis.  This multi part 
exercise will evaluate demographic characteristics associated with higher or lower 
probability for emergency service responses into neighborhood jurisdictions.  This 
exercise will also evaluate characteristics associated with the probability that emergency 
resources are available to respond and the likelihood of calls for service being time-
sensitive emergency events.  A non time-sensitive event can be defined as a situation that 
results in no action by the fire service to mitigate the incident.  A time-sensitive 
emergency event is one that requires action by the fire service to resolve the situation.  
Many public sector leaders contend that it is not possible to determine the severity of an 
emergency until trained personnel arrive on scene, at which time it is too late t alt r the 
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response (Blackstone et al., 2005).  This may or may not be true, but many high-
performance emergency medical systems utilize fluid deployment strategies to locate 
ambulances in geographical areas based on the likelihood of an emergency event 
occurring.  These systems rely on historical response and incident data to predict the 
location of future calls.  This is more complicated for fire departments, becaus  the 
service delivery platform is so broad.  Unlike EMS agencies, fire departments us  
predict fire, hazardous material, rescue, and medical events.  Rather than predicting risk 
at the individual level, this evaluation will focus at the neighborhood level.  
Neighborhoods tend to be homogenous (Ostrom, 2000).  Therefore, associating 
neighborhood risk characteristics with resource availability may provide an alter ative 
measure to guide allocation decisions.   
Research to evaluate government performance and public administration 
processes to measure service inputs and outcomes are numerous (Donahue, 2004a).  
Government leaders have utilized performance measures for many years to n he 
public trust and to provide more efficient services.  Although measures of efficiency for 
some public services provide valuable information, most performance measures used to 
evaluate fire, rescue, and emergency medical services are not sufficient to d termine 
effectiveness.  These performance measures are what Swiss and Strauss (2005) label 
process measures and are not true outcome measures.  Process measures provide 
information about how hard an organization is working, such as the average number of 
incidents a fire department responds to or average response times.  Process measures 
provide valuable information but do not indicate much about the organizational outputs 
or outcomes that are synonymous with assessing efficiency or effectiveness. 
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Response time is a measure of “process.”  NFPA 1710 sets the standard for paid 
fire departments to arrive at fire and other emergency events at 4 minutes or les  to 90% 
of calls.  The four minute benchmark for fire incidents is based on average time to 
flashover.  Humans, whether firefighters or civilians, cannot survive a flashover because 
temperatures often exceed 1000 degrees farenheight.  Few if any fire departments hav  
the resources to consistently meet this response time benchmark.  Many factors beyond 
the fire service’s control affect the time from fire ignition to arrival of emergency 
personnel and should be included in any deployment strategy.  For example, higher 
income residents usually invest in monitored fire protection systems that detec fires soon 
after ignition and notify the fire department to respond.  Investment in private fire 
protection, such as smoke detectors and sprinkler systems, is not common in lower 
socioeconomic communities.  Those unable to afford private fire protection systems are 
at greater risk, because notification of a fire event is dependent on a human witness 
(Donahue, 2004b, Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1996).     
In a world with unlimited resources, the response time benchmarks outlined in 
NFPA 1710 are ideal.  A department meeting such criterion would essentially provide 
citizens within a community a 90% chance of receiving assistance within four min tes 
every time they called 911.  However, this scenario is not practical for the majority of 
communities providing emergency services because the inordinate number of resources 
required to meet this standard are simply not available.  In addition, this benchmark does 
not address the issue of emergency requests that are not time-sensitive and do not require 
a rapid response, but still tie up valuable resources (Blackstone et al., 2005).  A more 
meaningful evaluation of fire service performance is how often resources arrive on an 
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emergency incident in time to prevent loss of life and property.  This measure is difficult 
to assess, but gets to the matter of efficiency.  It is not efficient for fire apparatus to arrive 
on the scene of a false alarm or minor medical situation within three minutes whil 
having a seven minute response time to a house fire.  An efficient emergency servies 
department gets resources to time-sensitive emergency events with urgency to limit loss 
of life and property, while handling less urgent requests in a manner that maintains 
maximum resource capacity for more critical incidents.  Evaluating the severity of an 
incident prior to an emergency resource arriving on the scene is challenging, but clear 
indicators of severity are often present to help triage responses.  
The goal of this research is to provide a model for improving fire service 
performance that is result oriented, not process oriented.  Responding to non-emergency 
events in record time places more persons at risk than it benefits, wastes valuable 
resources, and has huge opportunity costs.  Improving service delivery efficiency and 
effectiveness depends on separating emergency events, where response time and resource 
management are critical to preventing the loss of life or property from non-emerg ncy 
events (Perrin, 1998).  In addition, emergency service demand should influence where 
resources are located within a community.  Response time is an important factor o 
consider, but should not be the dominant factor when locating resources.  A more 
effective and efficient deployment strategy locates resources in areas of a community 
where demand and the likelihood of time-sensitive emergency events are the highest.  
This research focuses on neighborhood and emergency response variables in conjunction 
with probability analysis to construct an alternative model for emergency rsource 
allocation.   
106 
 
 
4.5 Factors Influencing Fire Service Resource Deployment 
Pre-hospital emergency medical service organizations are far ahead of the fire
service in developing resource deployment strategies.  Much of this is out of necessity, 
because insurance guidelines and other industry standards do not mandate a minimum 
number of emergency medical resources to lower insurance rates.  Therefore, urban 
emergency medical agencies have had to find more efficient methods to allocate scarce 
resources that can effectively meet their stated mission.  The single focus of these 
agencies provides the opportunity to utilize response information to evaluate future 
demand (Peters & Hall, 1999).  Not only do many of these high performance agencies 
use response data to predict demand, but they also use key indicators to evaluate the 
seriousness of each call for service.  Under this deployment model, a medical event that 
is rated a low priority will trigger a non-emergency dispatch for the responding 
ambulance.  If a higher priority medical incident is received while a unit respond  to a 
non-emergency event the unit can be diverted to the more serious call.  Again, the single 
focus on medical emergencies makes it easier for these agencies to predict and prioritize 
responses.   
The fire service as an organization is very different from a single focus 
emergency medical services agency.  Pre-hospital emergency care is a relatively new 
service.  It was only three or four decades ago that funeral home services provided 
antiquated pre-hospital emergency care.  These services would respond and place patients 
in the unit and, depending on the injuries, either take the individual to the funeral home or 
to the hospital.  Clearly, this was a conflict of interest, since the funeral service made 
more money if the patient went to the funeral home.  In the past few decades, pre-hospital 
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care has become highly developed.  Emergency medical systems throughout the country 
provide advanced medical care on emergency scenes and also transport injured and sick 
patients (Bledsoe, Porter, & Shade, 1997).  Many high performance systems that operate 
in the urban environment are labeled as third service systems.  These systems provide 
response and transport services, but are usually assisted by the local fire department.  To 
save money, most of these agencies work out of a central facility and deploy ambulance 
units throughout the response area based on the potential for a medical emergency.  For 
example, ambulances are assigned to street corners in areas likely to experience an 
emergency medical incident, rather than being assigned to a permanent sttio  facility.   
Fluid deployment strategies save on facility costs and permit the movement of limited 
emergency resources to meet changing demand.  
This is not the case with the fire service, which has been in existence in one form 
or another since the colonial period.  Fire stations in most cities have been in operation 
for decades and will not be moved no matter the service demands.  Not only are there 
historical constraints, but it is costly to build and/or relocate fire stations.  However, the 
emergency resources housed in these stations are subject to relocation.  The exogenous 
influences on the fire service place significant constraints on how resources are located 
throughout a community, which makes it difficult to simply relocate assets.  For example, 
the Insurance Services Organization (ISO) evaluates communities to set insurance rates 
based on local fire protection capabilities.  These factors encourage political and 
bureaucratic decision-makers to locate emergency resources in ways that may not be the 
most effective or efficient but will meet ISO criteria to lower insurance rates (Coe, 1983).   
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The modern urban fire service provides a dynamic service delivery platform.  
These agencies respond to fire, rescue, emergency medical, hazardous materials, and 
other emergency incidents, which places a premium on allocation decisions to maximize 
resource capabilities.  The dynamic service platform provided by most fire departments 
challenges the efficacy and practicality of the existing emergency deployment model, 
which ignores the expanded mission of the fire service.  Emergency resources are not 
allocated based on any scientifically driven methodology, which generates a lottery type 
situation for consumers.  Essentially, as more citizens call 911 for service, the hances of 
the next request receiving a timely response diminish because there are fewer resources 
available.  This situation is exacerbated by the allocation strategy employed by the fire 
service industry, which ignores the reality of limited resources and demand for its assets.   
Current allocation strategies attempt to distribute emergency units so every part of
a community can be reached by an emergency resource within a defined period of time.  
For example, decision-makers may draw concentric circles around each station location 
on a map to show the land area an emergency resource from its stations can reach within 
six minutes.  As a community grows, infrastructure is added, traffic congestion increases, 
and land area is annexed, gaps develop between the concentric response time circles 
which indicates apparatus under the best circumstances cannot meet the six minute 
benchmark.  This strategy leads to wide variance in workload for apparatus and personnel 
because demand is not spread equally throughout a jurisdiction.  Emergency apparatus in 
high demand areas may respond to six or seven times more incidents than units located in 
low demand areas.  This deployment strategy also places more value on a statistical life 
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in those areas with lower population density, since there are more emergency resources 
per person (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002).   
Distributing resources equally is politically appealing, but when multiple 
emergency incidents occur simultaneously in an area coverage gaps lead to increased 
response times.  Many of these potential incidents will not require a time sensitive 
response, but most departments fail to triage incidents based on severity.  Instead, 
departments respond with the same resource complement and urgency to all requests for 
assistance.  Responding to all incidents in the same way, without deference to the nature 
of the event, ties up valuable resources that might be needed to mitigate more critical 
situations.  Community, socioeconomic and structural characteristics associated with 
emergency services demand vary not only between communities but within communities, 
challenging the true efficacy of a static emergency services deployment strategy.   
4.6 Hypotheses for Emergency Service Demand 
Emergency service demand is a product of structural and social characteristics 
found across communities, which makes it difficult to predict with a high level of 
certainty.  The characteristics that raise or lower one’s risk for experi ncing a fire or other 
type of emergency are not necessarily the same as those associated with one’s likelihood 
of calling for assistance from the emergency services.  Risk for fire varis cross 
neighborhoods in most communities.  Neighborhood jurisdictions are populated by 
people with similar demographic characteristics and risk factors.  For example, 
neighborhoods where much of the population is lower income likely cannot afford private 
fire protection equipment, such as smoke detectors or sprinkler systems or simply do not 
have the resources to perform routine maintenance on their places of residence.  In these
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situations, more dilapidated residential structures are at greater risk for fire than 
neighborhoods with newer residential structures that have monitored fire protection 
systems.  Therefore, it is assumed demand will be higher in neighborhoods with lower 
median household income, because factors likely to contribute to the ignition of a fire are 
more prevalent (Walsh, 1998).    
 Other neighborhood characteristics are also likely associated with demand for 
emergency services but may not be considered risks for emergency events.  If your house 
catches on fire your education or income level do not matter; you will request assi ance 
from the local emergency services.  However, what if you break your arm, develop a 
headache or flu like symptoms, find water in your basement following a rain storm, have 
a smoke detector with a dead battery, or lock keys in your car?  Will you call the local 
emergency services for assistance?    Education and income levels, along with other 
factors are likely associated with neighborhood demand for emergency service.  It is 
certainly true that lower income and less educated populations are at greater risk for fire 
and other types of emergencies, but these groups are also more likely to request 
assistance from local emergency service agencies for problems that other demographic 
groups would manage differently.  In many ways, risk characteristics are rel ted to 
causation of emergency events, while other factors are simply correlated with emergency 
events.  Regardless, neighborhood characteristics associated with increased risk for 
emergency events or with increased likelihood of requesting assistance from the 
emergency services contribute to overall demand (Boyle & Jacobs, 1982).   
  Structural variables, such as building age and appearance, are likely to be 
associated with an increased or decreased risk of fire.  Older structures and those not 
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maintained are at increased risk for fire because wiring is often deficient and private fire 
protection systems are either not present or in disrepair.  Building construction techniques 
also contribute to fire risk, because certain construction methods are more conducive to 
fire spread while others are better at compartmentalizing fire (Brannig  & Corbett, 
2008).  The renter versus homeowner variable is associated with property maintenance.  
Rental properties are more likely neglected placing them at increased risk for fire.  
 Economic risk variables are neighborhood per capita household income and 
percent of persons receiving food stamps.  These factors are associated with risk for all 
emergency events.  Lower income neighborhoods are at greater risk for fire and medical 
emergencies because most structures have inadequate private fire protection systems and 
residents often do not have healthcare options.  Finally, social risk variables include 
neighborhood population, education levels, and percent elderly/youth.  Populations that 
are less educated tend to be associated with higher demand on local emergency services 
than other socioeconomic groups.  In addition, the young and old are more prone to 
medical emergencies and careless acts that increase the chance of fire vents.  Much 
variability in emergency service demand exists across the typical urban environment.  
The opportunity to explore relationships between demand and neighborhood 
characteristics has not been considered as a guide for emergency resource allocation 
decisions.  The number of persons in an area certainly is associated with demand to some 
extent, but it is likely that stronger correlations to demand exist based on the specific 
characteristics found within a population. 
Assuming that demand for emergency services is not completely random, it is 
logical that characteristics found within individual homogenous neighborhood areas 
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within every community are associated with call volume variability.  Establi hing an 
association between call volume (DEMAND) and the community risk variables identified 
guides the first research question and subsequent hypotheses.  Is emergency service 
demand (call volume) at the neighborhood level related to the structural, economic, and 
social characteristics? 
Community Risk Hypotheses 
 H1A (Structural Environment): The more dilapidated buildings become as they age 
or are neglected within a block group jurisdiction, the more demand emergency servie  
will experience.  There are a myriad of reasons that unmaintained structures and ones that 
have aged are at greater risk for fire, and may also serve as an indicator for predicting 
demand for other types of emergency services.  Building codes and construction are key 
factors to the prevention and/or containment of fire.  Over the past few decades, building 
codes directed at limiting fire risk have become a focus.  These codes include strict 
requirements for electrical wiring, fire stops, and alarm systems for new construction; 
however, few if any codes are retroactive to buildings constructed prior to the cde being 
implemented.  This means older structures are more susceptible to fire and fire spread.  
For example, balloon frame construction was the technique used almost exclusively to 
construct wood buildings over two stories until the mid-1900s.  This type of construction 
does not have fire stops between floors and permits fire to travel freely between wall 
studs from the basement to the attic, which poses a significant challenge to fire 
containment (Brannigan & Corbett, 2008).  Fire stops and other construction methods are 
now required to help contain the spread of fire, but older neighborhoods within a 
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community are more likely to have buildings that are more susceptible to fire and fire 
spread. 
 In addition to building construction techniques and codes, structures that are not 
maintained tend to be at greater risk for fire.  This includes not performing routine 
maintenance, such as allowing grass or bushes to grow up on the side of a building.  It 
also includes having clutter that may impede movement in and around a structure.  Again, 
appearance or code violations may be systemic of economic limitations, but it is clear 
that unmaintained structures are at greater risk for fire.  Therefore, one would expect 
areas within a community that are not well maintained and have more dilapidated 
buildings to place more demand on emergency resources allocated to those areas. 
 H2A (Economic Environment): Block group jurisdictions within a community that 
are economically depressed will place more demand on local emergency resources.  
Economic conditions for each block group are measured using average household 
income, percentage of homeowners, and percentage of persons eligible for food stamps.  
Persons with fewer economic resources are more likely to rely on government service , in 
particular the emergency services, than persons with more resources and options.  
Economic condition is likely to contribute to risk for fire and medical emergencies.  For 
example, those with more wealth will likely invest in private fire protection systems.  
This may include smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, or even a sprinkler system.  Persons 
with more wealth are also likely to have more health care options, making them less 
likely to utilize the emergency services for routine medical situations, such as a headache 
or the flu.  Again, as income decreases individuals have fewer options for obtaining 
health care or other services, making them more reliant on publicly provided service. 
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 H3A (Age Environment):  The age of persons residing within a block group 
jurisdiction is associated with emergency service demand.  Specifically, areas dominated 
by the old (over 65) and the young (under 18) are more likely to utilize the emergency 
services.  The aged are at greater risk for fire and medical emergencis, as health and 
carelessness become contributing factors to risk for medical and fire events.  The young 
tend to be more careless and take more risks that make them susceptible to medical and 
fire events, as well.  Therefore, jurisdictions with higher percentages of theld or young 
are likely associated with more demand on emergency services than areas dominated by 
more middle aged persons.   
 H4A (Educational Environment):  The level of education of the persons residing 
within a block group is inversely associated with demand on emergency services.  Risk is
an individually based characteristic, as personal habits and actions are the prdominant 
factors that raise or lower a person’s likelihood of experiencing a fire or medical vent 
(Walsh, 1998).  As education levels within a community increase the demand on 
emergency services should decline, because persons are likely more informed about fire 
safety and health issues, avoiding the need to utilize emergency services.  It s also likely 
that education is correlated with economic condition; however, the measure for education 
utilized is the percent of persons 25 years and older, who have graduated from high 
school or earned a graduate equivalent degree.    
Predicting emergency service demand based on neighborhood risk factors 
provides the foundation for developing an alternative allocation model.  The second 
phase is to find relationships between the neighborhood characteristics and  the likelihood 
of a time-sensitive emergency event.  Again, a time-sensitive emergency event is defined 
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as an incident requiring a rapid response by emergency service resources to limit human 
injury, loss of life, or property damage.  The outcome of most emergency service 
responses will not be altered by arriving a few minutes sooner; however, a delay of 
seconds can negatively affect the outcome of some incidents (Lerner, Maio, Garr son, 
Spaite, & Nichol, 2006).  Maximizing efficiency and effectiveness requires 
differentiating between time-sensitive emergency events and non time-sensitive events.  
Non time-sensitive events are those where the outcome will not change with a rapid
response.   
Emergency incidents often fit into four broad categories: fire, rescue, emerg ncy 
medical and hazardous materials.  For the most part, any incident involving uncontrolled 
fire or hazardous materials is a time-sensitive emergency event.  Incidents requiring 
special rescue operations, such as vehicle extrication, to free trapped victimsare time-
sensitive emergency events because most victims have suffered trauma.  The final group 
of incidents falls into the emergency medical category.  Time-sensitive emerg ncy 
medical events include cardiac arrests, myocardial infarctions, choking, hypoglycemic 
attacks, anaphylaxis, and significant traumatic injuries.  The list is long and situation 
dependent, making these events difficult to accurately delineate without individual level 
data.   
 It would be optimal to evaluate individual level data for each incident to 
determine the severity and its relationship to neighborhood characteristics; however, the 
available data does not contain the information necessary to perform such an analysis 
with a high level of confidence.  An alternative to predicting incident severity is using 
incident data to evaluate on scene time as it compares to neighborhood characteristics.  
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On scene time is defined as the total time from when a unit arrives at an incident to when 
the unit departs that incident.  In general, more severe incidents require longer on scne 
times because these incidents take longer to mitigate.  The longer units are tied up on 
incidents the more opportunity for additional incidents to occur simultaneously, which 
requires units from outside of the area to respond.  The number of hours per day the 
unit(s) assigned to a neighborhood are not available is associated with risk.  
Neighborhoods deemed more at risk based on demographic characteristics will increase 
demand on emergency resources, therefore reducing availability.  Predicting on scene 
time based on neighborhood characteristics is the basis for the second research question 
and hypotheses.  Is on scene time associated with neighborhood structural, economic, 
and/or social characteristics?   
4.7 Hypotheses for On Scene Time 
On Scene Hypotheses 
 H1B (Structural Environment):  Emergency resources will spend more time on 
scene in block group jurisdictions with more dilapidated and older structures.  The time 
emergency resources and personnel remain working at an incident is associated with the 
severity of the situation.  Regardless of the situation found when responders arrive, it is 
severity that determines the time required to successfully mitigate an incident.  Therefore, 
areas with characteristics associated with increased fire risk will require longer on scene 
times than other areas.  Clearly, fire events are the most time consuming incident type, so 
one would expect resources assigned to these areas will spend more time on scene during 
a year.   
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 H2B (Economic Environment):  The economic circumstances found within each 
block group area are associated with the time emergency resources spend mitigating 
incidents.  Lower income populations are more likely to utilize the emergency srvices, 
but one would also expect these populations to experience more severe emergency 
events.  For example, the inability to purchase smoke alarms or monitored fire alarm 
systems means fires will burn longer before emergency resources are summoned to the 
event, making it more difficult to contain these incidents.  Health care is another issu  in 
areas with fewer economic resources, because much of the population will lack 
preventative medical care.  This means medical situations are likely to be sever  mor  
often in these areas, requiring more time to resolve by emergency personnel. 
 H3B (Aged Environment):  Older and younger populations will be associated with 
more severe emergency events, which means emergency personnel will spend more time 
on scene in these areas mitigating situations.  These age groups are at greater risk for 
being involved with a fire event, which is arguably the most time-sensitive and time 
consuming type of event for emergency personnel to manage.  In addition, these age 
groups are also associated with more severe medical emergencies, which also require 
longer on scene times.  Therefore, it is expected that these groups will be associated with 
emergency service on scene time. 
 H4B (Educational Environment):  Educational levels across block groups are 
inversely associated with on scene time of emergency responders.  It is expected that 
areas with persons of less education will experience more severe emergency ev ts than 
areas populated by more educated persons.  Therefore, emergency personnel will sp nd 
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more time on scene throughout a year managing incidents in areas where education is not 
as prevalent.   
The goal of any emergency service resource allocation model is to locate units 
throughout a jurisdiction to maximize availability.  Availability of the unit(s) a signed to 
a neighborhood is an important measure because this determines the likelihood a 
department can respond in a rapid fashion to a time-sensitive emergency event if 
necessary.  In many ways, this concept of availability can be associated with play ng the 
lottery.  As more demand is placed on emergency resources or these resources are 
occupied more often, the probability of a resource being available when a citizen needs 
assistance decreases.  Similarly, one’s probability of winning the lottery decreas s with 
more players which creates less incentive to participate.  Most urban communities do not 
have the tax base or will to shift revenue from other services to add emergency resource 
capacity that is sufficient to manage changing demand.  The only solution is to allocate 
existing resources more effectively and efficiently.   
To this point, the research questions and testable hypotheses were formulated to 
build an alternative emergency resource deployment model.  A new model to deploy 
scarce emergency assets is based on neighborhood characteristics assocated with 
emergency service demand and risk assessments.  The problem public decision-maker’s 
continue to grapple with on a regular basis is how to allocate these resources in a manner 
that minimizes community risk.  Exploring characteristics associated wi h the probability 
of one neighborhood experiencing an increased or decreased chance of emergency events 
over another begins to lay a foundation for developing a new model to guide more 
effective and efficient deployment of these finite resources. 
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The risk assessment for each block group in the city of Charlotte details the 
relationship between emergency assets and demand for those assets to mitigate 
emergency events.  The research maps out this relationship created by the existing 
deployment strategy, which attempts to evenly distribute resources throughout a 
community with the primary goal to meet response time benchmarks.   Because demand 
is not also evenly distributed throughout communities, such a strategy can lead to 
coverage gaps in service that have the potential to detract from service delivery.  
Recognizing that fire stations are not easily moved, the research focuses on th  placement 
of emergency apparatus.  It is reasonable that apparatus and personnel can, in most 
circumstances, move to address changing demand and risk characteristics associated with 
emergency incidents.  Therefore, modeling the characteristics associated with demand for 
emergency services and the time limited resources are unavailable provides som  
guidance for more effectively locating emergency resources throughout a cmmunity to 
improve service delivery. 
 One can assume that block group areas with characteristics associated with 
demand and longer on scene times may require additional emergency assets over areas 
with less demand and shorter average on scene times.  It is also possible that these two 
calculations could be paradoxical in some block groups, where overall demand may be 
high but the number of time-sensitive incidents is low.  How such information is 
evaluated is really a value judgment, which is a reason each community provides a 
different level of emergency services.  What this research adds to the field is information 
that could better inform decision-makers about how to locate scarce emergency assets 
under conditions of uncertainty. 
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A new fire service deployment model could have a significant impact on local, 
state, and federal public policy decisions.  The ability to predict with a high level of 
confidence future emergency service demand, incident locations, and threat to life and
property of emergency events will significantly impact issues related to public finance 
and emergency service outcomes.  This is accomplished by allocating limited eergency 
resources to their highest net present value based on community risk characteristics 
associated with emergency service demand across block group areas.   
4.8 Summary 
 The demographic and structural characteristics found in local communities are 
constantly changing, which poses many challenges for emergency service decision 
makers.  The popular model used to guide locational decisions for allocating scarce 
emergency resources in most jurisdictions is not adaptable to a dynamic environment, 
because it is based on response time benchmarks and not service demand.  This leads to 
fire stations being evenly dispersed geographically throughout each jurisdiction, so that 
under ideal conditions each citizen can be reached by a resource within a defined 
maximum response time.  While resources are distributed evenly using this model,
demand for these services is not.  The goal of this research is to develop a set of criteria 
to guide the development of an alternative model based on demand for local emergency 
services at the neighborhood level. 
 To perform this analysis, emergency response data collected by the Charlotte Fi e 
Department and block group demographic information will be compared to test the stated 
hypotheses.  The block groups, which closely reflect the local neighborhood divisions, 
provide a relatively homogenous demographic resident profile and clearly defined 
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geographic boundaries for the study.  It is theorized that variance in structural and 
demographic variables common to all neighborhoods will be associated with increased or 
decreased demand for emergency services.  Identifying these relationships will provide 
the foundation for this research effort to develop an alternative model for allocating 
scarce emergency resources based on the premise that neighborhoods change.  If certain
characteristics found in these neighborhoods are associated with emergency service 
demand, decision-makers can be more proactive in locating critical resourc  in the 
future.  Therefore, as communities evolve, local emergency resources can be located in 
areas with characteristics consistent with increased demand to minimize risk. 
 Identifying variables associated with emergency service demand and on scene 
time provide an opportunity to infer the likelihood that emergency resource(s) assigned to 
each neighborhood will be available when requested.  To date, these scarce resources 
respond on a first-come-first-serve basis without regard for the severity of an incident.  
This leads to inefficiency because resources are not used to their highest net presen  
value.  Based on this system, residents in neighborhoods with a low probability that an 
emergency resource will be available when requested are at greater risk, specially when 
the situation is time-sensitive.  Residents in neighborhoods with higher probability 
measures are at lower risk.  Therefore, performing probability analysis for resource 
availability could provide information to shift resources in an effort to more evenly 
disperse risk across a community.  Keeping up with changing demand through such a 
model would permit proactive decision-making for locating resources, which could 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.  
 
 
CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR DEMAND 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The empirical findings derived from bivariate correlation and multivariate le st 
squares analysis used to predict emergency service demand are presented in this chapter.   
It is expected that the information gained from this analysis will contribute to the overall 
goal of developing a valid model for allocating limited emergency service esources to 
maximize service delivery within local communities.  The first part of this effort requires 
modeling demand for emergency service resources at the Census block group level.  
Again, block groups were chosen as the level of measurement because the fire service 
allocates emergency resources to defined geographical areas within communities.  Block 
group divisions are characterized as being relatively homogenous based on the 
characteristics of those residing in these areas, which is optimal for evaluating 
relationships between demographic measures and emergency service demand.  The block 
group areas also tend to parallel naturally forming neighborhood boundaries, which is t e 
situation in Charlotte.  For this analysis, block groups serve as proxies for neighborhood 
divisions.  Empirical findings are derived from regression models that include 
explanatory demographic measures theorized to drive emergency service d mand.  The 
information gained through this analysis challenges the efficacy of the current model to 
allocate emergency resources, which is guided by response time benchmarks. 
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The dominant factor influencing how emergency resource allocation decisions are 
made in the city of Charlotte, as in the majority of communities across the country, is 
response time.  Local public sector decision-makers often blindly allocate scarc  
resources in an effort to lower response times to the community as a whole.  However, 
demand for these resources is not equally distributed, which raises questions about the 
overall efficacy of basing allocation decisions on response times.  As with all public
sector decisions, more equitable distribution of goods and services often comes at the 
expense of efficiency (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002).  Identifying incidents or areas within 
a community that are more likely to require a rapid response to limit the loss of life and 
property is challenging, because, in general, emergency service systems, especially fire 
departments, are experiencing increased demand for service.  Increased service demand is 
rarely accompanied by additional resources, so finding methods to allocate limited 
resources more effectively is important to avoid service delivery problems.   
This research focuses on allocating resources based on a more utilitarian 
methodology, which is to distribute resources to provide the greatest good for the greatest 
number of citizens in a local area.  This requires making hard decisions that may require
leaving some parts of a community more exposed, as resources are moved closer to high 
demand areas to reduce overall risk.  To date, locational decisions for emergency 
resources are not based on scientifically driven analysis.  Many of the positive utcomes 
of this system occur by chance, rather than by informed decision-making.  In fact, 
Koehler & Wrightson (1987) argue that public services associated with property 
conservation are located in greater quantities in areas that produce the most tax revenues.  
This raises the question of whether public resources should be allocated based on need or 
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ability-to-pay.  In most communities, this paradox produces much of the political debate 
about resource allocation regardless of the service, as politicians attempt to ap ease those 
who pay the majority of the taxes while also delivering services to those most in need.  
Inevitably, persons with fewer resources or who lack the ability to purchase resources are 
more likely to need the goods and services provided by the public sector (Boyle & 
Jacobs, 1982).  Unlike other public sector services, the distribution of emergency servie
resources can make the difference between life and death, which often times has nothing 
to do with socioeconomic status.  The findings from this research provide some definitive 
relationships between demographic characteristics and demand for emergency resources, 
while also demonstrating the dynamic nature of the emergency environment that makes 
prediction fraught with pitfalls. 
5.2 Descriptive Information and Data 
 Many of the pitfalls associated with predicting demand in the emergency 
environment stem from variability across block group jurisdictions.  In particular, the 
presence of outliers is a constant challenge to accurately modeling this environment.  
Every community, no matter its size, will have isolated pockets of high demand for 
emergency services.  These high demand areas skew the data, and must be dealt with to 
perform meaningful analysis.  Simply eliminating outliers, which is suggested by some, 
is not an option in this situation because the outlier measures are not only valid but 
common to all local communities.  This makes it necessary to include the outliers in the 
analysis.  A brief evaluation of the univariate statistics for the explanatory nd dependent 
variables across block groups demonstrates the dynamic and varied environment that 
emergency service organizations must consider when allocating resources.   
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 Although the variation is large among the explanatory variables across block 
groups, the distribution for each of the measures proved to be normal.  The variation is a 
positive for evaluating meaningful linear relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables.  The population measures were used to norm the dependent 
variables across block groups to make the information more comparable across the study 
area, since the variation in population was large.  However, the remaining explanatory 
variable measures were included in the regression models as presented in Table 3.  The 
main data issues related to skew and outliers were found with the dependent variables 
used to measure emergency service demand.  The raw measurements for each of these 
variables are also presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
    Sample Block Group Data         
FY2006 Mean Std Dev Min Max 
N=118 Charlotte, N.C.         
Explanatory Variables 
Population 2,506.95 2,261.97 271 14,386 
Residential Units 1,073.09 909.15 156 5,371 
% persons >65 years old 0.0963 0.0509 0.0190 0.2347 
% persons <18 years old 0.2478 0.0704 0.0224 0.4354 
% Appearance Violations 0.1999 0.1972 0.0000 1.0320 
% Code Violations 0.0096 0.0199 0.0000 0.1806 
Average Building Age 34.39 15.74 6.00 63.00 
% eligible for Food Stamps 0.1099 0.1111 0.0000 0.6635 
% Owners 0.5270 0.2492 0.0000 0.9581 
Household Income 52,877.47 27,500.58 9,999 176,852 
% High School Graduates 0.8188 0.1495 0.3784 1.0000 
Dependent Variables 
Incidents per block group 282.16 331.47 7 2,819 
Fire incidents 14.90 12.79 0 77 
Structure Fires 7.63 6.71 0 42 
Other Type Fires 7.26 6.86 0 35 
EMS incidents 174.83 206.54 2 1,690 
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Table 3: Continued 
    Sample Block Group Data         
FY2006 Mean Std Dev Min Max 
N=118 Charlotte, N.C.         
EMS w/o motor vehicle 157.42 185.81 2 1,511 
EMS w/ motor vehicle 16.79 25.25 0 168 
Rescue incidents 1.14 6.32 0 68 
Haz-Mat incidents 6.36 14.07 0 146 
Alarm incidents 31.77 50.74 0 424 
Incident Cancelations 25.89 36.84 0 305 
Miscellaneous incidents 27.26 27.00 0 230 
Alarm incidents 31.77 50.74 0 424 
Incident Cancelations 25.89 36.84 0 305 
Miscellaneous incidents 27.26 27.00 0 230 
 
The skewed data measurements for the dependent variables were expected based on the 
nature of the emergency service environment and the fact that a block group cannot have 
fewer than zero emergency incidents.  A positive skew is common when there is a “floor” 
effect with data, which is the case when measuring emergency service demand.  The 
frequency statistics for each demand variable and histograms reveal a cl r “floor” effect 
for these measures.  This is also easy to see when reviewing the summary statistics in 
Table 1.  A disproportionate number of the measures across block groups are bunched up 
at the “floor.”2  Rather than the data being evenly distributed across the range of 
measures for each block group, a majority of the block groups experience low demand 
for each of the incident situations. 
 A second issue that further skews the data is outlier values, which are present for 
each of the demand variables, making the skew problematic for conducting linear 
regression analysis.  For example, four of the block groups experienced more than 100 
                                                          
2 “Floor” is the lowest possible measurement value for a variable.  In the case of demand, the lowest 
value is 0. 
127 
 
 
incidents per 100 persons (DEMAND), while the other 114 block groups sampled 
experienced fewer than 40 incidents per 100 persons.  This issue is not isolated to overall 
demand.  It is also a concern with the demand measures for FIRE, STRUCTURE, 
OTHER, EMS, EMSNMV, EMSMV, RESCUE, HAZMAT, ALARMS, CANCEL, and 
MISC.  To perform multivariate regression and analyze bivariate correlations, hese 
variables were transformed to normalize the data.  This action limits the positive skew to 
avoid biasing the estimators, which can increase the chance of committing a “ ype I or II 
error.”   
 The natural logarithm, rather than a higher power logarithm, was selected to 
transform the data.  This normalized the data while also maintaining the integrity of the 
sample.  Again, the outlier measures for demand are legitimate, so overly suppre sing 
their effect on the analysis could also lead to inaccurate findings.  Prior to calculating the 
natural log for the demand variables, a constant was added to the data to convert any 
measures less than 1, because a log cannot be calculated for such low values.  
Specifically, 1 was added to each data point in the sample, allowing all measures to be 
transformed using the natural log.  The transformation reduced the skew in each ofthe 
demand variables to an acceptable level.  In addition, this improved the linearity found 
between the dependent and independent variables, which was evaluated using scatter 
plots.  After correcting the skew, bivariate correlations were calculated between each of 
the dependent and independent variables.  These findings are displayed in Table 4. 
 The above bivariate correlations reveal some interesting and unexpected 
relationships.  Based on the hypotheses, the most unexpected findings involve the lack of 
correlation between demand and persons over 65 years of age.  This group is often found 
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to be at higher risk for fire events than other age groups, not including those under the 
age of 5 (Gamache, 2003).  It is likely that measurement problems contributed to this 
issue, as it is unclear how or to what extent assisted living facilities, which are prevalent 
in the sample community, were included.  The data only reveal a lack of variation across
the block groups, which might explain the insignificant findings between the elderly and 
demand for emergency services.  The findings for the relationships between the young 
and demand is also unexpected, because all are negative.  The hypothesized relationships 
were positive, as the young are often more prone to medical and fire related emergencies.  
Although the correlations are relatively weak between the young and demand, the i vers  
relationship is curious.  This unexpected finding may have resulted because the measure 
is too broad, focusing on those under 18 years of age rather than on the very young 
(Gamache, 2003).   
Table 4: Demand Correlations 
      Bivariate Correlations               
n=118 >65y/o <18y/o Food Owner Appear Code Build Income Educate 
Demand 0.066 -.292** .349** -.324** 0.114 0.08 .334** -.230* -.333** 
Demand 0.114 -.238** .558** -.556** .412* .265** .574** -.498** -.547** 
Fire 0.103 -0.169 .572** -.491** .313** .223* .499** -.457** -.525** 
Structure 0.135 -.206* .590** -.465** .346** .284** .479** -.439** -.482** 
Other 0.066 -0.155 .478** -.425** .200* 0.084 .424** -.374** -.467** 
EMS 0.092 -.216* .605** -.577** .454** .303** .597** -.530** -.590** 
EMSNMV 0.094 -.213* .618** -.561** .459** .312** .600** -.528** -.593** 
EMSMV 0.043 -.218* .279** -.509** .223* 0.049 .323** -.319** -.338** 
Rescue 0.178 -.376** 0.122 -0.173 -0.041 -0.044 0.088 -0.064 -0.091 
HazMat 0.014 -.188* .227* -.358** 0.145 0.137 .357** -.291** -.420** 
Alarms 0.152 -.281** .185* -.318** 0.073 -0.011 .232* -0.140 -.215* 
Cancel 0.045 -.239** .461** -.478** .286** 0.140 .446** -.452** -.462** 
Misc .209* -.368** .443** -.414** .232* 0.138 .464** -.368** -.843** 
            Standard Log *Significant @ .05 level **Significant @ .01 level 
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 Economic condition measured by the wealth variables is the predominant factor 
associated with demand for emergency services based on the bivariate correlations.  This 
is expected, as those with less purchasing power tend to rely more heavily on public 
services (Lipsky, 1980).  Clearly, EDUCATION, INCOME, OWNER, and FOOD are 
strongly correlated with most of the demand variables.  These findings demonstrate a 
distinct inverse pattern between income and demand.  Block groups with a higher 
percentage of persons eligible for food stamps are more likely to use the emergency 
services.  In particular, these groups are highly correlated with emergency m dical 
incidents that do not involve a motor vehicle and structure fires.  The act of requesting 
assistance for a medical condition does not necessarily indicate the presence of a true 
time-sensitive emergency.  In fact, block groups with more persons eligibl for food 
stamps are also highly correlated with cancellations and false calls, which support the 
possibility that persons with less wealth have a lower threshold for requesting a sistance 
from emergency services.  The high positive correlation with cancellations is al o 
consistent with the medical emergency response criteria in the city of Charlotte.  The 
Charlotte Fire Department responds to medical incidents with the Mecklenburg EMS 
Agency (MEDIC).  MEDIC dispatchers have the ability to screen calls for assistance to 
determine severity.  When an incident is deemed “non-emergent” or the MEDIC 
ambulance arrives on scene first to a “non-emergent” situation, the responding fire 
apparatus is cancelled.  Therefore, the high correlation to medical emergenci s does not 
indicate severity, only demand or lack thereof. 
 This is not necessarily the case with fire incidents, and more specifically structure 
fires.  Block groups with increased number of persons eligible for food stamp were 
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highly correlated to structure fires, which is an important finding.  Again, the structure 
fire variable was calculated for each block group to measure the number of firesthat 
involved structures.  The potential for death, injury, and property loss increases when a 
fire occurs in a structure, making these time sensitive emergency events.  All fires, no 
matter how small, will grow if left unchecked.  Therefore, this positive correlation is not 
only statistically significant but also significant to finding an alternative methodology to 
allocate scarce emergency resources to reduce loss of life and property.  These findings 
are further supported by the inverse relationship found between income and education 
and the dependent variables for demand.  As income or factors associated with wealth 
increase, demand for emergency services tends to decline.  In particular, more wealthy 
areas are less likely to have structure fires or request medical assistance.  There is also an 
inverse relationship between cancellations and wealth.  This is important, because it 
indicates, to a certain extent, that persons residing in these areas have a higher thres old 
for calling 911, meaning they are less likely to call for non-emergent situations.    
 The structural characteristics, which include building age, appearance violations, 
and code violations, correlate in expected ways with the FIRE, STUCTURE, and 
OTHER demand variables.  In particular, the variables for fire and overall demand are 
strongly correlated with building age, appearance violations, and code violations.  As was 
hypothesized, structures that are not maintained or fall into disrepair are more susceptible 
to fire events (Duncombe, 1992).  In many ways, these correlations also support the 
wealth effect, because lower income persons are less likely to have the resources to 
maintain and upgrade their places of residence.  In addition, block groups with higher 
percentages of renters compared to owners are positively correlated to fir  events.  This is 
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pertinent because it coincides with the structural characteristics finding that buildings not 
maintained are associated with more fires, which is often the case for rental properties.  
Obviously, it is not just the age or condition of the building, but the people who reside or 
work in these structures that increase the risk of fire or other emergency events
(Duncombe, 1992).   
 Although the bivariate correlations lack controls, the findings do indicate 
important patterns between many of the independent and dependent variables.  One can 
certainly infer from these calculations the importance of wealth and education when 
evaluating demand for emergency services.  A final correlation to point out is that
between education and miscellaneous incidents.  This is relevant because it depicts th  
lower threshold for utilizing the emergency services by those who are less ducated.  In 
general, miscellaneous events are not emergencies.  These situations involve aimal 
rescues, water problems, replacing batteries in smoke detectors or carbon monoxide 
detectors, and other conditions that, more often than not, could be resolved without the 
fire department.  It is evident that certain demographic characteristics are associated with 
increased reliance on the emergency services to solve emergent and non-emergent 
situations.  Although the demand variables do not indicate severity, one can infer the 
relative nature and time-sensitivity based on the different demand models, which is 
important for organizing an alternate way to allocate emergency service resources. 
5.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 A quick look at the correlations between the independent and dependent variables 
demonstrates some clear relationships.  However, these relationships do not control for 
the other interceding variables.  A multivariate regression was performed to evaluate the 
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association between each of the dependent demand variables and the explanatory 
variables.  The scatter plots revealed linear relationships between the variables; however, 
multicollinearity proved to be a problem when including all of the independent variables 
in the regressions.  Tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) scores consistently 
indicated collinearity problems with the education variable.  According to Miles and 
Shevlin (2001), VIF scores near or above 4 indicate an actionable collinearity problem.  
This issue was further supported by the bivariate correlations, which indicated a strong 
relationship between the variables EDUCATION, OWNER, and INCOME.  The variable 
for FOOD STAMPS was also strongly correlated to these economic measures; how ver, 
its relationship is in the opposite direction.  When included separately in the regression 
models the VIF and tolerance scores are raised, but do not meet the criteria for being 
actionable.   
 To correct this problem, principal components analysis (PCA) was used to 
combine the highly correlated variables.  A factor score was saved as a variable 
combining EDUCATION, OWNER, and INCOME.  The new factor score serves as an 
explanatory variable and is labeled WEALTH, which resolved the collinearity issue.  The 
variable for FOOD STAMPS remains in each of the models and was not included in the 
factor for WEALTH in order to maintain as much precision in predicting demand as is 
possible.  The factor for WEALTH and the FOOD STAMP variable are paradoxically 
associated with the demand variables, which would not be detectable if all four variables 
were included in the principal components analysis. 
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 The standardized regression coefficients (Beta scores) for the twelve mu tiple 
regression models are listed in Table 5.  The WEALTH factor is included in each of the 
models, replacing the variables OWNER, INCOME, and EDUCATION.  
Table 5: Demand Beta Coefficients 
Multivariate Regression Beta 
Scores             
n=118 AdjR2 >65y/o <18y/o Appear Code Build Food Wealth 
         
Demand 0.528 -0.013 -0.295** 0.036 -0.044 0.248** 0.240** -0.343** 
Fire 0.442 0.011 -0.205* -0.091 -0.058 0.211* 0.364** -0.301** 
Structure 0.447 0.029 -0.268** -0.02 0.039 0.128 0.431** -0.193+ 
Other 0.347 -0.038 -0.170+ -0.171+ -0.176* 0.254* 0.321** -0.311* 
EMS 0.581 -0.03 -0.293** 0.054 -0.024 0.247** 0.277** -0.332** 
EMSNMV 0.586 -0.033 -0.293** 0.056 -0.012 0.249** 0.308** -0.297** 
EMSMV 0.250 -0.021 -0.250* 0.017 -0.167 0.113 -0.027 -0.492** 
Rescue 0.142 0.019 -0.395** -0.105 -0.037 -0.064 0.154 -0.182 
HazMat 0.217 -0.116 -0.234** -0.152 -0.02 0.255* -0.076 -0.425** 
Alarm 0.132 0.044 -0.262** -0.063 -0.124 0.088 0.053 -0.304* 
Cancel 0.391 -0.095 -0.313** -0.05 -0.116 0.210* 0.216* -0.369** 
Misc 0.410 -0.003 -0.393** -0.058 -0.062 0.223* 0.313** -0.194+ 
+ Significant @ .10 level * Significant @ .05 level ** Significant @ .01 level 
 
The adjusted R-square values are indicative of the ability to predict demand for 
emergency services using demographic explanatory variables across the population.  
These variables, and in particular the economic and structural measures, explain a great 
deal of the variance for many of the demand measures.  The models that stand out are 
overall demand, fire demand, structure fire demand, EMS demand, and EMS demand for 
medical situations not related to a motor vehicle.  These models have strong adjusted R-
squared values, providing substantial information to better inform emergency service 
locational decisions.  In addition, the models for miscellaneous demand and cancelled or 
false calls proved relatively strong.    
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 A quick scan of the regression findings indicates explanatory variables measuring 
economic status are the most important to predicting demand for emergency services.  
The beta coefficients for the models predicting DEMAND, FIRE, EMS, and CANCEL 
are strongest for <18 years old, WEALTH and FOOD.  In addition, the beta magnitude 
for FOOD is high concerning medical emergencies not involving a motor vehicle, 
structure fires, and other types of fires.  This indicates that as socioeconomi status within 
a block group rises, one can expect a decrease in the number of requests for assistance 
from the emergency services.  However, a decline in economic status appears to have a 
stronger positive relationship with demand for these services.   
 The explanatory variables measuring structural condition, with the exception of 
BUILD AGE, in each block group did not contribute a great deal to the models predicting 
demand.  BUILD AGE was significant for overall DEMAND, FIRE, and EMS.  Building 
age was hypothesized to be an important factor for predicting fires, especially those 
occurring in structures; however, the age of buildings proved insignificant in the model 
for structure fires.  The findings for BUILD AGE are somewhat conflicting.  BUILD 
AGE was significant for predicting overall fire demand, but not for fires occurring in 
structures.  Charlotte is a relatively new city that has experienced a great deal of 
development over the past decade.  One would expect older structures to be more 
susceptible to fire because of decay and systems that do not meet code (Duncombe, 
1992).  However, many of the techniques used in construction today are also very 
susceptible to fire.  The development of lightweight trusses, for example, has made it 
more economical to build apartments and other residential structures in economically 
depressed areas.  Lightweight truss construction is vulnerable to rapid fire spread, but it is 
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likely the characteristics of the individuals who occupy these structures hat make them 
more susceptible to fire (Schaffer, 1988).  This is supported by the beta coefficients for 
WEALTH and FOOD associated with structure fire incidents, which are moreinflu ntial 
for assessing risk.  Building age and code violations were significant for predicting other 
types of fires, which is consistent with the literature.   
 Based on the findings for age, the hypotheses for these variables and their relation 
to demand must be rejected.  Surprisingly, no significant relationships were found 
between the demand variables and the elderly.  The lack of variation across block groups 
likely contributed to these findings.  It is unclear whether the variable represents the 
actual breakdown of the population, because it is possible that nursing facilities and other 
assisted living communities were not counted or are dispersed in areas with a low 
percentage of elderly persons.  Regardless, one would have expected a statistically 
significant relationship between demand and the elderly.  On the other end of the age
spectrum, the variable for the young proved to be inversely associated with each ofthe 
demand variables except OTHER.  Again, the significant relationships were correctly 
hypothesized, but not the direction of the relationship.  One would expect that as the 
percentage of young increases within a block demand for the emergency servies would 
also increase.  Much of the literature argues that the very young (ages less than 5) are at 
increased risk for medical and fire events over other age groups; however, the block 
group data used for this analysis was not detailed enough to isolate this age group 
(Gamache, 2003).    Regardless, the relationship between percent under 18 and demand 
across block groups is inverse, which is opposite of the hypothesized relationship.   
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 The model for predicting ALARMS was weak with an adjusted R-square value of 
.132.   WEALTH was inversely associated with demand for alarm incidents and proved 
to be the only significant variable of consequence.  One can infer that areas with more 
wealth are less likely to summon emergency services for alarms that prove to be non-
events.  This is further strengthened by the relationship between WEALTH and 
CANCEL, as more affluent areas are associated with fewer cancelltions and false calls.  
This is balanced by the positive relationship between FOOD and CANCEL indicating a 
greater propensity for false or non-emergent events in areas that are more conomically 
depressed.  Finally, FOOD is positively related to demand for miscellaneous incidents.  
This is expected, as the nature of most incidents coded “miscellaneous” are non-emergent 
events that often could have been resolved by the complainant.  This further supports 
Boyle and Jacobs’ (1982) findings that economically depressed areas use public services 
more frequently. 
5.4 Problems with the Dataset: Mapping Residuals 
 The Census block group demographic data creates some issues when predicting 
emergency service demand.  An issue that must be considered is that much of the 
information is derived from permanent residents.  Therefore, during daylight hours much 
locational information changes, as residents travel to work, school or other locations.  In 
addition, there are some areas that have relatively few residential housing units, such as 
the uptown area, airport, and highly commercial areas.  To evaluate the impact of these 
areas on the findings, residuals for three of the demand models were mapped.  Block 
groups where the standardized residuals for each model were more than or less than two
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standard deviations from the mean were highlighted on the maps located in the appendix 
to visually depict these phenomena.3   
 Insignificant regression findings for the >65 year old variable in each of the 
demand models was a catalyst for mapping the residuals.  This population group was 
clearly identified in the fire service literature as being at much greate  risk of injury and 
death from fire and other emergency situations.  Therefore, residuals for themultivariate 
model for overall DEMAND, a bivariate model with the >65 year old variable and 
FIREDEMAND, and a bivariate model with the >65 year old variable and overall 
DEMAND were mapped.  For each of the three models, DEMAND was under predicted 
based on the independent variables for block groups in the uptown and airport areas.  
This was expected because neither area has a high level of residential structures, which 
reduces the amount of valid demographic data for the analysis.  However, the airport and 
uptown areas generate a large number of emergency incidents that fire department 
personnel respond to.  Although these areas include few residents, each area experinces 
a large influx in population daily as people flow into these areas for work or travel.  
These non-permanent persons that flow in and out of these areas are captured by the 
DEMAND variables, but not by the explanatory demographic variables collected by the 
Census. 
 There were also areas where overall DEMAND was over predicted based on the 
explanatory variables.  Each of the models to predict overall DEMAND had two block 
groups that fell two standard deviations or more below the mean.  These areas were 
located on the periphery of the city, where population density is low.  In fact, the vast 
                                                          
3 See Appendix G, H, & I for residual maps of each demand model. 
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majority of the identified block group areas lie outside of the city limits.  However, these 
block groups were included in the analysis because part of each block group is within the 
city limits and at least one emergency incident occurred within that area.  A combination 
of low population density, low call volume, and the likely differences in population 
between day and night time hours are likely the reasons DEMAND was over predicted 
for these areas. 
 The residual maps help to validate the research findings for demand, as only a 
very few block groups proved to be outliers.  These potential demographic anomalies 
were identified in Chapter 3, especially the potential impact of the airport property and 
uptown areas.  However, each area includes some residential units, making it difficul  to 
justify not including them in the original population of block groups from which the 
sample was drawn.  However, it is evident that highly commercialized areas and others 
where residential population is low do not reflect the vast majority of the Charlotte area, 
which explains some of the unexpected findings from this analysis. 
5.5 Fire Demand Model Discussion 
 It is evident that economic status is a strong predictor of demand for emergency 
services.  More importantly, the characteristics of the population and not just the size of 
the population should be considered when allocating scarce resources to maximize 
service delivery.  The above findings are not overwhelming but do provide a plethora of 
information to help develop a new methodology to locate emergency resources.  The 
politically desired method for distributing public sector goods and services is often t  
maximize equality.  This means that in the perfect world everyone residing in a 
community has the same chance that an emergency resource in their area will b  
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available when requested.  Equal access and service delivery is the foundation on which 
finite emergency resources are allocated in most communities.  The distribution of these 
resources is most often based on an arbitrary response time benchmark.  This strategy i  
effective as long as only one emergency incident occurs at a time within a respons  
jurisdiction.  Under such conditions, response time and service delivery are predictabl .  
However, the emergency environment is dynamic, meaning that systems commonly 
experience high demand periods where many emergency incidents occur simultaneously.  
Once units begin to respond, availability and response time to additional incidents 
becomes random and unpredictable (Peters & Hall, 1999). 
 Although emergency resources may be distributed equally throughout a 
community, demand for these services is not equal.  Therefore, equal distribution will 
inevitably disenfranchise high demand areas within a community.  The above findings 
demonstrate that not only is demand not equally distributed throughout communities, but 
certain demographic characteristics are predictive of demand.  Greater wlth and 
education in a particular area within a community correlates to lower demand for 
emergency services.  The opposite is also true, as poverty inundates an area, as indicated 
by food stamp eligibility, demand increases, especially for medical and fire events.  
Based on this information, one might propose to simply relocate some emergency 
resources from economically stable areas to more impoverished areas to providem re 
effective service delivery. 
 Unfortunately, it is not as simple as just shifting resources based on demand 
characteristics found across a community.  Increased demand does not necessarily 
indicate increased risk of death or property loss.  This was made clear in an evaluation of 
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emergency service responses by Blackstone et al. (2005), which found the majority of 
alarms received by police and fire departments prove to be non-events that waste 
valuable resources.  The same explanatory variables in this analysis that proved
predictive of fire and medical demand were also predictive of cancellations, false calls, 
and miscellaneous incidents.  Not only do areas with higher rates of poverty utilize the 
emergency services for more fire and medical situations, they are also more likely to use 
these services for more frivolous reasons, such as replacing a battery in a smoke detector.  
Again, the threshold for calling 911 seems to be very different based on one’s economic 
status.  The question is how to separate out the likelihood of emergent incidents from 
those that are not emergent.  Although the data available for this analysis is not complete 
enough to confidently make such assessments, one can infer from the above findings 
relevant information on this subject. 
 Evaluating the demand for fire responses provides an initial assessment of risk fr 
life and property loss based on demographic characteristics.  It is hard to triage fire 
incidents, especially those involving a structure because a fire event will cont nue to 
worsen if not attended to.  It is clear that lower income areas are much more likely to 
have a fire event than higher income areas, but the overall number of fires within the city
only accounts for roughly 6% of the call volume the fire department responds to.  Still, 
fire does pose great risk to property and life.  Therefore, it warrants attention from policy 
makers in the public safety sector.  It is also important to balance the causaleffects for 
the poor being more susceptible to fire events.  A fire is, for the most part, a low 
probability/high consequence event.  In many ways, an individual can reduce the chancs 
of fire, especially in the home, by purchasing private fire protection goods and service  
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(Jones-Lee, 1974).  For example, investing in smoke detectors or monitored alarm 
systems can substantially reduce the risk of a catastrophic fire event.   
 Fire protection systems purchased in the private sector are effective, because they 
continuously monitor environmental conditions.  When a fire does occur, these systems 
alert the fire department to a fire condition during the incipient stage or beginning part of
the fire event, which provides an opportunity for rapid extinguishment with minimal 
property loss or risk to life.  In addition, occupants are alerted to the fire before it has the 
opportunity to spread, providing ample time for self-evacuation.  Early recognition of a 
fire condition is critical to reducing the risk of death and property loss.  Because the e are 
low probability events, those with limited resources are not likely to purchase fire 
protection goods and services from the private sector in lieu of other necessities (Holt & 
Laury, 2002).  Instead, these groups are more likely to rely heavily on the public sector to 
reduce their risk of property and life loss from fire, which is born out in the statistic l 
findings compiled for this research.  
 Those with more resources and expendable income are more likely to invest in 
private fire protection systems.  Not only do they have the means to invest in these 
products, but in many cases they have more to lose which provides additional incentive.  
Although those with more resources must still rely on the fire service if a fire does occur, 
the chances of death or injury are greatly reduced for these groups.  Based on these 
findings, it is reasonable, if reducing risk to life from fire is the priority, to allocate 
emergency resources in greater numbers to areas that are economically depressed.  
Concentrating emergency resources in areas where people are more reliant on the service 
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should reduce losses from fire events, without disproportionately increasing the risk to 
life in more economically stable areas. 
5.6 Medical Demand Model Discussion 
 In addition to fire emergencies, public safety organizations must also weigh
medical emergency demand when allocating resources.  For this analysis, three models 
were derived to evaluate demand for emergency medical services.  These involv d using 
the explanatory variables to predict overall demand for medical services, deman  for 
medical emergencies not involving a motor vehicle, and medical emergencies involving a 
motor vehicle.  The model for medical emergencies involving a motor vehicle was weak, 
which was expected based on the demographic characteristics.  Although certain groups 
are more at risk for being involved in a motor vehicle accident, such findings in this 
analysis are likely to be more spurious than predictive.  The demographic explanatory 
variables did account for a significant proportion of the variance for overall medical 
demand and demand for medical assistance not involving a motor vehicle.  These 
findings must be balanced by the high rate of incidents that prove to be non-emergent 
events, which is much more likely for medical situations (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002).  
Again, the decision to request assistance from the emergency services is an individual 
decision.  The threshold for when to call and when not to call varies widely across a 
population, so sorting emergent and non-emergent medical incidents is challenging. 
 The analysis does support the prevailing belief espoused in the literature that 
economically depressed areas are correlated with greater demand for medical services.  
More educated and economically stable populations clearly generate less d mand for 
these services.  The real question, which cannot be confidently answered through this 
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research effort, is which demographic variables correlate to medical incidents that are 
emergent.  Time sensitive medical emergencies include heart attacks, dibetic situations, 
cardiac arrest, major trauma, and any other situation that poses an immediate threat to an 
individual’s quality of life.  For the most part, the majority of medical emergencies prove 
to be non-events or at least situations where a quick response by emergency workers is 
not necessary to prevent harm (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002).  Based on the findings that 
more wealth and education are inversely correlated with miscellaneous and false calls, 
one can infer that groups with these characteristics are also less likely to request 
assistance for non-emergent medical conditions.  The challenge is sifting through the data 
to determine if this is the case.  Clearly, economic condition determines one’s likelihood 
for requesting assistance for a medical condition, but this does not indicate whether t  
conditions are more often true emergencies.  It is quite possible that economically stable 
and unstable areas experience the same chance or volume of time-sensitive med cal 
emergencies, it is just in the more economically challenged areas that there are more non-
emergent requests for service.  In such a situation, resources must be allocatd differently 
to maximize patient outcomes. 
5.7 Summary 
 The analysis demonstrates that the economic condition of an area is the 
predominant demographic characteristic associated with overall demand for emergency 
service resources.  Such a finding is not unexpected, as much of the literature on public 
sector resource allocation indicates that those with fewer resources are more dependent 
on public services (Lipsky, 1980).  Although the findings are not particularly earth 
shattering, they do contribute to better understanding and substantiating the 
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socioeconomic factors that drive demand on local government emergency services.  By 
breaking down the incidents into eleven categories, it was possible to further isolate the 
demographic characteristics associated with different types of emergency events.  Each of 
the demand models was significant; however, only the models for FIRE, STRUCTURE, 
EMS, EMSNMV, CANCEL, and MISC proved to have adjusted R-squares at or above 
.400.  The other demand models were relatively weak, which may be a symptom of 
insufficient data for those types of incidents.  Regardless, one would expect the models 
for FIRE, EMS, CANCEL, and MISC to be the strongest, because factors that influence 
demand associated with these types of situations are driven by individual condition. 
 One’s risk for fire or a medical emergency is predominately determined by 
individual characteristics with minimal effect from environmental conditions.  This is 
demonstrated by the weak correlations found between building age and fire events.  It is 
plausible that much of the correlation between building age and emergency service 
demand is spurious.  This relationship is more a factor of the characteristics of tho e who 
occupy and are charged with maintaining these structures than the structures themselves.  
True, the age of a building may be a contributing factor to a fire event or false alrm, but 
it is not likely that the age of a building influences the demand for emergency medical 
incidents or miscellaneous events.  Finally, building age was not significant in the model 
to predict structure fire demand, which is where one would most expect to find a 
significant relationship if structural characteristics are reliable predictors of demand. 
 Therefore, the explanatory variables for economic condition are clearly the most 
influential for predicting emergency service demand.  It is evident that the emergency 
service environment is dynamic.  The location of emergency incidents is in many ways 
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random, making them difficult to predict with a high level of accuracy.  The uncertainty 
about where the next fire or cardiac arrest will occur is an important factor influencing 
the continued effort of public safety decision-makers to spread scarce resources equally 
throughout local communities.  This speaks to the reactive nature of the public sector.  
The information gained through this analysis likely falls short of the threshold required to 
convince policy makers to allocate emergency resources more proactively.  However, it 
provides a starting point to discover whether demographic characteristics, such as income 
or education, can be used to locate emergency resources to save more lives and reduce 
property damage over the current allocation model. 
 In many ways, this analysis further supports the random nature of emergency 
events.  However, it also reveals the importance of income and education for reducing 
risk for fire events.  This lends support to the idea of placing more emphasis on public 
education to encourage the use of private fire protection goods and services.  Demand for 
the emergency services is clearly not completely random; however, prediction is fraught 
with pitfalls as the lowest risk area in a community could still experience a catastrophic 
emergency event.  A more directed effort at higher risk areas in a community to i crease 
the use of private fire protection systems could reduce the workload on emergency 
services, permitting more availability and better service delivery.  Regardl ss, public 
managers have the capability to improve service delivery and outcomes by recognizing 
the different demand characteristics found within and across local communities.   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR TIME 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The empirical findings derived from bivariate correlation and multivariate le st 
squares regression analysis used to predict the time emergency units spend managing 
incidents is presented in this chapter.  Two time models are formulated; the firs  evaluates 
the average total time units spend on emergency incidents for each block group and the 
second evaluates the average time units spend on emergency scenes mitigating incide ts.  
The theory behind the analysis is that the time units spend managing incidents is 
important to allocation decisions, because these are rivalrous services.  When services 
have rivalrous consumption, one person’s enjoyment of the service prevents another 
person’s simultaneous enjoyment of that service, which is not consistent with a true 
public good (Weimer & Vining, 2005).  This is important because while emergency units 
are responding to and managing incidents, no matter the severity, they are not available to 
manage additional emergency situations.  Therefore, areas where demographic 
characteristics are associated with units spending more time responding to and managing 
incidents will experience a greater likelihood for simultaneous emergency situations to 
occur.  When simultaneous incidents occur within the same response area, a unit or units 
from outside of the area must respond.  This situation leads to prolonged response times, 
which may compromise the ability to prevent unnecessary loss of life or property. 
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Because most fire departments, including the Charlotte Fire Department, do not triage 
calls by severity, unit availability is important. 
Emergency service systems, with few exceptions, assign incidents on a first come 
first serve basis.  This creates a lottery like situation for the public sector “customer,” 
which is based on nothing more than luck.  Response time to incidents is predictable 
when units are stationary in their assigned locations.  If one assumes that an emergency 
system will never manage more than one incident at a time, equally distributing resources 
throughout a community based on a set response time criteria is logical.  This distribution 
means the response time to every part of the community is predictable.  Under such 
circumstances, everyone residing in the community could have a set expectation th t if 
assistance from the emergency services is requested, a unit will always arrive within a 
specified time period.  Therefore, depending on the length of that response time, residents 
within the community could more effectively manage risk associated with fire, medical, 
and other emergency incidents.  However, this is not the case which prevents civilians 
from formulating a set expectation that a unit assigned to their area will be available to 
respond when requested.  As with a lottery, as the numbers or participants increae the 
chances of winning decrease.   The more time units spend unavailable managing 
incidents within each block group area, the greater the probability that unit will not be 
available to respond when requested.  Therefore, it is theorized that areas where units 
spend more time responding to and managing incidents will be at greater risk of suffering 
losses.  If demographic characteristics can then be used to predict TOTAL TIME and ON 
SCENE time, resources can be more effectively distributed to improve the likelihood that 
a unit will be available in each area when assistance is requested.  
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It is likely that the model for TOTAL time will not only capture unit workload, 
but also incident severity.  Areas that experience more demand will have units that spend 
more time responding to and managing incidents.  In addition, TOTAL time will rise in 
areas where incidents are more severe and take longer for emergency personnel to 
resolve.  The advantage of modeling total time is that every type of incident is captured, 
including situations where responding units are cancelled prior to arriving on the scene.  
The information gathered through this model can then be compared to the information 
derived from the model predicting ON SCENE time.  
The second model attempts to predict the time units spend on emergency scenes 
mitigating incidents.  In many ways, it is theorized that time is a rough proxy for incident 
severity.  Again, the available data is not sufficient to thoroughly and confidently assess 
incident severity across the wide spectrum of incident types.  However, one can posit that 
more severe and complicated emergency situations will take longer for emergency 
responders to mitigate.  For example, responders will spend more time extinguishi  a 
building fire than extinguishing a dumpster fire.  It is expected that identified correlations 
between ON SCENE time and the demographic explanatory variables will begin to 
isolate characteristics associated with more severe incident types.  This is in accordance 
with the idea that DEMAND does not necessarily equate with incident severity, wh ch is 
the measure emergency service allocation should be based on to maximize outcomes.  
Comparing these findings with those derived from the models to predict DEMAND will 
further inform the development of an alternative model for locating scarce emerg ncy 
service resources in local communities. 
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6.2 Summary Time Statistics 
 Univariate statistics for the time measures do reveal the compressed nature of 
these measures.  This is especially true for ON SCENE time when emergency m dical 
incidents are isolated.  It is important to remember that the times are averages calculated 
for each block group, which further depresses the variation in the summary statistic  
presented.  Each of the variable measures was normally distributed and did not require 
any transformation for the regression analysis. 
Table 6: Time Univariate Statistics 
Summary Statistics for Time Variables       
n=118 Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Block Group Total Time  0:15:28 0:02:11 0:10:42 0:21:41 
Block Group On Scene Time 0:04:53 0:01:08 0:02:53 0:09:03 
Scene Time for Fires 0:05:20 0:02:20 0:00:00 0:15:16 
Scene Time for EMS 0:04:19 0:01:03 0:01:44 0:06:52 
 
6.3 Descriptive Information for the Time Variables 
 
 Bivariate correlation calculations were performed to evaluate the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and dependent variables.  In addition to the two stated 
dependent variables (TOTAL TIME & ONSCENE TIME), on scene time for each block
group was also calculated separately for fire and medical incidents.  Theseadditional 
variables were included to isolate the predominant type of emergency incidents in a  
effort to evaluate any potential associations with the explanatory variables.  These 
correlations are presented in Table 7. 
 The bivariate correlations, in many ways, provide more information for 
understanding the pattern of demand for emergency services associated with 
demographic characteristics.  Although many of the relationships are expectd, some are 
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conflicting.  In general, time spent responding to and managing emergency incidents is 
longer for block groups that have more wealth and affluence.  This finding is challenged 
by the strong significant relationship between ONSCENE and OWNER, APPEAR, and 
CODE, which is inverse.  This seems to indicate that block groups with a higher 
percentage of owner occupied residential structures compared to renter occupied 
structures are associated with shorter on scene times, which is also true for areas with 
more appearance and code violations.  One would expect that more dilapidated and 
neglected structures would be associated with increased on scene time, becausesu h 
structures are more susceptible to fire spread.   
Table 7: Time Bivariate Correlations 
     Bivariate Correlations for Time             
n=118 >65y/o <18y/o Appear Code Build Food Own Income Educate 
          
TOTAL 0.028 -0.021 -.436** -0.179 -.425** -.533* .331* .489** .394** 
SCENE -0.073 0.162 -.427** -.272* -.493** -.367** -.457** .426** .423** 
FIRE -0.112 0.118 -0.168 -0.014 -.262** -0.111 0.021 0.072 0.162 
EMS -0.091 0.126 -.348** -.182* -.370** -.368** .376** .462** .385** 
 *Significant @ .05 level  **Significant @ .01 level 
 The OWNER variable is highly correlated with INCOME and EDUCATION, 
which are descriptive of wealth.  However, in this case, it appears that block groups with 
more renters, which are often associated with lower socioeconomics, are related to longer 
on scene times for emergency incidents.  Although not consistent with the other wealth 
indicators, this finding is logical.  Most rental properties are multi-family, meaning that 
they are usually larger structures than those used for single family occupancy.  Fires in 
apartment buildings can be large, requiring many fire resources to extinguish.  In 
addition, those residing in these structures tend to be at increased risk for such events.  
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However, based on the other time models, one might expect the block groups with more 
OWNERS to be associated with longer on scene times. 
 It is also curious, on the surface, that the significant associations between the 
structural characteristics (APPEAR, CODE, BUILDAGE) and dependent variables are 
negative.  As buildings age they are thought to be more susceptible to fire events,which 
was supported by the FIRE DEMAND model (Duncombe, 1992).  However, based on the 
above correlations, as structures age, become more dilapidated, and fail to meet code the 
time responders spend responding to and managing emergency situations declines.   
These findings are likely linked to the socioeconomic condition of the persons occupying 
these buildings, and do not reflect on the buildings themselves. 
 If time is assumed to be a proxy for incident severity, the correlation findigs are 
quite relevant to formulating an alternative method to guide emergency resourc  
allocation decisions.  The correlation findings, when compared to the demand models, 
support the theory that longer on scene time is an indicator of incident severity.  In 
particular, as indicators of wealth and economic stability for block group areas improve, 
the time responders spend managing incidents increases.  The demand models indicated
that as economic circumstances rise within block groups, the demand for emergency 
services declines.  These findings support the belief that although there is an inverse
relationship between DEMAND and WEALTH, incidents in these areas are likely to be 
more severe.  This further supports the higher threshold persons with more wealth and 
education have when determining whether to engage the emergency services for 
assistance and further underscores the challenges to most effectively locate scarce public 
safety resources. 
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6.4 Multivariate Regression Findings 
 Four time models are presented to predict total time units spend responding to and 
managing incidents, time units spend on scene mitigating emergency situations, time 
units spend managing just medical calls for assistance, and time units spend managing 
fire calls using the demographic explanatory variables.  The model to predict time un ts 
spend on scene managing fire incidents indicates a significant inverse relationship 
between BUILD and ON SCENE time, which is consistent with the findings from the 
other time models.  However, the model itself for FIRE ON SCENE time is not 
significant (0.130), decreasing its value to the overall research effort.  Therefore, much of 
the analysis discounts this model and focuses on the other three. 
 As with the DEMAND models, a factor for WEALTH that combines the 
explanatory variables OWNER, INCOME, & EDUCATION is used in each model to 
avoid multicollinearity issues.  Unlike with the demand models, each of the dependent 
time variables calculated proved to be normal and did not require transformation.  The 
beta statistics for each model are presented in Table 8. 
 Although the models are not particularly strong for predicting time, each provides 
some valuable information to the overall research effort.  The adjusted R-squared valu s 
are significant at the .05 level for all models except FIRE ON SCENE.  For the first 
model, the average total time for each incident occurring in the sample block groups was 
calculated.  This served as the dependent variable, which was regressed against the 
explanatory demographic characteristics found in each block group.  The strongest 
association was measured between the TOTAL TIME variable and the FOOD STAMPS 
variable.  FOOD STAMPS serve as a proxy for economic status and are negatively 
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associated with TOTAL TIME.  This finding is expected based on the DEMAND 
models, which indicated a strong positive relationship with overall demand and 
cancellations.  Again, the TOTAL TIME variable includes cancelled incidents.  
Therefore, as the number of cancelled incidents rises in a block group, the TOTAL TIME 
measure will decrease because of the influx of incidents with short time periods.  It 
appears, based on this model, that block groups with declining economic conditions are 
associated with more requests for assistance from the emergency servi es, but the time 
per incident is shorter than that experienced in more economically stable areas.   
Table 8: Beta Coefficients for Time 
    Multivariate Regression Beta Findings         
N=118 AdjR2 >65y/o >18y/o Appear Code Build Food Wealth 
         Total 
Time 
0.316 0.039 0.043 -0.174+ 0.142 -0.195+ -0.357** 0.073 
On 
Scene 
Time 
0.330 -0.001 0.209* -0.187+ -0.009 -0.220* 0.031 0.318** 
EMS 
On 
Scene 
0.238 -0.111 0.135 -0.147 0.067 -0.053 -0.046 0.390** 
FIRE 
On 
Scene 
0.037 -0.011 0.080 -0.135 0.116 0.256* -0.020 -0.064 
 +Significant @ .10 level *Significant @ .05 level **Significant @ .01 level 
 The second model isolates the time units spend on scene managing incidents.  
Therefore, incidents where units were cancelled prior to arrival for whatever reason are 
not included, because these situations skew the data biasing the estimators.  Based on this 
model, three of the explanatory variables proved significant.  The positive relationship 
between the variable for less than 18 years of age and on scene time is consistent with he 
literature, if time spent on scene is indeed a proxy for incident severity.  Again, the young 
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are thought to be at greater risk for fire and medical emergencies.  In addition, the 
WEALTH factor is positively associated with ON SCENE, further supporting the belief 
that units spend more time managing incidents in more economically stable areas of the 
city.  One can surmise that the association with longer ON SCENE times is reflective of 
more affluent persons being less likely to use the emergency services for frivolous or 
non-emergent situations.   The model also corroborates the information found in the 
bivariate correlation calculations that BUILD AGE is inversely associated with ON 
SCENE time.  This is likely more a reflection of the persons occupying these structures, 
because one would expect that as buildings age there is a higher propensity for fire 
events.   
 The final model isolates the time units spend on scene for medical situations in 
the sampled block groups.  As with the overall ON SCENE variable, time spent on 
medical incidents is significantly related to the WEALTH factor.  More affluent block 
groups are associated with longer ON SCENE times.  This is not a definitive finding of 
severity but does begin to support such a theory.  An issue with ON SCENE time for 
medical emergencies is the compressed nature of the measurements.  For example, even 
for the most severe medical emergency units should not spend more than 10 to 15 
minutes at the scene, which is different than a fire event.  In addition, the fire service 
unit’s ON SCENE time is affected by exogenous factors beyond its control, such as the 
arrival of the MEDIC ambulance.  It is possible that this association between tim  and 
wealth is related to ambulance response time, which can inflate the ON SCENE time of
fire units if the ambulance has a longer response to the scene.  Under such circumstan es, 
the fire unit ON SCENE time is artificially inflated while the unit waits for the 
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ambulance to arrive.  Taking this into consideration, the model provides information to 
support a more thorough investigation into the possibility that more affluent persons ae 
likely to request assistance from the emergency services more often for time-sensitive 
situations. 
6.5 Data Problems and Caveats 
 Modeling time for emergency units based on demographic characteristics proved
to be a challenge, because whether aggregating TOTAL TIME or ON SCENE time 
numerous exogenous factors influence the measures.  TOTAL TIME is not as 
problematic to measure as ON SCENE time, because the factors affecting TOTAL TIME 
still render the unit not available to respond to additional emergency situations.  The 
purpose of calculating this measure was to capture not only every type of incident, but 
also travel time to these incidents.  Averaging the total time for all units assigned to an 
incident is somewhat problematic, because outlier times can skew the measures.  This 
situation occurs, for example, when multiple units are dispatched to a fire event that is 
extinguished quickly by firefighters or by an installed sprinkler system.  Under such 
conditions, all but one or two units will be released from the incident, while the 
remaining unit(s) is likely to remain on location for an extended period removing water 
or waiting on a responsible party for the building to arrive and assume control.    
 Such situations will inflate TOTAL TIME.  In the end, TOTAL TIME is a catch 
all measure for the average amount of time units are not available to respond to other 
incidents.  This is an important measure for evaluating unit availability across bl ck 
group areas based on demographic variables.  Areas with inflated TOTAL TIME may 
indicate an increased chance the unit assigned will not be available to respond to an 
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additional incident.  In such a situation, a simultaneous incident will require a unit(s) 
from outside the area to respond, lengthening the response time which could be a 
problem if the incident is time-sensitive.  Therefore, areas with low unit TOTAL TIME 
should be at less risk based on unit availability. 
 The more problematic issues revolve around the ON SCENE time measures, 
which have the potential to be influenced by a myriad of external factors.  The main 
factor, especially related to medical incidents, is the time it takes for a MEDIC 
ambulance to arrive.  MEDIC uses a fluid deployment system to locate its units.  The 
system measures historical call volume statistics for different time periods of each day to 
locate its limited emergency resources.  Therefore, ambulances are often mre 
concentrated in high demand areas.  This creates an interesting relationship between the 
fire resources, which are distributed in greater numbers more equally across the city than 
are MEDIC units.  It is possible that the inverse association between ON SCENE time 
and WEALTH is more a reflection of the ambulance deployment methodology than 
incident severity.  This would occur if MEDIC, recognizing lower demand in wealthir 
areas, shifted its resources to favor higher demand areas within the city.  Therefore, when 
a medical incident occurs, no matter severity, in more affluent areas the ambulances are 
more likely to have longer response times.  Under such conditions, the fire unit might 
have an inflated ON SCENE time not related to the type incident, because of the 
additional time spent waiting on the ambulance to arrive.  Although this cannot be 
confirmed through the existing data set, it is plausible and deserves further consideration. 
 Another issue with ON SCENE time for medical situations is that the measures 
become compressed, limiting variability.  Based on medical standards of care, units 
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should not remain on scene for much longer than 10 to 15 minutes for the most severe 
situations.  In fact, units may spend more time on non-emergent events because there i 
no medical reason to rush the patient to a hospital.  Not having access to the actual patient 
care data reports makes it somewhat precarious to infer allocation decisions based on 
these models, because of the many threats to validity. 
6.6 Discussion 
 The three models formulated to predict time emergency resources are ng ged 
responding to and managing incidents with the demographic explanatory variables at the 
block group level provided mixed results.  Once again, the economic indicators proved to 
be important for predicting unit workload.  Units responding to incidents within areas that 
have more wealth will spend more time managing incidents.  The causal effectso  the e 
findings are less clear, because there are certain threats to validity that cannot be 
controlled.  Each of these threats has been described and requires further research to mo e 
thoroughly assess the true relationship between these variables.  However, the data does 
provide initial findings that are consistent with the hypothesized relationships.  For 
example, one would expect units to spend more time on scene at incidents occurring in 
areas with more affluence based on the literature and DEMAND models.  Although 
DEMAND declines as WEALTH increases, it appears that the incidents in more affluent 
areas are more severe or at least require more time to be resolved than in lower income 
areas.  This is further substantiated by the high number of cancellations and false calls 
received in lower socioeconomic areas of the city, which indicate a low threshold for 
requesting assistance from the local emergency services. 
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 The wealth effect is important to predicting DEMAND and workload for 
emergency resources, but building age and the young were also significant in the ON 
SCENE time model.  Building age was expected to influence ON SCENE time measures, 
because of the documented increased fire risk older buildings pose.  However, this 
relationship was not supported by the analysis, which indicated that older buildings are 
associated with less ON SCENE time.  This finding is likely spurious, influenced more 
by the risk factors associated with those who reside in older buildings than the buildings 
themselves.  Another curious finding, only because the DEMAND models indicated a 
relationship contrary to that hypothesized, is the positive association with the young.  
Areas with higher percentage of persons under the age of 18 were associated with longer 
ON SCENE times, which were expected because this age group is perceived to be at 
increased risk for fire or medical situations.   
6.7 Summary 
 The information derived from these models provides more of a foundation to 
build on than conclusive evidence on which to base a new deployment model.  The major 
problem is the threats to validity associated with the time variables.  It is possible that 
each of the variables are valid measures; however, more detailed review of the data must 
be undertaken before claiming with a high level of certainty that the information is valid.  
The most significant threat is to the ON SCENE time measures which are influenced by 
the response time of the MEDIC ambulance unit, among other factors.  In particular, this 
is most problematic when trying to use time as a proxy for assessing incident sev rity.  
MEDIC utilizes fluid deployment strategies, which involve predicting demand based on 
historical response data.  Therefore, it is possible that fire apparatus ON SCE E time for 
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EMS incidents is a reflection of MEDIC’s deployment model, which changes by the hour 
as trends in demand shift.  This compromises the ON SCENE measure as a proxy for 
severity.  However, these measures are valid for assessing TOTAL time and ON SCENE 
time if evaluating the likelihood of unit availability across block group areas.  Under such 
circumstances, the ON SCENE time reflects the true emergency service n ronment fire 
units respond within.  For example, if the positive relationship between WEALTH and 
ON SCENE is caused by the deployment strategy utilized by MEDIC, which allocates 
fewer resources to lower demand areas, then such information is valid to consider when 
allocating fire service resources.  In many ways the actual reasons for more extended ON 
SCENE time measurements in wealthier block groups is irrelevant, if the extend d time is 
predictable.  This still permits deployment decisions to be adjusted for such conditions, 
which impact unit availability. 
 When a fire unit is ON SCENE caring for a critical patient, extinguishing a fire, 
or waiting for an ambulance, the unit is not available to respond to other incidents.  The 
challenges to validity for using time as a measure of incident severity may be 
problematic, but the information does provide important insight into factors associated 
with extended or shortened time periods units spend responding to and managing 
incidents based on demographic characteristics.  This is important information for 
making allocation decisions, because the more time units spend unavailable the more risk 
their response area assumes.  When combined with the information derived from the 
DEMAND models, this information is logical and telling about the emergency services 
environment.  In short, the same demographic characteristics related to more DEMAND 
are also related to shorter ON SCENE and TOTAL time units are unavailable to respond 
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across block group areas.  Regardless of severity, this indicates that locating emergency 
units based on DEMAND or TIME is problematic, since these two measures work 
against each other.  Average time calculations also conceal some of the details of the 
response information.  For example, a high demand area could sustain more critical 
events than a low demand area, but the larger number of incidents when averaged 
together diminishes the impact on the analysis of the longer duration incidents.   
 In the end, more detailed incident level information needs to be collected to 
substantiate many of the findings related to these three models.  It is relaively easy to 
infer from the findings some information that is useful to developing an alternative 
methodology for allocating scarce emergency resources.  However, the block group level 
data on its own does not provide the detail necessary to confidently extrapolate each of 
the findings into the practical application of locating resources.  The threats to validity 
have been noted and do cause one to pause when analyzing this information.  However, 
the data does reveal some interesting correlations that provide a solid foundatin for 
further study not only to substantiate the existing information, but also to have more 
confidence in the findings.  The practical application of this information depends on 
ensuring a high level of confidence in the models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 This analysis produced numerous usable models to predict emergency service 
demand based on demographic population characteristics measured at the block group 
level.  The city of Charlotte served as the study area, where data on the block group 
characteristics and emergency service response information was collected to onduct the 
research for this dissertation.  A combination of bivariate correlations and multivariate 
linear regression was used to measure the relationships between the emergency rsponse 
data and explanatory variables to build coherent models of demand and unit workload 
across the block group areas.  These models demonstrated that the economic condition of 
persons residing in these homogenous areas were strong predictors of emergency service 
demand and workload.  This information lays the groundwork to formulate an alternative 
model to locate emergency service resources more systematically across lo al 
jurisdictions to maximize service delivery outcomes. 
The distribution of scarce resources challenges public sector agencies at all levels 
of government.  These agencies are often castigated as being inefficient and ineffective, 
yet they are constrained by the ideals of the public sector to deliver service in a fair and 
equitable manner.  These predominantly political constraints can be problematic when 
locating emergency service resources, because demand for these services is not equally 
distributed across local communities.  This dissertation has put forth and tested a theory 
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that population demographic characteristics drive demand for emergency service .  By 
modeling these relationships, public sector decision-makers should be able to better 
locate these resources to enhance service delivery.  Current resource allocation 
methodology often demands that decision-makers distribute emergency service units 
equally throughout local communities without regard to demand for these services.  This 
leads to an unequal distribution of workload on the emergency service personnel.  It also 
disenfranchises certain sectors within a community by delivering more service assets to 
low demand areas, while high demand areas receive inadequate resources to provide a 
comparable level of protection.  Using this even-distribution strategy to allocate 
emergency service resources ignores the drivers of demand for these servics, wh h 
arguably are demographic characteristics associated with wealth and education levels 
found within these areas.  This research attempts to substantiate the relationships between 
demographic variables found at the neighborhood level (block group) and demand for 
emergency services to help guide the development of an alternative model to locate these 
finite resources to maximize outcomes. 
In addition to exploring resource demand drivers, an effort is also made to model 
the relationship between demographic characteristics found in the population and the 
time emergency units spend responding to and managing calls for service.  In particular, 
two models were formulated.  The first tested the relationship between demographic 
characteristics and the total time units spent managing emergency incidents.  Total time 
captures the time from when a unit is dispatched to the time the unit is available to 
respond to another incident.  This measure includes calls in which the unit was cancelled 
prior to arrival on scene, and all other responses for each block group.  A second model 
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utilizes on scene time as the dependent variable.  The time units spend on scene across 
block groups does not include cancellations, because for cancelled incidents the 
responding units never arrive on scene to record a valid time for the measure.  Therefore, 
only those incidents where a unit actually arrives were included in the models.  This 
measure is theorized as a proxy for incident severity and workload across the block group 
areas.  Time is an important factor to the emergency services because consumption is 
rivalrous, meaning that when simultaneous emergency situations occur in the same 
response area a unit from another area must respond.  This is problematic because the 
response times are extended and the area where the unit responds from is without 
protection for the duration of the incident.   
7.2 Problems with the Current Locational Methodology 
The findings derived from this research challenge the established model for 
locating emergency resources used by local decision-makers across the country.  The 
current locational model is problematic for two particular reasons: 1. Emergency 
resources are scarce and 2. Emergency service agencies are subject to managing 
simultaneous incidents.  The fact that resources are limited means that public decision-
makers must make hard choices about how to distribute these resources, which is 
influenced by a myriad of factors and interests.  The fire service, among other public 
sector agencies, is famous for complaining that service delivery is ineffective because of 
inadequate resources.  The lack of ingenuity and pressure from exogenous interests 
paralyze the creation of alternative methods to better allocate these resources.  Again, the 
number one factor is response times, which are directly related to the number of available 
resources a community can harness.  Clearly, the more units spread out in a community, 
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the lower the response times.  Exogenous groups, such as the National Fire Protection 
Administration (NFPA) or Insurance Services Organization (ISO), place significant 
pressure on fire service administrators to locate units in a way that reduces response times 
to all areas of a defined jurisdiction (Granito, 2003).   
Response time benchmarks espoused by the NFPA and ISO are partially derived 
from efforts to limit loss of life and property resulting from low probability emergency 
events, which include structure fires and cardiac arrests (Shpilberg, 1977).  The goal to 
arrive on scene within four minutes of the dispatch is to contain fires before flash over 
and improve the chance of reviving victims suffering cardiac arrests.4  These and other 
situations emergency service personnel manage are time-sensitive events, meaning the 
faster that units arrive on scene the better chance to prevent the loss of life and property 
(Kuehnert, 1999).  However, the majority of incidents that emergency service personnel 
respond to are not time-sensitive situations where the outcome will be affected by a su  
four minute response time.  As is substantiated in the literature, certain demographic 
characteristics are linked to increased risk for being afflicted by a time sensitive 
emergency situation.  In addition, persons with fewer economic resources rely mor  
heavily on emergency services than those who are more economically stable (Gamache, 
2003; Lipsky, 1980).  Recognizing that emergency service resources are limitedyet 
attempting to distribute them evenly has the effect of disenfranchising areas with more 
people and areas that have demographic characteristics consistent with i creased risk.  In 
                                                          
4 Flash over is defined as the stage of a fire at which all surfaces and objects in a room or area are heated to 
their ignition temperature and flames develop on all contents and combustible surfaces at once (Brannig  
& Corbett, 2008).  The probability of a person suffering cardiac arrest (heart stops beating) to survive 
declines by about 10% for every minute care is not pr vided (cardiopulmonary resuscitation).  Therefor, 
after 10 minutes in cardiac arrest without care a prson statistically has zero chance of survival.  Each of 
these events is extremely time sensitive. 
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effect, public decision-makers who espouse distributing these resources evenly place a 
higher value on statistical lives of those residing in lower risk and lower density areas of 
a community (Felder & Brinkmann, 2002). 
The service delivery limitations of scarce resources are further exacerbated by the 
opportunity for simultaneous emergency incidents to occur in the same response area.  
This creates numerous challenges for emergency service units, but in particular it 
nullifies the benefits of using response time as the primary benchmark for locating 
resources evenly across a community.  As Peters and Hall (1999) note, once units begin 
to respond to calls for service, response time becomes a random variable.  Therefore, th  
logic behind the current deployment model to place an emergency resource within a 
certain response time of every person in a community becomes ineffective.  Because 
areas with higher demand and more severe incidents will overwhelm the assigned 
emergency resources, all additional calls for service will result in extended response 
times.  This is a reason that time units spend responding to and managing incidents was 
calculated for each block group and compared to demographic characteristics.  
Presumably, block groups with characteristics associated with units that spend more time 
responding to and mitigating incidents will be at greater risk based on the current 
locational strategy, because the more time a unit assigned to an area is unavailable the 
greater likelihood of a simultaneous incident occurring. 
7.3 Jefferson versus Hamilton Allocation Strategy 
Emergency service decision-makers continue to apply a methodology that relies 
on response times to evenly distribute emergency resources despite the inefficiencies and 
service delivery problems with this framework.  The hesitancy to be innovative and use 
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data to better inform locational decisions is ignored by public sector decisions-makers for 
a myriad of reasons.  Much of the reason for this is the political and institutional culture 
of the public bureaucracy, which on the whole subscribes to a more Jeffersonian ideology 
for organizing public sector service delivery (Wood & Waterman, 1994).  As Sylves 
(2004) points out in his paper about emergency managers, leaders who follow a 
Jeffersonian system work to organize service delivery to satisfy political interests that 
pervade a community.  This is in contrast to organizing service delivery based on 
outcomes, which is espoused by Jefferson’s counterpart Alexander Hamilton.  Hamilton, 
according to Sylves (2004), argues that public services should be delivered based on 
outcomes derived from empirical analysis.  The idea of “Customer satisfaction in 
government has a ring of Jeffersonianism” (Sylves, 2004, 31).  A clear principal-agent 
relationship exists between the “customers” and emergency service managers, just a  a 
relationship exists between these managers and the political representatives, which drives 
the emphasis on equal distribution of resources among the public.  Although politically 
appeasing, such a strategy may not maximize potential outcomes from the limied
emergency service resources available. 
Unfortunately, the information or data required to make more proactive locational 
decisions to maximize outcomes is often not readily available (Swersey & Ignall, 1991).  
As Sylves (2004) points out, the data that is collected by public sector bureaucracies is 
often “coded,” making it extremely difficult to draw out meaningful findings to improve 
service delivery.  Public sector data, such as performance measures and budgets, are 
challenging for outsiders of the bureaucracy to decipher, because the numbers do not 
always provide a clear picture of service delivery.  This situation proved prophetic for 
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completing this dissertation.  A great volume of data is available on the fire service, but it 
is often basic, hard to access, difficult to interpret, and at times inaccurate.   Because of 
this, it is challenging to meet the ideals of Hamilton’s theory on organizing public sector 
service delivery based on outcomes.  This is one reason public sector managers often 
default to the Jeffersonian way of delivering public sector goods and services (Sylves, 
2004). 
The purpose of this research is in many ways an effort to stimulate a more 
Hamiltonian methodology to locate and manage local emergency services.  This requires 
empirical analysis of the data to find better ways to generate more positive u comes, 
which requires proactive policies.  Here again is a major stumbling block to changing the 
current method for allocating emergency resources.  As Leeson (2007) describes in his 
analysis of the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, public sector officials have 
an incentive to be reactive and overly cautious when formulating policy to avoid 
committing “type I policy errors.”  These are errors that result when a proactive policy 
falls short of its goal or does not provide the intended benefits.  These policy errors are 
problematic for politicians because proactive policies are overt, which is in stark contrast 
to reactive policy initiatives.  Reactive policies are subject to “type II olicy errors,” but 
these errors are less costly to political actors because responsibility for such failures is 
more diffuse.  This makes it difficult to hold specific policy makers accountable.  The 
current locational model is reactive and generates endless “type II errors.”  However, it is 
difficult to identify those who are most harmed by such a policy because when an 
emergency unit does not arrive in a timely manner, the “customer” does not have the 
information to understand the reasons behind the delayed response or whether the delay 
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increased loss.  This information asymmetry creates a moral hazard situation, which 
benefits the agent (fire department) who is not held accountable for the misappropriation 
of resources (Friedman, 2002).  This provides an incentive to policy makers to maintain 
the status quo for locating scarce emergency resources. 
Allocating emergency resources based on demand for these services would 
require proactive policy initiatives derived from statistical analysis of data.  Such actions 
would draw the attention of the public, especially as emergency resources were moved 
from one location to another to satisfy demand.  One can imagine the citizens’ concern 
when they are accustomed to seeing two fire apparatus in their area fire station, and then 
one day they notice there is only one.  The perception would be of decreased protection, 
which would not become a significant problem until a high profile incident occurred 
resulting in loss of life and property.  At this point, the political pressure could become 
intense, as residents blame the loss on the public sector decision-maker’s proactive policy 
to shift an emergency resource from their area to a higher demand area.   
When decision-makers implement proactive policy initiatives it is easier for the 
public and other principals to identify victims if failures occur, which increases political 
scrutiny (Leeson, 2007).  It does not matter whether the proactive policy led to more 
effective and efficient locational decisions that reduced overall loss of life and property, 
because the costs, no matter how big or small, are more visible, while any benefits r main 
unclear and hidden to the average observer.  This is not the case with policy initiatives 
that encourage equal distribution of scarce emergency resources, which are reactive in 
nature, as it is almost impossible with such policies for the public or even the agents to 
identify victims when failures occur.  Therefore, there may be many costs and few 
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benefits associated with a reactive policy, but the inability to clearly identify these costs 
make reactive policies appealing to government officials who fear public scrutiny.   
The incentive structure in the public sector favors reactive policies and a 
commitment to more Jeffersonian ways of managing service delivery.  This impedes 
public managers from being innovative when locating emergency service resources 
(Sylves, 2004).  In addition, the emergency service environment is highly dynamic.  This 
makes it difficult to predict demand with enough confidence to overcome the incentive to 
be reactive, which became evident in performing this analysis.  There are simply
incalculable influences on demand, only a very few of which can be measured.  An effort 
was made to identify some factors that drive demand for emergency services in an effort 
to build a model for locating these scarce resources more effectively through proactive 
policy initiatives. 
7.4 Review of Empirical Findings and Analysis 
The empirical findings from this research support the ability to develop an 
alternate means to locate resources to improve service delivery based on scientific data 
analysis.  Although this analysis just scratched the surface of such an effort, the findings 
provide a foundation to build upon.  The analysis was based at the Census block group 
level, because these groups most closely reflect the naturally formed neighborhood areas 
in most communities.  The block groups, like neighborhoods, are demographically 
homogenous, providing valid measures for assessing emergency service demand 
(Ostrom, 2000).  In addition, emergency resources are often located throughout 
communities in a manner that permits the response areas for fire service units to correlate 
with the block group boundaries.  For the most part, the unit or units located in each fire 
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station have a primary response area that usually includes three to five block group areas.  
When conducting this analysis all information was calculated for each block group, and 
not based on unit response areas. 
A myriad of theoretical models to predict emergency service demand were 
formulated based on the explanatory demographic characteristics.  Multivariate least 
squares regression was used to evaluate the capability of the models to predict em rgency 
service demand at the block group level.  The explanatory variables can be placed into 
three categories: economic, structural, and social.  Specifically, the economi  measures 
were household income, percent of persons receiving food stamps, percent owners versus 
renters, and percent of persons 25 and older completing high school.  Structural measures 
included average building age, percent of appearance violations, and percent of code 
violations.  In addition, the variables for percent of persons over 65 years of age and 
percent of persons under 18 years of age were included as explanatory social variables.  
Because of some collinearity issues with the economic variables, a factor w s calculated 
to combine INCOME, OWNER, and EDUCATION.  All explanatory variables were 
included in each analysis to predict demand. 
A majority of the hypothesized relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables were substantiated by the analyses.  The economic variables 
proved most important in each of the demand models.  FOOD and WEALTH were 
significant at the 0.05 level in the models for overall demand, fire demand, EMS demand, 
and cancellations.  These findings substantiated the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3 that 
economic status is inversely associated with demand for emergency services.  Su h 
findings were expected because as wealth increases so does one’s ability to purchase fire 
171 
 
 
and medical goods from the private sector to lower risk.  For example, more wealthy 
persons are likely to invest in fire prevention and detection products, such as smoke 
detectors or monitored alarm systems to reduce fire risk.  In addition, those with more 
resources and education clearly have a higher threshold for requesting assistance.  This 
can be inferred from the correlation with reduced demand and is further substantiated by 
the inverse relationship with cancellations and miscellaneous calls.  It appears that in 
wealthier and more educated areas citizens are less likely to utilize the emergency 
services for non-emergent events, which is consistent with the literature that those with 
less wealth rely more heavily on the public sector (Lipsky, 1980). 
The structural characteristics did not provide much predictive power based on the 
model statistics.  The age of buildings across block group areas was weakly correlated to 
demand, but not to the extent that was hypothesized.  The percentage of appearance and 
code violations across block group areas proved not to be significant in most of the 
models.  These findings were somewhat puzzling, but point to the idea that individual 
characteristics are more influential in determining risk of fire and meical events, than 
structural characteristics in and of themselves.  Older buildings may be more prone to fire 
because of construction techniques, antiquated wiring, and/or insufficient fire protection 
systems.  However, building age is certainly less influential on emergency srvice 
demand than the persons who occupy the buildings, which appear to be captured best by 
the economic measures. 
The remaining explanatory variables measured differences in population age.  
These variables included the percentage of persons over sixty-five years old nd less than 
eighteen years old found in each block group area.  Both variables were hypothesized to 
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be positively associated with demand, because these age groups have been identified to 
be at increased risk for fire and medical events.  The percentage of people over sixty-five 
years old was not significant in any of the demand models, and all of the bivariate 
correlations were extremely weak.  The variable for percentage of young or those under 
eighteen years of age was significant at the 0.05 level in each of the demand models; 
however, the relationship was opposite of that hypothesized.  To better understand these 
relationships with the social variables more data needs to be collected.  It is unclear 
whether, for example, measuring youth between 0 and 18 is too large of a range, and 
whether the findings are spurious or legitimate.  While the information serves as a 
catalyst to perform more analysis, it is not a proxy for action. 
On the surface, the demand models indicate that economic status of persons in a 
community is a strong predictor of emergency service demand.  Clearly, those who have 
more are less likely to use the emergency services; however, these findings tell little 
about incident severity, which is a critical component for developing an alternativ  
method for locating scarce resources.  Demand is just one factor, because the number of 
incidents in an area fails to completely demonstrate true need for these servic s.  
Therefore, the time units spend in each block group responding to and managing 
incidents was calculated as a proxy for unit workload and incident severity.  Each of the 
models to test the stated hypotheses for TOTAL TIME and ON SCENE time on their 
own proved inconclusive.  Again, the economic variables were the most predictive in 
each of the models, indicating that socioeconomic status is associated with the workload 
placed on the assigned emergency units across block groups.  In particular, WEALTH 
was positively associated with ON SCENE time, while FOOD STAMPS proved 
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insignificant in this model.  In addition, BUILD AGE was inversely associated with ON 
SCENE time.  In the model to predict TOTAL TIME, FOOD STAMPS had a significa t 
(0.05 level) inverse relationship with TOTAL TIME.  Although many factors threaten th  
validity of findings from these models when evaluated independent of other information, 
they are quite informative when compared to the information derived from the deman  
models. 
In short, the demand models indicate that distressed economic areas utilize the 
emergency services more frequently than more wealthy areas.  As economic status 
declines within block groups, the demand for fire and medical emergencies rises along 
with demand for miscellaneous or non-emergent assistance and the number of cancelled 
incidents increase.  This is combined with the findings that more wealthy areas are 
inversely associated with cancellations and miscellaneous incidents.  Based on this 
information, one might suggest simply locating more emergency resources in low income 
areas because they appear to be more likely to have fire and medical events than the more 
wealthy areas.  However, the associations established between economic status and the 
propensity to call for non-emergent (MISC) situations or the likelihood of a cancelled or 
false call raise other questions about locating resources.  Economic stability appears to be 
associated with lower demand, but when assistance is requested in these areas the dat  
suggests a higher probability that the incident will be time-sensitive.  Although not 
conclusive, it is reasonable to infer that more wealthy areas have a much higher t reshold 
for requesting assistance from the emergency services than distressed areas.  This is 
further substantiated by the TOTAL TIME and ON SCENE models which, at the very 
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least, indicate that emergency units on average spend more time in the more wealthy
neighborhoods responding to and managing incidents.   
The time models, when compared to the demand models, paint a clearer picture of 
the relationship between demographic characteristics and need for emergency service 
assistance.  Areas with more wealth are less likely to call for assistance, but when they do 
units will spend more time mitigating the incident situation.  One can infer that based on 
this comparison, calls for services in more economically stable neighborhoods tend to be 
more severe, since overall they require more time to mitigate.  This is further 
substantiated by the opposite situation in the lower income block groups, where time 
units spend responding to and managing incidents is inversely associated with economic 
conditions.  Based on the demand models, persons residing in economically distressed 
block groups have a higher propensity for calling 911 for situations that are minor in 
nature and do not require much time for emergency service personnel to mitigate.  The 
significant positive relationship between lower economic conditions and cancellations 
and miscellaneous incidents also indicates that persons in these areas use less dicretion 
when deciding whether to call for assistance.   Some of this lack of discretion is 
explained by limited alternatives.  A person who does not have healthcare coverage or 
cannot get a landlord to respond to a broken water pipe is left with few options but to 
request assistance from the emergency services.  Although this raises demand, these are 
not time-sensitive incidents, and could be treated differently to better allocate resources 
toward those areas where potential loss of life and property are more likely bas d on 
demographic characteristics. 
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In many ways the findings presented in this research are conflicting, especially for 
developing an alternative methodology for locating emergency resources.  On the one 
hand, it is evident that certain demographic characteristics are associated with more or 
less demand for these services.  However, the same characteristics associated with 
decreased demand appear to be associated with a higher likelihood of time-sensitive 
incidents, while those characteristics associated with higher demand are also linked to 
more non-emergent situations.  Yet these findings are descriptive of the emergency 
environment and quite informative for evaluating where to locate emergency resources to 
better maximize outcomes.  This is best exemplified in a qualitative thought experiment, 
which applies the information derived from this analysis to the actual emergency s rvice 
environment. 
7.5 Economic Outlier Block Group Comparison 
 Two outlier block groups were identified based on economic conditions to 
evaluate the types and numbers of emergency incidents.  To identify these block groups,
the high and the low measures for each of the four economic variables were used: 
OWNER, INCOME, FOOD STAMPS, and EDUCATION.  Although no block group 
contained the high or low extreme for all four variables, two block groups did stand out 
based on the numbers.  The two block groups selected were linked to the neighborhood 
area each sits within to provide more contexts for the discussion.  At the low end, the 
Southside Park/York Road neighborhoods located in the west side of the city had the 
lowest household income, lowest high school graduation levels, less than 5% of the 
population own their homes, building age far exceeded the mean across the city, and food 
stamp eligibility was well above the mean city average making this one of th  most 
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distressed areas based on economic conditions in the city of Charlotte.  On the other end 
of the wealth spectrum, the Foxcroft neighborhood, located on the south side of the city, 
had the highest household income levels, over 95% are high school graduates, 80% are 
homeowners, and no one is receiving food stamps.  A table of these findings is provided 
below. 
Table 9: Demographic Information for Outlier Areas 
Comparison of Demographic Information for Outlier Areas  
  Mean Values Southside/York 
Road 
Foxcroft 
    
Food Stamps 0.1099 0.3493 0.0000 
Owner 0.5270 0.0565 0.7902 
Income $52,877  $9,999  $176,852  
Education 0.8187 0.3784 0.9501 
Build Age 32.50 years 46 years 32 years 
 
 
These two outlier neighborhoods depict the gap between economic conditions that exist 
within the city of Charlotte, which puts into perspective the challenges associated with 
allocating public goods and services.  The demand for emergency services and types of
incidents that occurred in each of these neighborhoods is almost as striking.  A table of
incident types is provided below. 
 The difference in demand associated with economic condition is clearly 
demonstrated in Table 10.  What is not clear is the severity of incidents and their time-
sensitive nature.  The ability to relate this information to the demographic variables 
would make it more evident where resources should be located to maximize incident 
outcomes.  What is evident though is the availability of units that could be gained in each 
of the areas if responses were based on incident severity.  For example, if units had either 
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not responded or responded but remained available to the miscellaneous situations and 
alarms in the Southside/York neighborhood area, the overall workload or demand on 
these units would fall by almost 100 incidents.  Such a change in response strategy would 
certainly mean that units would be available more time during a day, which would res t 
in a lower probability that a time-sensitive emergency would receive a delaye  response.  
It should also be noted that response time to the Foxcroft neighborhood is shorter than 
that to the Southside/York neighborhood.  This likely indicates that simultaneous 
incidents are occurring in the Southside/York area, requiring units from other areas to 
respond more often.   
Table 10: Response Data for Outlier Areas 
 Comparison of Response Data for Outlier areas   
  Southside/York Road Foxcroft 
Total Incidents 575 43 
Incidents per 100 persons 40.41 6.99 
Total Fire Incidents 31 (5%) 1 (2.3%) 
Fires per 100 persons 2.18 0.16 
Structure Fires 13 0 
Other Fires 18 1 
Total EMS Incidents 369 (64%) 20 (46.5%) 
EMS per 100 persons 25.93 3.25 
EMS w/o motor vehicle 325 16 
EMS w/ motor vehicle 43 4 
Total Alarms 50 (8.7%) 13 (30.2%) 
Total Cancelations 68 (11.8% 3 (7%) 
Total Miscellaneous 40 (7%) 6 (14%) 
Average TOTAL TIME 18 minutes, 12 seconds 17 minutes, 41 seconds 
Average SCENE TIME 12 minutes, 2 seconds 13 minutes, 13 seconds 
Average Response Time 4 minutes, 56 seconds 4 minutes, 29 seconds 
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7.6 Locating Resources Based on the Findings: A Practical Application 
 The city of Charlotte continues to grow in population and area as people move 
from other locations and the city annexes unincorporated land.  Since 2005 the Charlotte 
Fire Department has built three new fire stations and is considering two more in 2009.  
Recently, in December of 2008, a station with one engine company was placed into 
service at the intersection of Pineville-Matthews Road and Providence Road (Arboretum 
area) in the south side of the city.  Concurrently, the city was also considering whether to 
build a station on the east side near the intersection of North Sharon Amity and Central
Avenue (Eastland Mall area).  This situation provides another opportunity to use the 
findings from this analysis to quantitatively evaluate these locational decisions based on 
demographic characteristics and potential future demand for services.  Below is a table of 
the demographic characteristics for each of these areas.  As with most fire stations across 
Charlotte, the primary response area consists of about five block group areas.  Therefore, 
the five block group areas closest to the subject fire station locations were select d for the 
following comparison.  The demographic measures were averaged across the five ar as 
for each station location..5 
Table 11: Station Location Comparison Information 
Demographic Comparison for Station Location Areas   
  Mean Values Eastland Area Arboretum Area 
 (n=331)   
Food Stamps 0.1099 0.1499 0.0111 
Owner 0.5528 0.3397 0.6277 
Income $56,478  $41,024  $77,733  
Education 0.8228 0.8264 0.965 
Build Age 34.3 33.4 20.4 
 
                                                          
5 Station #39, which is located at the Arboretum, was placed into service December 2008.  The Eastland 
block group area does not have a fire station. 
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The demographic data presented in Table 11 indicates the stronger economic conditions 
in the Arboretum area of the city versus those found in the Eastland area.  Based on these 
numbers and the findings in the analysis, it is expected that demand for emergency 
services in the Eastland area will exceed that in the Arboretum area.  Education is 
comparable across these two areas, but there is a large difference betwen INCOME, 
OWNER, and FOOD STAMPS indicating more risk for fire and medical emergencies in 
the Eastland area.  This becomes even more evident when evaluating the number and 
types of incidents that occurred in each of these areas during FY2006, which is presented 
in Table 12. 
Table 12: Station Comparison with Response Information 
Comparison of Response Data for Station Location 
Areas   
  Eastland Area Arboretum Area 
   
Total Incidents 530 122 
Incidents per 100 persons 16.42 5.67 
Total Fire Incidents 23.4 6.4 
Fires per 100 persons 0.72 0.3 
Structure Fires 14.8 2 
Other Fires 806 4.4 
Total EMS Incidents 356 63 
EMS per 100 persons 11.06 3.2 
EMS w/o motor vehicle 326.8 61.4 
EMS w/ motor vehicle 28 7.4 
Total Alarms 33.8 16.6 
Total Cancelations 65.4 10.4 
Total Miscellaneous 44.2 15.6 
Total Fire Losses ($) $59,504  $17,020  
Average TOTAL TIME 18 minutes, 51 seconds 18 minutes, 18 seconds 
Average SCENE TIME 11 minutes, 52 seconds 12 minutes, 24 seconds 
Average Response Time 5 minutes, 52 seconds 5 minutes, 38 seconds 
 
180 
 
 
 Based on the demographic and response information, the findings from this 
research would support placing an emergency services station in the Eastland area over 
the Arboretum area.  The demand differences are stark, but again it is not clear which 
area is more at risk for time-sensitive fire and medical emergencies.  However, the time 
variables calculated for each block group are telling, especially for decision-makers who 
are very concerned with reducing response times.  The Eastland area block group bucks 
the trend between time and demographic characteristics that have been establish d in this 
dissertation.  In this situation, TOTAL TIME and response times to incidents in the
Eastland area exceed those in the Arboretum area.  Not using time as a proxy for incident 
severity, these findings do likely indicate that there is an increased probability of 
simultaneous incidents occurring in the Eastland area, placing additional workload on the 
assigned units. 
 The surrounding stations to the Eastland area are the busiest by call volume in the 
city.  The demand for emergency service resources in the Arboretum area is consistent 
with the demographic characteristics tested for this dissertation associated with decreased 
demand.  The fire stations surrounding the Arboretum area, as opposed to the Eastland 
area, experience some of the lowest workload based on call volume.  Although it is not 
possible to evaluate incident severity or the potential for time-sensitive events in each of 
these areas with the available data, one can infer that a time-sensitive event in th  
Arboretum area would be more likely to receive a timely response than a similar ituation 
in the Eastland area based on unit workload and proximity.  The other finding of 
significance between these two areas is the average monetary losses attributed to fire.  
The Eastland area experienced three and a half times more monetary loss than the 
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Arboretum area.  Based on this practical application of the demographic characteristics, 
economically depressed neighborhoods have more need for emergency resources than 
economically stable areas. 
7.7 Future Research Possibilities 
 The goal at the outset of this dissertation was to predict emergency service 
demand and workload with enough confidence to use the findings to formulate a new 
model for locating emergency resources.  It is safe to acknowledge that the information 
derived from the analysis falls well short of this goal.  However, the findings are 
applicable to guiding resource location decisions with some caveats, which is hopefully 
demonstrated through the practical application examples.  This alone makes the research 
relevant, and hopefully contributes to the field of study.  It also should stimulate futur
research efforts to develop more confident models for predicting demand and incident 
severity based on demographic characteristics. 
 Monetary loss statistics across block group areas must also be measured to 
evaluate whether such losses are associated with certain demographic chracteristics.  
During FY2006, monetary losses attributed to fire exceeded $16.5 million in the city of
Charlotte.  Modeling these losses could provide further information to guide emergency 
service resource location decisions to maximize outcomes.  Regardless of demand, areas 
that experience increased monetary losses need additional resources over those that have 
a lower probability of suffering losses.  Clearly, monetary losses are not the nly losses 
that occur from fire and other emergency incidents.  People are injured or killed each year 
from these events, and these statistics must also be included in any effort to find different 
methods to locate emergency services.  How such measures correlate to demand is 
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unclear, but it is likely that the demographic characteristics found throughout the 
population are predictive of these losses.     
 Losses associated with fire and other emergency situations are important to 
evaluate in conjunction with probability analysis to estimate the chance of time-sensitive 
events and unit availability across block areas.  Such analysis requires incident level data 
to assess incident severity, so that the probability findings derived have a high level of 
confidence associated with them.  Formulating an alternative model for locating 
emergency resources requires an understanding of the true risk factors for ime-sensitive 
fire and medical events.  Although the emergency services environment is highly 
dynamic, it is likely that models can be developed to locate resources that reduce overall 
risk to local communities from fire and medical situations that are far more effective than 
the current distribution model.  Political and public sector incentives work against the 
implementation of such an effort, but to date, little attention has been paid by fire serv c  
leaders to innovate and formulate a new method to better utilize limited resources.  Such 
a situation may become a necessity in the future, as demand continues to rise and public 
sector economic conditions further limit the number of resources available to protect the 
public. 
7.8 Conclusion to the Conclusion 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to challenge the established reactive 
locational models that pervade the fire service industry.  Fire service lead rs continue to 
spend inordinate amounts of time fighting for additional resources and then complaining 
when those resources are not granted.  The industry has become so reliant on resources to 
meet response time benchmarks that when the resources are not available effectiv ness 
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declines.  The reality is that the fire service industry has minimal political capital, 
because most citizens do not believe they will ever need the emergency services.  In 
addition, these services are human intensive, making them prime targets when funds are 
reduced to balance budgets.  It is true that in the public sector demand will meet supply 
(Wood & Waterman, 1994), which is a reason the public sector is not capable of 
operating completely efficiently.  However, responsible public sector leaders should be in 
a perpetual search for new ways to distribute limited resources to maximize outcomes, 
especially when the outcomes are measured based on number of lives saved and property 
conserved.   
If nothing else, this research provides evidence that it is possible to utilize 
empirical analysis to evaluate data to guide the development of more effectiv  lo ational 
models.  It is unclear whether the findings in this research are conclusive to the p int that 
they can be confidently used to alter emergency service resource allocation.  However, 
the practical application of these findings is apparent in the analysis of the city of 
Charlotte’s decision to build a new fire station in the Arboretum area.  It is unclear the 
exact reasons why the Arboretum location was chosen over the Eastland location, but he 
analysis substantiates the value of the findings from this research.  A comparison of the 
economic conditions across these two areas appears to indicate that one area is 
economically stable and the other is not.  This situation is further substantiated when 
evaluating the types of incidents in each area, number of incidents, and average times.  
Information to predict monetary losses and probability of time-sensitive emerg ncies 
based on the demographic characteristics further justify locating an emergency service 
resource in one area over the other.  In the end, the fire station was constructed a the 
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Arboretum location which, if nothing else, does lend credence to the belief that public 
sector decision-makers are not conducting scientifically driven empirical analyses when 
determining where to locate scarce resources. 
This is not an effort to be critical of the practical allocation decisions made by the 
city of Charlotte, but it does demonstrate the potential value of this research.  
Demographic characteristics across block groups are predictive of demand.  If these 
indicators are ignored when locating scarce emergency resources, service d livery and 
outcomes will suffer.  It is unclear what the future holds for the emergency services, but 
the most likely scenario is that demand will continue to increase while local resourc s 
decline.  Public sector decision-makers can remain resistant to change or embrac  the 
available information in order to allocate these resources to more effectively prevent the 
loss of life and property.     
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APPENDIX A: SPECIAL APPARATUS 
 
 
BRUSH TRUCK (5) 
 Modified ¾ ton standard 4-wheel drive pick-up truck units.  These units have a 
mounted water pump and 250 gallon water tank.  A booster reel with nozzle is also 
included to extinguish brush fires.  In addition, these units carry rakes, shovels, and a 
chain-saw to assist with clearing and extinguishing brush fires.  The 4-wheel drive feature 
allows the trucks to be driven into more remote areas that cannot be reached by standard
fire apparatus. 
 
TANKER TRUCK (5) 
 These apparatus are similar to the engine company design used by the Charlotte 
Fire Department.  The main difference with the tanker apparatus is that eac carries 1000 
gallons of water and 300 gallons of foam concentrate.  The tankers not only provide 
water when hydrants are not readily available, but are also an integral part of the aircraft 
crash rescue platform.   
 
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRUCK (3) 
 These units are similar to the rescue apparatus, except they carry equipment to 
manage hazardous material releases.  These apparatus carry reference mat rials and 
computers to identify chemicals, and the equipment to mitigate, and then decontaminate 
rescuers who may have come into contact with the hazardous material.  These units 
respond to gas leaks and other hazardous conditions across the region. 
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URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE TRUCK (2) 
 Two tractor drawn trailers are stored at Fire Station #11, which contain a cche of 
equipment for performing trench rescue and USAR operations.  Each truck contains raw 
materials for shoring up building and trench collapses, including saws, hydraulic shores 
and tools, search cameras, listening equipment, and other assets to affect rescu  in 
collapse situations.  Each time these units are dispatched, they respond with a rescue 
company. 
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APPENDIX B: FIRE STATION LOCATIONS 
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APPENDIX C: NORTHEAST BLOCK GROUPS 
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APPENDIX D: NORTHWEST BLOCK GROUPS 
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APPENDIX E: SOUTHEAST BLOCK GROUPS 
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APPENDIX F: SOUTHWEST BLOCK GROUPS 
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APPENDIX G: MAPPED RESIDUALS FOR OVERALL DEMAND 
Sample Block Groups (n=118) 
Standardized residuals mapped for multivariate regression model 
(all demographic variables = independent & DEMAND = dependent) 
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APENDIX H: MAPPED RESIDUALS FOR BIVARIATE DEMAND 
 
 
Sample Block Groups (n=118) 
Standardized residuals mapped for bivariate regression model 
(>65 year old = independent variable & DEMAND = dependent variable) 
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APENDIX I: MAPPED RESIDUALS for BIVARIATE FIREDEMAND 
 
 
Sample Block Groups (n=118) 
Standardized residuals mapped for bivariate regression model 
(>65 year old = independent variable & FIREDEMAND = dependent variable) 
 
